A Study on the Multi-Task Incentive Mechanism for the Service Provider

作     者：Li Lei Xin Zhanhong 

作者机构：Beijing Univ Posts & Telecommun Sch Econ & Management Beijing 100876 Peoples R China 

出 版 物：《China Communications》 (中国通信（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2008年第5卷第1期

页      面：79-83页

核心收录：

学科分类：0810[工学-信息与通信工程] 02[经济学] 0202[经济学-应用经济学] 0808[工学-电气工程] 0809[工学-电子科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 0839[工学-网络空间安全] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 

主　　题：service provider principal-agent analysis asymmetric information incentive mechanism 

摘      要：Both conflict and asymmetric information exist betweenthe telecom operators and the service provider,and result in illegal behaviors of the service provider.The relationship between the telecom operators andthe service provider is classical multi-task principalagentrelationship. The multi-task incentive for theservice provider is considered in the design of theprincipal-agent incentive contract, and it is necessaryto add the multi-task incentive to the serviceproviders through the analysis of the risk costs andthe agency costs of this problem.