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RTRC:A Reputation-Based Incentive Game Model for Trustworthy Crowdsourcing Service

China Communications 2016年第12期13卷 199-215页

作者： Xindi Ma Jianfeng Ma Hui Li Qi Jiang Sheng Gao School of Computer Science and Technology Xidian University School of Cyber Engineering Xidian University School of Computer & Software Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology School of Information Central University of Finance and Economics

The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds may be reluctant to join and contribute information. Thus, the low participation level of crowds will be a hurdle that prevents the adoption of crowdsourcing. A critical challenge for these systems is how to design a proper mechanism such that the crowds spontaneously act as suppliers to contribute accurate information. Most of existing mechanisms ignore either the honesty of crowds or requesters respectively. In this paper, considering the honesty of both, we propose a game-based incentive mechanism, namely RTRC, to stimulate the crowds to contribute accurate information and to motivate the requesters to return accurate feedbacks. In addition, an evolutionary game is designed to model the dynamic of user-strategy selection. Specially, the replicator dynamic is applied to model the adaptation of strategy interactions taking into account the dynamic nature in time dependence and we also derive the evolutionarily stable strategies(ESSs) for users. Finally, empirical results over the simulations show that all the requesters and suppliers will select honest strategy to maximize their profit.

关键词： crowdsourcing system evolutionary game theory evolutionarily stable strategy incentive mechanism

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A tripartite evolutionary game analysis of providing subsidies for pick-up/drop-off strategy in carpooling problem

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Autonomous Intelligent Systems 2023年第1期3卷 50-65页

作者： Zeyuan Yan Li Li Hui Zhao Yazan Mualla Ansar Yasar College of Electronics and Information Engineering Tongji UniversityShanghai201804China. Shanghai Research Institute for Intelligent Autonomous Systems Shanghai201203China. Shanghai Institute of Intelligent Science and Technology Tongji UniversityShanghai201804China. UTBM CIAD UMR 7533F-90010 Belfort cedexFrance. IMOB Hasselt UniversityMaartelarenlaan 423500 HasseltBelgium.

Although the pick-up/drop-off(PUDO)strategy in carpooling offers the convenience of short-distance walking for passengers during boarding and disembarking,there is a noticeable hesitancy among commuters to adopt this travel method,despite its numerous ***,this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game theory(EGT)model to verify the evolutionary stability of choosing the PUDO strategy of drivers and passengers and offering subsidies strategy of carpooling platforms in carpooling *** model presented in this paper serves as a valuable tool for assessing the dissemination and implementation of PUDO strategy and offering subsidies strategy in carpooling ***,an empirical analysis is conducted to examine and compare the sensitivity of the parameters across various *** findings suggest that:firstly,providing subsidies to passengers and drivers,along with deductions for drivers through carpooling platforms,is an effective way to promote wider adoption of the PUDO ***,the decision-making process is divided into three stages:initial stage,middle stage,and mature *** strategy progresses from initial rejection to widespread acceptance among drivers in the middle stage and,in the mature stage,both passengers and drivers tend to adopt it under carpooling platform subsidies;the factors influencing the costs of waiting and walking times,as well as the subsidies granted to passengers,are essential determinants that require careful consideration by passengers,drivers,and carpooling platforms when choosing the PUDO *** work provides valuable insight into the PUDO strategy’s applicability and the declared results provide implications for traffic managers and carpooling platforms to offer a suitable incentive.

关键词： Carpooling problem Pick-up/drop-off strategy Offering subsidies strategy Tripartite evolutionary game theory evolutionarily stable strategy

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Habitat destruction may lead to highly female-biased sex ratios

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Journal of Chongqing University 2017年第3期16卷 93-97页

作者：王亚强 Institute of Mathematics and Information Science Baoji University of Arts and SciencesBaoji 721013Shaanxi ProvinceP.R.China

Local mate competition(LMC) was firstly used to explain extra-ordinary female-biased sex ratios. However, some observations have found that the sex ratios of some species are more female-biased than the predictions of LMC and its extensions; there is not yet a theory that accounts for the mechanisms of more female-biased sex ratio. Here, we assume that LMC occurs at a destructed habitat that reduces the resource for production, and present a new extension for the LMC model. Consequently, our model shows that the evolutionarily stable strategy(ESS) for sex ratio depends on two parameters: the number of foundresses and the degree of habitat destruction. Moreover, the sex ratio decreases as the degree of habitat destruction increases, i.e., the proportion of female increases. These results generally agree with experimental data, and may provide a new basis for the evolution of female-biased sex ratios in local mate competition and a new theory support for conservation of some species.

关键词： local mate competition habitat destruction sex ratio evolutionarily stable strategy

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On evolutionarily stable Strategies

On Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

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第40届中国控制会议

作者： Xiao Zhang Yaqi Hao Daizhan Cheng Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science Chinese Academy of Sciences

evolutionarily stable strategy（ESS） is an essential concept in the research of biological evolution. By putting ESS under a metric space framework, this paper proposes a relaxed definition of ESS which is more suitable for the investigation of finite evolutionary games（EGs）, that is, the ESS with stability radius. Based on the new definition, stability and stabilization of EGs and EGs with control are studied respectively.

关键词： Evolutionary game evolutionarily stable strategy semi-tensor product of matrices metric space

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基于演化博弈模型的产业集群式转移条件及政策适配性研究

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产业经济 2015年第5期

作者：李停

集群式产业转移是有限理性的企业在产业转移过程中的合作，是群体决策、调整及决策稳定的过程。基于演化博弈模型，针对自由市场和引入政府干预两种情形下集群式产业转移条件的研究表明，在产业集群式转移过程中，下游企业复制动态演化... 详细信息

集群式产业转移是有限理性的企业在产业转移过程中的合作，是群体决策、调整及决策稳定的过程。基于演化博弈模型，针对自由市场和引入政府干预两种情形下集群式产业转移条件的研究表明，在产业集群式转移过程中，下游企业复制动态演化博弈存在唯一的均衡策略；而上游企业复制动态演化博弈存在两个稳定均衡策略，既有可能收敛于全部转移，也有可能收敛于全部不转移。政府补贴或者惩罚虽不能确保集群式产业转移，但加大了产业集群式转移成功的概率，但在实践中应正确把握承接地政府补贴和转出地政府惩罚的“度”的问题。

关键词：集群式产业转移有限理性演化博弈进化稳定策略 industrial clustering transfer bounded rationality evolutionary game model evolutionarily stable strategy

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突发公共卫生事件中地方政府与社会公众间的演化博弈研究

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管理科学 2022年第4期

作者：许智琪程郁琨姚双良

近年来，突发公共卫生事件频发，社会公众与地方政府相互配合是及时、高效解决突发公共卫生事件的必然选择。本文以全球抗击新冠肺炎疫情为背景，讨论在突发公共卫生事件中社会公众与地方政府之间的博弈关系，基于有限理性假设，构建演... 详细信息

近年来，突发公共卫生事件频发，社会公众与地方政府相互配合是及时、高效解决突发公共卫生事件的必然选择。本文以全球抗击新冠肺炎疫情为背景，讨论在突发公共卫生事件中社会公众与地方政府之间的博弈关系，基于有限理性假设，构建演化博弈模型，分析博弈双方决策行为的动态调整过程，得到在不同条件下社会公众和地方政府的演化稳定策略。同时，利用MATLAB进行仿真实验，分析在博弈过程中政府的奖惩、上级部门的处罚等主要因素对博弈双方策略选择的影响。研究结果表明，完善相关的补贴政策，普及疫情防控的相关法律法规，加大对社会公众随意流动、违反疫情相关规章制度的惩罚力度，提高对地方政府宽松防疫的处罚等措施可以有效促进社会公众和地方政府之间的相互协作，最终实现共同积极防疫。

关键词：演化博弈突发公共卫生事件演化稳定策略 evolutionary game public health emergencies evolutionarily stable strategy

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