Revenue-sharing contract to coordinate independent participants within the supply chain

作     者：Chen Kebing Gao Chengxiu Wang Yan 

作者机构：Coll. of Science Nanjing Univ. of Aeronautics and Astronautics Nanjing 210016 P. R. China School of Mathematics and Statistics Wuhan Univ. Wuhan 430072 P. R. China 

出 版 物：《Journal of Systems Engineering and Electronics》 (系统工程与电子技术（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2007年第18卷第3期

页      面：520-526页

核心收录：

学科分类：12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 

基　　金：the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70471034) the Talent Foundation of Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (s0670-082) 

主　　题：supply chain management coordination mechanism revenue-sharing contract Stackelberg game,sequential strategy. 

摘      要：To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large.