Incentive Contracts for Venture Capital Syndication
Incentive Contracts for Venture Capital Syndication作者机构：School of Management Dalian University of TechologyDalian 116024 China School of Mathematics Liaoning Normal UniversityDalian 116021 China School of Management Dalian University of TechologyDalian 116024 China
出 版 物：《Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University(English Edition)》 (西南交通大学学报（英文版）)
年 卷 期：2007年第15卷第1期
页 面：49-54页
学科分类：12[管理学] 120204[管理学-技术经济及管理] 1202[管理学-工商管理]
主 题：Venture capital. Syndication Asymmetric information Incentive contract
摘 要：Aiming at the incentive problems of venture capital syndication at the second and later stages, an game model is set up by principal agent and incentive theory, given that the lead venture capitalist has already some knowledge of the project quality from his initial funding of the project. Under symmetric and asymmetric information, the model analyzes how the optimal syndication contracts induce venture capitalists to truthfully reveal their information to each other, and vary with the level of venture capitalists＇ expertise and information in evaluating projects.
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