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Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering 2022年第5期31卷 534-562页

作者： Caiyun Liu kebing chen College of Economics and Management Nanjing University of Aeronautics and AstronauticsNanjing 210016China Department of Mathematics and Computer Tong Ling UniversityTong Ling 244061China

In the context of the global low-carbon economy,the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism(CCATM)plays an important impact on the production and trade of enterprises and is widely implemented by most governments to reduce carbon *** this paper,we investigate a two-stage supply chain game model with a stochastic demand under the CCATM,in which the manufacturer has two production modes and the retailer has two order opportunities,and both of them make green *** results show that the optimal decision is irrelevant to carbon cap while is relevant to carbon emissions per unit *** profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer increase under the ***,we explore the optimal decisions under the buyback contract and the payment contract provided by the manufacturer to the *** find that the transfer payment can't improve the profit while the buyback contract can *** further extend our model by investigating the scenario with the risk-averse channel members,and find that the first optimal order quantity of the retailer would reduce due to risk aversion,while the manufacturer would invest more green effort and the manufacturer would be more likely to cooperate with alowerrisk-averse retailer.

关键词： Cap-and-trade two order opportunities two production modes green effort

INFORMATION STRUCTURES AND PRICING DECISIONS IN COMPETING SUPPLY CHAINS

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Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering 2012年第2期21卷 226-254页

作者： kebing chen Jun LIANG Jianbin LI Department of Mathematics Nanjing University of Aeronautics and AstronauticsNanjing210016China School of Management Huazhong University of Science and TechnologyWuhan430074China

The paper investigates the pricing decisions of two competing supply chains under the different information structures. Each retailer has private information about the market demand and has the right to decide whether or not to share the information with the manufacturer. Three demand-information structures, i.e., information sharing in both supply chains, information sharing in only one supply chain and information sharing in neither supply chain, are considered. We investigate the value of information by comparing the information structures, and find that the information value not only works in the channel directly, but also does in the competing channel indirectly. Information sharing in a supply chain always benefits its manufacturer, but hurts its retailer; while it benefits both the manufacturer and the retailer of competing supply chain, regardless of whether this competing supply chain has information sharing. From the perspective of channel, when t^e competition is more intense, information sharing in a supply chain makes this supply chain better off, and when the competition is less intense, the information sharing in a supply chain makes this supply chain worse off. However, it always makes the competing supply chain better off regardless of whether the competing supply chain has information sharing.

关键词： Incomplete information pricing supply chain competition game theory

Revenue-sharing contract to coordinate independent participants within the supply chain

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Journal of Systems Engineering and Electronics 2007年第3期18卷 520-526页

作者： chen kebing Gao chengxiu Wang Yan Coll. of Science Nanjing Univ. of Aeronautics and Astronautics Nanjing 210016 P. R. China School of Mathematics and Statistics Wuhan Univ. Wuhan 430072 P. R. China

To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large.

关键词： supply chain management coordination mechanism revenue-sharing contract Stackelberg game,sequential strategy.

Pareto Optimal Solution for Supply Contracts with Multiple Suppliers

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Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences 2006年第3期11卷 515-519页

作者： chen kebing GAO chengxiu School of Mathematics and Statistics Wuhan University Wuhan 430072 Hubei China

This paper analyzes an electronic procurement （e-procurement） process between a manufacturer and N-supplier in the e-market. We proof that using the general contract based on auction theory, i. e. the wholesale price contract, would not achieve the coordination of channel composed of the manufacturer and the winning supplier. The paper designs a contract mechanism, i.e. the side payment price-restricted contract based on auction theory, which not only ensures Pareto optimal solutions for both, but also coordinates the supply chain. A numerical experiment is provided to compare the performance of different auction mechanisms and to reinforce key managerial insights generated through analysis.

关键词： supply chain coordination auction theory contract order statistics

Polyphenol-based hydrogels: Pyramid evolution from crosslinked structures to biomedical applications and the reverse design

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Bioactive Materials 2022年第11期7卷 49-70页

作者： Zimu Li Zhidong chen Hongzhong chen kebing chen Wei Tao Xiao-kun Ouyang Lin Mei Xiaowei Zeng Institute of Pharmaceutics School of Pharmaceutical Sciences(Shenzhen)Sun Yat-sen UniversityShenzhen518107China Department of Spine Surgery Center for Orthopaedic SurgeryThe Sixth Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-sen UniversityGuangzhou510655China Center for Nanomedicine Brigham and Women’s HospitalHarvard Medical SchoolBostonMA02115United States School of Food and Pharmacy Zhejiang Ocean UniversityZhoushan316022China

As a kind of nature-derived bioactive materials, polyphenol-based hydrogels possess many unique and outstanding properties such as adhesion, toughness, and self-healing due to their specific crosslinking structures, which have been widely used in biomedical fields including wound healing, antitumor, treatment of motor system injury, digestive system disease, oculopathy, and bioelectronics. In this review, starting with the classi-fication of common polyphenol-based hydrogels, the pyramid evolution process of polyphenol-based hydrogels from crosslinking structures to derived properties and then to biomedical applications is elaborated, as well as the efficient reverse design considerations of polyphenol-based hydrogel systems are proposed. Finally, the existing problems and development prospects of these hydrogel materials are discussed. It is hoped that the unique perspective of the review can promote further innovation and breakthroughs of polyphenol-based hydrogels in the future.

关键词： Biomaterials Adhesive hydrogels Polyphenol Disease treatment Reverse design

Downside Risk-Aversion Analysis for a Single-Stage Newsvendor Problem

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Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences 2007年第2期12卷 198-202页

作者： YANG Lei GAO chengxiu chen kebing LI Jianbin School of Mathematics and Statistics Wuhan UniversityWuhan 430072Hubei China

We extend the classical newsvendor problem by introducing a downside risk constraint from the perspective of inventory control. At the beginning of a replenishment period the newsvendor will place an order, then he will review the inventory level at the end of the period. If the inventory level is positive then he will bear the holding cost and if the inventory level is negative then he will bear the backorder cost. The optimal order quantity has a simple form. We analyze the form of the optimal order quantity when we restrict that the probability that the cost level is larger than or equal to a fixed cost constant is less than a fixed value of probability. At last, we analyze the case that the fixed cost constant is equal to the expected cost.

关键词： supply chain newsvendor problem inventory management risk

SUPPLY CHAIN DISRUPTION MANAGEMENT WITH MULTIPLE COMPETING RETAILERS

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Transactions of Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics 2008年第4期25卷 295-302页

作者：陈克兵肖条军南京航空航天大学理学院南京大学工程管理学院

As for the supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple competing retailers, the disruption management decision is considered for the demand disruption that both the investment sensitivity coefficient and the investment-elasticity are changed simultaneously. Meanwhile, the corresponding solutions are given for different cases of the disruption, and the characteristics of the solutions are analyzed. The production plan is proved to he robustness under certain conditions, and the production plan of the coordination strategy is investigated for the disruption with appropriate contractual arrangement, i. e. , a subside rate schedule. Mutual restraints exist between the changed investment sensitivity coefficient and the investment-elasticity when the coordination mecha- nism is used. And the more the number of the retailers in the system, the more the subside provided by the suppler on the coordinaton strategy.

关键词： supply chain management robustness coordination disruption management subside rate schedule

基于政府不同补贴形式下的绿色产品制造商渠道选择策略分析

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中国管理科学 2024年第3期32卷 167-177页

作者：陈克兵王雨琦南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院江苏南京210016

为促进可持续供应链的发展,政府通常会根据企业的绿色研发成本尝试采用不同的补贴形式,制造商也会根据政府的补贴形式设计不同的渠道结构来销售产品。本文构建了一个由政府为领导者,制造商和零售商为跟随者组成的供应链博弈模型。根据... 详细信息

为促进可持续供应链的发展,政府通常会根据企业的绿色研发成本尝试采用不同的补贴形式,制造商也会根据政府的补贴形式设计不同的渠道结构来销售产品。本文构建了一个由政府为领导者,制造商和零售商为跟随者组成的供应链博弈模型。根据制造商绿色生产技术,政府提供其研发成本补贴或单位生产补贴,研究了制造商采取不同销售渠道结构下的政府补贴、制造商产品绿色度水平和直销渠道价格,及各个成员的利润或绩效。研究结果表明:政府补贴形式与制造商的绿色技术投入及渠道结构选择之间存在密切关联性。从制造商角度看,当政府向制造商提供研发成本补贴时,若制造商降低其绿色研发成本,则制造商采用双渠道结构模式能减少政府支出,并且是对制造商、零售商和政府都更优的策略。而当政府向制造商提供单位生产补贴时,制造商则需综合考虑消费者环保意识、价格弹性和绿色技术开发成本率等因素选择不同的渠道结构。此外,从政府绩效角度看,当绿色技术开发成本或环境改善的边际收益较低时,采用单位生产补贴将更利于政府和环保产品生产的政策,同时更有利于制造商和零售商的利益;否则,政府应采用研发成本补贴策略。

关键词：绿色供应链补贴渠道策略绿色度政府绩效

黄土高原南部地区人工模拟暴雨条件下不同坡度谷子坡耕地产流产沙过程

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水土保持学报 2021年第3期35卷 90-95,103页

作者：陈科兵吴发启姚冲西北农林科技大学水土保持研究所陕西杨凌712100 西北农林科技大学资源环境学院陕西杨凌712100

以谷子坡耕地为研究对象,通过人工模拟降雨试验,探究不同生育期谷子在不同坡度下对坡耕地坡面侵蚀过程的影响,揭示黄土高原地区坡耕地侵蚀过程特征和机理。根据试验区现行退耕还林(草)政策、降雨特点及谷子生长特性,在80 mm/h降雨强度和... 详细信息

以谷子坡耕地为研究对象,通过人工模拟降雨试验,探究不同生育期谷子在不同坡度下对坡耕地坡面侵蚀过程的影响,揭示黄土高原地区坡耕地侵蚀过程特征和机理。根据试验区现行退耕还林(草)政策、降雨特点及谷子生长特性,在80 mm/h降雨强度和4个坡度(3°,5°,10°,15°)条件下分别对4个生育期(幼苗期、拔节期、抽穗期、灌浆期)的谷子种植坡面进行人工模拟降雨。结果表明:种植谷子对坡耕地坡面侵蚀过程有明显影响,随着谷子的生长,坡面初始产流时间不断延长,坡面产流曲线更快趋于平稳,坡面平均产流产沙强度逐渐降低,谷子的减流效应和减沙效益逐渐提高。3°与15°坡面初始产流时间由裸地5.25,1.40 min分别延长至灌浆期12.70,7.63 min;3°与15°坡面平均产流强度在灌浆期分别降低至0.52,0.78 L/(m^(2)·min),平均产沙强度在灌浆期分别降低至0.83,2.07 g/(m^(2)·min);与裸地相比,谷子由幼苗期生长至灌浆期,坡面径流量减少12.27%~48.24%,产沙量减少19.90%~84.00%。研究结果为揭示黄土高原谷子坡耕地侵蚀机理提供参考,并为区域高质量发展供科学依据。

关键词：谷子土壤侵蚀坡度模拟降雨

基于决策因子选择的梯级水库多目标优化调度规则研究

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水利学报 2017年第8期48卷 914-923页

作者：杨光郭生练陈柯兵吴旭树武汉大学水资源与水电工程科学国家重点实验室水资源安全保障湖北省协同创新中心湖北武汉430072

运用极端随机森林挖掘水库调度信息,考虑各水库相关因子与决策目标的相互关系,提出了梯级水库输入数据选择(Cascade-reservoir Input-variables Selection,CIS)方法,引入Gaussian径向基函数建立水库调度规则,并采用PA-DDS多目标算法对... 详细信息

运用极端随机森林挖掘水库调度信息,考虑各水库相关因子与决策目标的相互关系,提出了梯级水库输入数据选择(Cascade-reservoir Input-variables Selection,CIS)方法,引入Gaussian径向基函数建立水库调度规则,并采用PA-DDS多目标算法对水库调度规则参数进行优化,得到了同时考虑供水和发电的多目标优化调度规则集。汉江上游梯级水库的应用结果表明:CIS方法能优选得到较为稳定的决策因子,且能在充分利用已有优选信息的同时避免决策因子选取上的重复和冗余;经梯级多目标优化调度,优选的决策因子能得到比传统决策因子结果分布更优的非劣解集,在以发电为主要目标进行优化调度时,能有效调整汛期和非汛期的水量利用方式,梯级水库年均发电量和供水量分别提高了0.33%和7.84%。

关键词：梯级水库调度多171标优化数据挖掘决策因子选择径向基函数