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evolutionary games in a generalized Moran process with arbitrary selection strength and mutation

Chinese Physics B 2011年第3期20卷 21-26页

作者：全吉王先甲 Institute of Systems Engineering Wuhan University Economics and Management School Wuhan University

By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals＇ payoff accumulating from games is mapped into fitness using an exponent function. Both selection strength β and mutation rate ε are considered. The process is an ergodic birth-death process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we give the analysis results for which strategy will be favoured when s is small enough. The results depend on not only the payoff matrix of the game, but also on the population size. Especially, we prove that natural selection favours the strategy which is risk-dominant when the population size is large enough. For arbitrary β and ε values, the ＇Hawk-Dove＇ game and the ＇Coordinate＇ game are used to illustrate our model. We give the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games and compare the results with those of the replicator dynamics in the infinite population. The results are determined by simulation experiments.

关键词： evolutionary games fitness-dependent Moran process birth-death process evolutionary stable strategy

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evolutionary Game Analysis on Innovation strategy of Enterprises

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Innovation Strategy of Enterpr...

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2009中国控制与决策会议

作者： Lu Fang-yuan~1,Jiao Ke-yan~2 1.Business School,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China 2.Information Engineering department,Henan College of Finance & Taxation,Zhengzhou 450002,China

＜正＞This paper studies how does the individual enterprise of the middle and large-sized enterprises clusters choose its own innovation strategy between independent innovation strategy and imitative innovation strategy and what effect does its choice have on itself and the whole society through evolutionary game *** conclusions reveal that on one hand,the government’s most basic policy on encouraging enterprises to innovate is the sound system of intellectual property rights protection;on the other hand,the government may adjust the ratio of the enterprises which make independent innovation to the enterprises which make imitative innovation in the middle and large-sized enterprises clusters by tax policy,cost subsidies and so on,so as to make this innovation ratio more reasonable and more stable.

关键词： National student loan evolutionary game Duplicative dynamic evolutionary stable strategy

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evolutionary stable Strategies for Supply Chains: Selfishness,Fairness, and Altruism

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Journal of Systems Science and Information 2018年第6期9卷 532-551页

作者： Caichun CHAI Hailong ZHU Zhangwei FENG Institute of Game Behavior and Operations Management Nanjing University of Finance and Economics Institute of Applied Mathematics Anhui University of Finance and Economics School of Engineering and Management Nanjing University

The management strategies of a firm are inevitable affected by individual behavior preferences. The effect of individual preference on the evolutionary dynamics for supply chains is studied by employing replicator dynamics. Each firm has three behavior preferences: selfishness, fairness, and altruism. Firstly, the case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers including two pure strategies is considered and the effect of preference parameter on the equilibrium outcome in the shortterm interaction is discussed. Secondly, the equilibrium state in the short-term is always disturbed because the change of the environment, firm’s structure, and so forth. Using the replicator dynamics,the evolutionary stable strategies of manufacturers and retailers in the long-term interaction are analyzed. Finally, the extend case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers include three pure strategies is investigated. These results are found that the strategy profile in which both manufacturer and retailer choose fairness or altruism, or one player chooses fair or altruistic strategy and the other player chooses selfish strategy may be evolutionary stable, the stability of these equilibria depends on the the preference parameters.

关键词： stability evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium preference

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Research on the Electric Energy Metering Data Sharing Method in Smart Grid Based on Blockchain

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Journal on Big Data 2023年第1期5卷 57-67页

作者： Shaocheng Wu Honghao Liang Xiaowei Chen Tao Liu Junpeng Ru Qianhong Gong Jin Li Shenzhen Power Supply Co. Ltd.Shenzhen518001China School of Cyberspace Security Beijing University of Posts and TelecommunicationsBeijing100876China Key Laboratory of Trustworthy Distributed Computing and Service(BUPT) Beijing100876China

Enabling data sharing among smart grid power suppliers is a pressing challenge due to technical hurdles in verifying,storing,and synchronizing energy metering *** and sharing limitations are stringent for users,power companies,and researchers,demanding significant resources and time for permissions and *** paper proposes a blockchain-based architecture for secure and efficient sharing of electric energy metering ***,we propose a data sharing model based on evolutionary game *** on the Lyapunov stability theory,the model’s evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)is *** results verify the correctness and practicability of the scheme proposed in this paper,and provide a new method for realizing convenient,safe and fast data sharing.

关键词： Smart grid data sharing blockchain evolutionary stable strategy

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evolutionary Game Analysis on Contributing Factors of Confirming Storage Financing Mode’s Credit Risk

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Contributing Factors of Confir...

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第30届中国控制与决策会议

作者： ZHANG Lang FENG Xian FAN Tingting HU Haiqing Xi’an University of Technology School of Economics and Management

This paper constructed an evolutionary game model which reveals the lending behavior between commercial banks, core suppliers and small and medium enterprises（SMEs） under the confirming storage financing mode. It turns out that under confirming storage financing mode, short-term commercial bank lending rates, storage and regulation cost, probabilities of joint loan fraud within SMEs and their counterparties, probabilities for counterparties to abide by the repurchase agreements, pledge’s ending price, SMEs’ profit margin and penalties supply chains enforce to SMEs for default are significant factors, which have influence on SMEs’ default probabilities and probabilities of commercial banks’ credit supply. Meanwhile, lending rates, probabilities of joint loan fraud between buyers and vendors within the supply chain and penalties supply chains enforce to the default party are playing a significant role for the strategy choice of commercial banks and SMEs.

关键词： Confirming Storage Financing Credit Risk evolutionary Game evolutionary stable strategy

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Under the Limited Rational Conditions the Games between the Investors in Securities

Under the Limited Rational Conditions the Games between the ...

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第十五届工业工程与工程管理国际会议

作者： Cheng Wei Wang Hailong Zeng Xiaodan School of Management Shenyang University Shenyang P.R.China 110044

＜正＞The game between buyer and seller in stock market is inevitable due to their common purpose of gaining profits. The classical supposition in the traditional game theory is the complete rational person,and it does not match reality in serious ***,the game theory was improved by using the concept of a limited rational of game theory and introducing of the dynamic reproduction *** Game methods was applied to the stock market,and then made the dynamic reproduction thinking combined with the binary *** built a dynamic stability strategy in the prediction model,which can guide securities investors for a more rational investment.

关键词： Limited Rationality evolutionary Game Theory evolutionary stable strategy

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基于仓单质押融资的物流企业与银行的演化博弈分析

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物流管理 2018年第9期

作者：柴正猛段黎黎

物流企业与银行之间的良好合作关系是物流金融业务继续发展的前提和基础。以仓单质押融资业务为例，运用演化博弈理论对物流企业与银行之间的监督包庇问题进行了分析，构建复制动态方程和运用动态相位图分析群体策略的演化过程及结果，... 详细信息

物流企业与银行之间的良好合作关系是物流金融业务继续发展的前提和基础。以仓单质押融资业务为例，运用演化博弈理论对物流企业与银行之间的监督包庇问题进行了分析，构建复制动态方程和运用动态相位图分析群体策略的演化过程及结果，为建立良好的合作关系提供理论依据。分析结果表明：该动态系统的演化方向受到博弈支付矩阵以及系统的初始状态的影响。银行监督成本、银行的收益损失、物流企业的包庇成本和物流企业的罚金是影响演化结果的关键性因素。通过外部力量的加入，可促使系统演化至(不包庇，不监督)这一期望演化稳定策略。

关键词：仓单质押合作演化均衡演化稳定策略 warehouse receipts financing cooperation evolutionary equilibrium evolutionary stable strategy

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