RTRC:A Reputation-Based Incentive Game Model for Trustworthy Crowdsourcing Service

作     者：Xindi Ma Jianfeng Ma Hui Li Qi Jiang Sheng Gao 

作者机构：School of Computer Science and TechnologyXidian University School of Cyber EngineeringXidian University School of Computer & SoftwareNanjing University of Information Science & Technology School of InformationCentral University of Finance and Economics 

出 版 物：《China Communications》 (中国通信（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2016年第13卷第12期

页      面：199-215页

核心收录：

学科分类：12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 07[理学] 070105[理学-运筹学与控制论] 0701[理学-数学] 

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61672408, U1405255, 61502368, 61602537, 61602357, 61672413, U1509214, U1135002) National High Technology Research and Development Program (863 Program) (Grant Nos. 2015AA016007, 2015AA017203) China Postdoctoral Science Foundation Funded Project (Grant No.2016M592762) Shaanxi Science & Technology Coordination & Innovation Project (Grant No.2016TZC-G-6-3) Shaanxi Provincial Natural Science Foundation (Grant Nos. 2015JQ6227, 2016JM6005) China 111 Project (Grant No. B16037) Beijing Municipal Social Science Foundation(Grant No. 16XCC023) Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant Nos. JB150308, JB150309, JB161501, JBG161511) 

主　　题：crowdsourcing system evolutionary game theory evolutionarily stable strategy incentive mechanism 

摘      要：The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds may be reluctant to join and contribute information. Thus, the low participation level of crowds will be a hurdle that prevents the adoption of crowdsourcing. A critical challenge for these systems is how to design a proper mechanism such that the crowds spontaneously act as suppliers to contribute accurate information. Most of existing mechanisms ignore either the honesty of crowds or requesters respectively. In this paper, considering the honesty of both, we propose a game-based incentive mechanism, namely RTRC, to stimulate the crowds to contribute accurate information and to motivate the requesters to return accurate feedbacks. In addition, an evolutionary game is designed to model the dynamic of user-strategy selection. Specially, the replicator dynamic is applied to model the adaptation of strategy interactions taking into account the dynamic nature in time dependence and we also derive the evolutionarily stable strategies(ESSs) for users. Finally, empirical results over the simulations show that all the requesters and suppliers will select honest strategy to maximize their profit.