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COORDINATING A TWO-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN THROUGH DIFFERENT CONTRACTS UNDER PRICE AND PROMOTIONAL EFFORT-DEPENDENT DEMAND

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Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering 2013年第3期22卷 295-318页

作者： B.C.GIRI S.BARDHAN T.MAITI Department of Mathematics Jadavpur UniversityIndia

Retail price and promotional effort are two important parameters on which demand of a commodity largely depends. This paper develops and analyzes a two-echelon supply chain where market demand depends on both retail price and sales effort. The centralized model is studied as the benchmark case, and the wholesale price-only contract is studied as the base case in which each entity tries to maximize its individual profit. Different contract mechanisms are implemented to outperform the base case in terms of both total chain＇s as well as individual profits. Comparisons among the coordinating contracts are provided so that any entity may choose the better one from available contracts after the contract parameters are negotiated. The model is extensively examined through a numerical example.

关键词： Price and effort-dependent demand wholesale price-only contract wholesale price discount revenue sharing profit sharing two-part tariff

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Audit Mechanisms to Select Alliance Member of Industrial Clusters in Scenic Spot

Audit Mechanisms to Select Alliance Member of Industrial Clu...

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战略与管理工程：企业、环境与危机——2009战略管理国际会议

作者： LU Jihua ZHAO Xi'nan DAi Xunfeng School of Business Administration Northeastern University

Based on the Principal-Agent theory and the assumption of fixed cost and audit cost and utility retention,the alliance leader of the industrial clusters in the scenic spot has to design excellent audit mechanisms to select the alliance member,and to enable every alliance member to participate actively in the alliance and work harder for it for implementing the efficient resource allocation,according to the correlativity of private information actually offered by each and every alliance *** study is done with the intention of solving the profit sharing problem in a industrial cluster of the scenic spot based on asymmetric information in accordance to how a member worked and what and how much information a member *** also provides a theoretical base to a certain degree to solve the problem of alliance member selection of such industrial cluster of the scenic spot.

关键词： Industrial Cluster Scenic Spot Audit Mechanism profit sharing

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