Audit Mechanisms to Select Alliance Member of Industrial Clusters in Scenic Spot
作者单位：School of Business AdministrationNortheastern University
会议名称：《战略与管理工程：企业、环境与危机——2009战略管理国际会议》
会议日期：2009年
学科分类：120201[管理学-会计学] 12[管理学] 120203[管理学-旅游管理] 1202[管理学-工商管理]
关 键 词：Industrial Cluster Scenic Spot Audit Mechanism Profit Sharing
摘 要：Based on the Principal-Agent theory and the assumption of fixed cost and audit cost and utility retention,the alliance leader of the industrial clusters in the scenic spot has to design excellent audit mechanisms to select the alliance member,and to enable every alliance member to participate actively in the alliance and work harder for it for implementing the efficient resource allocation,according to the correlativity of private information actually offered by each and every alliance *** study is done with the intention of solving the profit sharing problem in a industrial cluster of the scenic spot based on asymmetric information in accordance to how a member worked and what and how much information a member *** also provides a theoretical base to a certain degree to solve the problem of alliance member selection of such industrial cluster of the scenic spot.