Career concerns, shareholder monitoring and investment efficiency: From the perspective of compensation contract rigidity in Chinese SOEs

作     者：Hualin Wan Kai Zhu Xinyuan Chen 

作者机构：Lixin Accounting Research Institute/School of Accounting and Finance Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce Institute of Accounting and Finance Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Institute of Accounting and Finance/School of Accountancy Shanghai University of Finance and Economics 

出 版 物：《China Journal of Accounting Research》 (中国会计学刊（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2015年第8卷第1期

页      面：59-73页

学科分类：12[管理学] 0202[经济学-应用经济学] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 0201[经济学-理论经济学] 

基　　金：support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.70972060,71102013 and 71272008) National Accounting Leader(Reserve)Personnel Training Plan(Academic Class) Humanities and Social Science Research Foundation of the Ministry of Education of China(Nos.11JJD790008,13YJC790041 and 14JJD630005) Innovation Program of the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission(Nos.11ZS186 and 14ZS157) the "Shu Guang" project supported by the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission and Shanghai Education Development Foundation(No.10SG54) the "211" Key Project of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics 

主　　题：Career concerns Shareholder monitoring Investment 

摘      要：This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer(CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs) during the 1999–2007 period and find that there is a significant decline in investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement, relative to other periods, and that this decline becomes less significant under stronger shareholder supervision. Our research furthers understanding of the significance of SOE incentive and monitoring mechanisms.