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On-demand cut off the covert channel to mitigate meltdown

Science China(Information Sciences) 2021年第9期64卷 244-246页

作者： Yusong TAN Baozi CHEN Liehuang ZHU Qingbo WU Peng ZOU Yuanzhang LI College of Computer Science National University of Defense Technology School of Computer Science and Technology Beijing Institute of Technology

Dear editor,Recently, researchers have discovered a new kind of attack named Meltdown [1] that exploits the out-of-order execution behavior of modern processors and side-channels. The adversary can use this method to overcome the memory isolation that is protected by a processor and read the entire kernel memory of a machine it executes on. Mitigating this new attack is thought to be expensive at the moment because current solutions are based on common optimization techniques for modern processors.

关键词： Security Vulnerability Meltdown Attack System Performance Cache Attack Microarchitecture Attack side channel

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Malware Guard Extension:abusing Intel SGX to conceal cache attacks

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Cybersecurity 2020年第1期3卷 22-41页

作者： Michael Schwarz Samuel Weiser Daniel Gruss Clementine Maurice Stefan Mangard Graz University of Technology GrazAustria CNRS IRISARennesFrance.

In modern computer systems,user processes are isolated from each other by the operating system and the ***,in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hypervisor isolates tenants from other tenants that are co-located on the same physical ***,the hypervisor does not protect tenants against the cloud provider and thus,the supplied operating system and *** SGX provides a mechanism that addresses this *** aims at protecting user-level software from attacks from other processes,the operating system,and even physical *** this paper,we demonstrate fine-grained software-based side-channel attacks from a malicious SGX enclave targeting co-located *** attack is the first malware running on real SGX hardware,abusing SGX protection features to conceal ***,we demonstrate our attack both in a native environment and across multiple Docker *** perform a Prime+Probe cache side-channel attack on a co-located SGX enclave running an up-to-date RSA implementation that uses a constant-time multiplication *** attack works,although in SGX enclaves,there are no timers,no large pages,no physical addresses,and no shared *** a semi-synchronous attack,we extract 96%of an RSA private key from a single *** extract the full RSA private key in an automated attack from 11 traces within 5 min.

关键词： Intel SGX side channel side-channel attack Prime+Probe

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