On-demand cut off the covert channel to mitigate meltdown

作     者：Yusong TAN Baozi CHEN Liehuang ZHU Qingbo WU Peng ZOU Yuanzhang LI Yusong TAN;Baozi CHEN;Liehuang ZHU;Qingbo WU;Peng ZOU;Yuanzhang LI

作者机构：College of Computer Science National University of Defense Technology School of Computer Science and Technology Beijing Institute of Technology 

出 版 物：《Science China(Information Sciences)》 (中国科学:信息科学(英文版))

年 卷 期：2021年第64卷第9期

页      面：244-246页

核心收录：

学科分类：11[军事学] 1105[军事学-军队指挥学] 0839[工学-网络空间安全] 08[工学] 110505[军事学-密码学] 110503[军事学-军事通信学] 

基　　金：supported by National S&T Major Project of China (Grant No. 2016ZX01040101) National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61602498, 61872444) 

主　　题：Security Vulnerability Meltdown Attack System Performance Cache Attack Microarchitecture Attack Side Channel 

摘      要：Dear editor,Recently, researchers have discovered a new kind of attack named Meltdown [1] that exploits the out-of-order execution behavior of modern processors and side-channels. The adversary can use this method to overcome the memory isolation that is protected by a processor and read the entire kernel memory of a machine it executes on. Mitigating this new attack is thought to be expensive at the moment because current solutions are based on common optimization techniques for modern processors.