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Incentive Contracts for Venture Capital Syndication

Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University(English Edition) 2007年第1期15卷 49-54页

作者：张新立杨德礼 School of Management Dalian University of TechologyDalian 116024 China School of Mathematics Liaoning Normal UniversityDalian 116021 China School of Management Dalian University of TechologyDalian 116024 China

Aiming at the incentive problems of venture capital syndication at the second and later stages, an game model is set up by principal agent and incentive theory, given that the lead venture capitalist has already some knowledge of the project quality from his initial funding of the project. Under symmetric and asymmetric information, the model analyzes how the optimal syndication contracts induce venture capitalists to truthfully reveal their information to each other, and vary with the level of venture capitalists＇ expertise and information in evaluating projects.

关键词： Venture capital. Syndication asymmetric information Incentive contract

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Empirical evidence on holdup behavior by Japan banks

Empirical evidence on holdup behavior by Japan banks

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公司财务研讨会

作者： Jun YAO Department of Accountancy, City University of Hong Kong 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong

＜正＞ Some theoretical articles reveal that inside banks may use their information monopoly power to extract rent from their clients. Consistent with this holdup hypothesis, Houston and James （1996） find a significantly negative relation between loan-to-debt ratio and growth for firms using a single bank in U.S. For the cases in Japan, however, the results are inconclusive. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein （1991） find a negative relation between loan-to-debt ratio and growth for Keiretsu firms while Anderson and Makhija （1999） find it is positive no matter the firms are Keiretsu affiliated or not. With a non-linear specification, this research reconciles those seemingly conflicting results and successfully identifies the holdup behavior by Japan banks.

关键词： Debt Mix Banking relationship Rent Extraction Growth asymmetric information

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Joint Pricing-Production Quantity Decision Under Consignment Contract With Revenue Sharing When Manufacturing Cost Is asymmetric

Joint Pricing-Production Quantity Decision Under Consignment...

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2010 Chinese Control and Decision Conference

作者： Dan Li~(1,2),Jiafu Tang~1 1.School of information Science and Engineering,Northeastern University,Shenyang,110004,China 2.School of Business Administration,Shenyang University,Shenyang,Liaoning 110041,China

＜正＞In a two-echelon supply chain under consignment contract with revenue sharing,firstly,the manufacturer reports his manufacturing cost to the retailer;secondly,for each item sold,the retailer deducts a percentage from the selling price and remits the balance to the supplier according to the manufacturer’s manufacturing cost reported;thirdly, the supplier decides on the retail price and delivery quantity for his product,and retains ownership of the *** maximize her own profit,the manufacturer will misreport his manufacturing cost for asymmetric *** this paper we show that there is a unique solution in *** elegant analytical results allowed us to know how the supplier decides on the retail price and delivery quantity for his *** our research,we also know how the supplier’ s decision changes with system parameters.

关键词： Misreporting Consignment Contract Revenue Sharing Supply Chain Management asymmetric information

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THE RATCHET EFFECT UNDER COURNOT RIVALRY

THE RATCHET EFFECT UNDER COURNOT RIVALRY

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The 4th International Conference on Management

作者： RobertD.Cairns Department of Economics McGill University

We discuss the ratchet effect in a Cournot equilibrium among identical firms which can writepooling or separating contracts with workers of two different qualities. Even in this simple model, theoperation of the ratchet effect is much more complicated than in nonrivalrous situations. We also con-sider implications of such contracting for two different limiting competitive equilibria.

关键词： Ratchet Effect Cournot Oligopoly asymmetric information Workers’ Rents

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Ex Ante versus Ex Post Expectation Damages:Does the“Lower of the Two”Approach Make Sense?

Ex Ante versus Ex Post Expectation Damages:Does the“Lower o...

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2011年（第九届）“中国法经济学论坛”

作者： Zhiyong Liu Georgia State University Ronen Avraham University of Texas

What information should courts utilize when assessing contract damages? Should they award damages at the ex ante rationally foreseeable level (ex ante expected damages)? Or should they award damages at the ex post level incorporating new information revealed after contracting (ex post actual damages)? This article shows that ex ante expectation damages are more efficient than ex post actual damages through a simple model of costly litigation for contract breach,where there are either costs of verifying the breach victim’s ex post damages,or general litigation costs such as lawyer *** should award foreseeable flat damages,rather than seeking ex post accuracy and awarding actual damages,because actual damages lead to distortions in breach incentives once we take parties’ litigation decisions as *** costly litigation,the distortion induced by the actual damages remedy may be over-breach or under-breach depending on whether the American or the English rule applies and on how large the litigation cost is,a result different from the under-breach equilibrium in Avraham and Liu (2009),which did not consider litigation *** find that regardless of the direction of the distortion,actual damages induce *** ante damages are more efficient not only because of its relatively low informational demand,but more importantly because of the insensitivity of parties’ litigation decision to their ex post private *** results are robust to accounting for renegotiation.

关键词： Breach of Contract asymmetric information Expectation Interest Renegotiation

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Financial Contract Model of Credit Guarantee under the Condition of Risk-limitation

Financial Contract Model of Credit Guarantee under the Condi...

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第24届中国控制与决策会议

作者： Xiaoling Cui 1 , Dan Wang 1 , Yunfeng Wang 2 1. School of Economics and Management, Liaoning Shihua University, Fushun 113001, China2. PetroChina Fushun Petrochemical Company, Fushun, 113008, China

In order to control credit guarantee risk, it has built a credit guarantee financial contract model under the condition of risk limitation. The strategy of credit guarantee institution may be decided by its risk limit. There are many factors that decide critical risk of credit guarantee institution together. The analysis result has shown that credit guarantee institution may agree to guarantee or refuse to guarantee for SME according to the interval of retained earnings of SME. When the retained earnings of SME is in the interval, credit guarantee institution can make the optimal strategy, otherwise, it can’t. The conclusion can direct credit guarantee practice effectively.

关键词： Credit Guarantee asymmetric information Financial Contract Model Risk Limit

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Financial Contract Model of Credit Guarantee Based on Default Rate

Financial Contract Model of Credit Guarantee Based on Defaul...

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2010 Chinese Control and Decision Conference

作者： Xiaoling Cui~1,Yunfeng Wang~2 1.School of Economics and Management,Liaoning Shihua University,Fushun 113001,China 2.PetroChina Fushun Petrochemical Company,Fushun,113008,China

＜正＞In order to make credit guarantee contract more scientific and subjective,it has built a credit guarantee financial contract model with default repayment factor *** analysis result has shown that credit guarantee institution may agree to guarantee or refuse to guarantee for SME when the retained earnings of SME is *** is a critical value of retained earnings for SME when the retained earnings is over zero. When it is over the critical value,the optimal strategy of credit guarantee institution may be to guarantee all application to obtain bank loan for SME according to the allocation proportion for credit guarantee risk with *** it is less than the critical value,credit guarantee institution is willing to guarantee part of application to obtain bank loan for SME,that is,credit guarantee may carry out credit guarantee rationing.

关键词： Credit Guarantee asymmetric information Financial Contract Model Default Rate

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会计信息可比性与新三板公司定向增发

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财务与会计导刊（理论版） 2018年第1期 26-35页

作者：郑琦李常安

论文研究了会计信息可比性对新三板公司定向增发的影响。以同行业上市公司作为新三板公司对标，研究发现新三板公司会计信息可比性越高，所能吸引的参加定向增发认购的投资者数量越多；其次提高会计信息可比性能吸引更多新投资者认购，... 详细信息

论文研究了会计信息可比性对新三板公司定向增发的影响。以同行业上市公司作为新三板公司对标，研究发现新三板公司会计信息可比性越高，所能吸引的参加定向增发认购的投资者数量越多；其次提高会计信息可比性能吸引更多新投资者认购，而未能吸引更多原投资者认购，且在一定程度上会计信息可比性和盈余透明度存在替代关系。再次，会计信息可比性较高的公司，定向增发的发行市盈率和发行市净率更高。最后，提高会计信息可比性使得信息在投资者之间的分布更加均衡、降低投资者之间意见分歧。本文研究表明新三板公司可以从提高会计信息可比性入手，降低投资者承担的信息不对称风险，从而降低资本成本和提高公司价值。

关键词：会计信息可比性新三板公司定向增发信息不对称 financial statement comparability NEEQ firm private equity placement asymmetric information

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灰色市场下考虑非对称信息的制造商质量披露及定价策略

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管理科学 2021年第2期

作者：蒋忠中赵金龙弋泽龙秦绪伟

针对灰色市场条件下产品质量为非对称信息的情形，构建由一个制造商、一个灰色市场投机者和顾客组成的Stackelberg博弈模型，研究了制造商的质量披露及定价策略。研究表明，在产品质量和低价市场顾客支付意愿较低时，制造商的质量披露... 详细信息

针对灰色市场条件下产品质量为非对称信息的情形，构建由一个制造商、一个灰色市场投机者和顾客组成的Stackelberg博弈模型，研究了制造商的质量披露及定价策略。研究表明，在产品质量和低价市场顾客支付意愿较低时，制造商的质量披露策略是向顾客隐藏质量信息，反之则向顾客披露质量信息；在定价策略方面，随着低价市场顾客支付意愿的提高，制造商可通过不断缩小高、低价两个市场的价格差与灰市投机者进行竞争。进一步地，通过与产品质量对称信息情形对比分析发现，虽然非对称信息情形下制造商具有信息优势，但制造商不一定能够获得更高的利润，且其利润并不总是受到灰市投机者的影响。最后，通过将模型进一步扩展到制造商进行质量研发，即质量为内生时的情形，结果表明上述研究结论具有较好的一致性和普适性，可为灰色市场下制造商质量披露与定价提供有益的管理启示。

关键词：灰色市场非对称信息 Stackelberg博弈质量披露定价策略 gray market asymmetric information Stackelberg game quality disclosure pricing strategy

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信息不对称理论之教学思考

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教育学 2014年第2期

作者：张炳林杨改学

在教学活动中，教学信息不对称表现为“师生知识相离”、“教师知识包含学生知识”、“学生知识包含教师知识”、“师生知识有交叉又有不对称”等状态。教师拥有一定的不对称教学知识是教学开展的前提，然而，研究“教师—学生”博弈模... 详细信息

在教学活动中，教学信息不对称表现为“师生知识相离”、“教师知识包含学生知识”、“学生知识包含教师知识”、“师生知识有交叉又有不对称”等状态。教师拥有一定的不对称教学知识是教学开展的前提，然而，研究“教师—学生”博弈模型发现，教师会以对自己有利的努力方式来获得最优化的利益。事实上，教学信息的“对称”与“不对称”对教学效果的影响各有利弊。教学中，教师应充分利用信息的对称部分、合理创设不对称、促进不对称向对称的转化。

关键词：信息不对称教学表征博弈模型教学启示 asymmetric information features of teaching game-model teaching revelation

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