Evolutionary Game Analysis on Contributing Factors of Confirming Storage Financing Mode’s Credit Risk
作者单位：Xi’an University of Technology School of Economics and Management
会议名称：《第30届中国控制与决策会议》
会议日期：2018年
学科分类：12[管理学] 120202[管理学-企业管理（含：财务管理、市场营销、人力资源管理）] 02[经济学] 0202[经济学-应用经济学] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 020204[经济学-金融学（含∶保险学）]
基 金：supported by National Nature Science Foundation projects 71672144、71372173 Shaanxi Soft Science Research Program projects 2017KRM057、2017KRM059 Humanities and Social Sciences Special projects of Shaanxi Education Department 15JK1547 Xi’an University of Technology school-level funds 2015TS008、105-400211414
关 键 词：Confirming Storage Financing Credit Risk Evolutionary Game Evolutionary Stable Strategy
摘 要：This paper constructed an evolutionary game model which reveals the lending behavior between commercial banks, core suppliers and small and medium enterprises（SMEs） under the confirming storage financing mode. It turns out that under confirming storage financing mode, short-term commercial bank lending rates, storage and regulation cost, probabilities of joint loan fraud within SMEs and their counterparties, probabilities for counterparties to abide by the repurchase agreements, pledge’s ending price, SMEs’ profit margin and penalties supply chains enforce to SMEs for default are significant factors, which have influence on SMEs’ default probabilities and probabilities of commercial banks’ credit supply. Meanwhile, lending rates, probabilities of joint loan fraud between buyers and vendors within the supply chain and penalties supply chains enforce to the default party are playing a significant role for the strategy choice of commercial banks and SMEs.