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Optimal Contract for the principal-agent Under Knightian Uncertainty

Journal of the Operations Research Society of China 2020年第4期8卷 637-654页

作者： Kun-Lun Wang Chen Fei Wei-Yin Fei Department of Financial Engineering Anhui Polytechnic UniversityWuhu 241000AnhuiChina Glorious Sun School of Business and Management Donghua UniversityShanghai 200051China

Under the Knightian uncertainty,this paper constructs the optimal principal(he)-agent(she)contract model based on the principal’s expected profit and the agent’s expected utility function by using the sublinear expectation theory.The output process in the model is provided by the agent’s continuous efforts and the principal cannot directly observe the agent’s efforts.In the process of work,risk-averse agent will have the opportunity to make external choices.In order to promote the agent’s continuous efforts,the principal will continuously provide the agents with consumption according to the observable output process after the probation period.In this paper,the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation is deduced by using the optimality principle under sublinear expectation while the smoothness viscosity condition of the principal-agent optimal contract is given.Moreover,the continuation value of the agent is taken as the state variable to characterize the optimal expected profit of the principal,the agent’s effort and the consumption level under different degrees of Knightian uncertainty.Finally,the behavioral economics is used to analyze the simulation results.The research findings are that the increasing Knightian uncertainty incurs the decline of the principal’s maximum profit;within the probation period,the increasing Knightian uncertainty leads to the shortening of probation period and makes the agent give higher effort when she faces the outside option;what’s more,after the smooth completion of the probation period for the agent,the agent’s consumption level will rise and her effort level will drop as Knightian uncertainty increasing.

关键词： Knightian uncertainty principal-agent Sublinear expectation HJB equation Behavioral economics

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Incentive regulation of banks on third party logistics enterprises in principal-agent-based inventory financing

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Advances in Manufacturing 2014年第2期2卷 150-157页

作者： Xue-Hua Sun Xue-Jian Chu Zhong-Dai Wu Shanghai Key Laboratory of Mechanical Automation and Robotics Shanghai University Modern Logistics Research Center Shanghai University China Shipping Information System Co. Ltd

In inventory financing,asymmetric information between banks and the third party logistics enterprises may incur moral risks,often causing economic losses of banks.To effectively solve this problem,a pure incentive scheme and a regulatory incentive scheme are designed with the principal-agent theory.By comparison,it is found that the pure incentive model is not applicable to practical conditions,and regulatory incentive model can not only solve practical problems substantially but also outbalance pure incentive model under certain conditions.The research results from example analysis given in this paper offer theoretical instruction and a practical method for effective regulation of banks.

关键词： Inventory financing Asymmetric information principal-agent Regulatory incentive

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监管、多重代理与商业银行治理的最优激励契约设计

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金融与保险 2010年第10期 40-53页

作者：蒋海朱滔李东辉

因受到严格监管，商业银行的治理机制和激励契约设计与一般企业存在明显差异。近年来我国银行治理机制得到了较大改善，但仍然存在激励约束机制不健全等诸多问题。本文从银行治理特征入手，归纳抽象出银行治理中两个最主要特征：多重委... 详细信息

因受到严格监管，商业银行的治理机制和激励契约设计与一般企业存在明显差异。近年来我国银行治理机制得到了较大改善，但仍然存在激励约束机制不健全等诸多问题。本文从银行治理特征入手，归纳抽象出银行治理中两个最主要特征：多重委托代理和多任务性，并在Holmstrom & Milgrom(1991)模型框架下，揭示商业银行最优激励契约均衡条件，同时进一步探讨了我国上市银行的最优激励契约设计问题。结果表明，目前上市银行普遍建立起了与银行经营业绩相关联的薪酬激励制度，但监管当局尚未建立起与风险控制相联系的正向和负向激励约束机制，这样的薪酬契约安排可能导致高管将过多精力放在经营业绩上，而忽视对银行风险控制的努力。

关键词：商业银行监管委托代理薪酬激励　　Commercial Banks Regulation principal-agent Compensation Incentive

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行政吸纳服务：双重委托代理困境下政府购买养老服务策略研究

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社会保障制度 2022年第10期

作者：顾永红刘宇

人口老龄化迫使我国公共养老服务体系建设的步伐不断加快。社区养老成为弥补家庭养老功能不足的有效途径，引入市场机制进行服务购买有利于优化社区养老资源配置结构。从委托代理关系上看，作为政府购买社区养老服务的主要民办组织，社... 详细信息

人口老龄化迫使我国公共养老服务体系建设的步伐不断加快。社区养老成为弥补家庭养老功能不足的有效途径，引入市场机制进行服务购买有利于优化社区养老资源配置结构。从委托代理关系上看，作为政府购买社区养老服务的主要民办组织，社会工作机构同时受到民政部门的“合同委托”和街道办事处的“行政委托”，容易引发多重信息不对称和多方价值取向差异。文章将武汉市“五社联动”项目经验纳入“行政吸纳服务”解释框架，从主体吸纳、行为吸纳和价值吸纳三个维度分析政府购买社会工作养老服务中的共建、共治、共享逻辑。在政社互构实践中，“信任—合作”关系的建立，有助于消解服务购买中的双重委托代理危机，建构多元、协作和共享的公共服务供给平台，以及提升公共服务供给效率。

关键词：行政吸纳服务政府购买服务委托代理社区养老五社联动　　administrative absorption of service government purchase of service principal-agent community-based elderly care five-element linkage in community

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Difficulty and Breakthrough Analytical Framework of EGS-oriented Consumer Logistics Outsourcing Based on principal-agent Theory

Difficulty and Breakthrough Analytical Framework of EGS-orie...

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2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information(BMEI 2011)

作者： XIA Xiangyang Dept.of Modern Logistics School of Management Ningbo Institute of Technology Zhejiang University Ningbo China WU Jiefeng Dept.of Info.Management School of Logistics Zhejiang Wanli University Ningbo China

With emergence of EGS,many self-service logistics activities are being outsourced to E-Grocers by traditional grocery shoppers,which results in a difficulty to complete consumer logistics.Therefore,this study,first of all,analyses the difficulty of Consumer Logistics outsourcing,then explained based on theoretical framework of principal-agent theory,and a mathematical model of incentive contract is constructed.Finally,the breakthrough ways are put forward to avoid the moral hazard.

关键词： EGS Consumer Logistics outsourcing principal-agent Difficuly and Breakthrough

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The Distributed Decision Making Risk Management Model for Virtual Enterprise Based on principal-agent Theory

The Distributed Decision Making Risk Management Model for Vi...

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2011 Chinese Control and Decision Conference（CCDC）

作者： Xianli Sun is with the Department of Information and Engineering,Shenyang Institute of Engineering,Shenyang 110136,China.Min Huang is with the College of Information Science and Engineering,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110004,China.Xingwei Wang is with the College of Information Science and Engineering,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110004,China.

The virtual enterprise must avoid risks successfully for the desired goal.When the leader and partners of virtual enterprise are in relation non-team and may exploit their information in an opportunistic way,in order to ensure virtual enterprise risk management carried out smoothly,the leader must develop effective risk control mechanism.The principal-agent theory and Distributed Decision-making （DDM） method are applied to solve the risk management of virtual enterprise with principal-agent characteristic and the principal-agent DDM risk management model of virtual enterprise is developed with one principal and multi-agent,analysis of the risk preference impact on decision-making.At the same time,discusses the solution to the model,and the method of combining with the C language and the Lingo is used to do the simulation.

关键词： Virtual enterprise Risk Management Distributed Decision-making principal-agent Risk Preference Hidden Action Hidden Information

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打开柔性契约与代理人行为间的“薛定谔黑箱”

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管理科学 2021年第6期

作者：陈梦龙尹贻林彭冯

对委托代理分析范式的拉卡多斯批判揭示，在柔性契约与代理人行为之间横亘着“薛定谔黑箱”。本研究放松了科斯式再谈判的辅助性假设，整合契约参照点与委托代理分析范式，构建了有调价冲突存在的竞争中介模型，以期揭示柔性契约与代理... 详细信息

对委托代理分析范式的拉卡多斯批判揭示，在柔性契约与代理人行为之间横亘着“薛定谔黑箱”。本研究放松了科斯式再谈判的辅助性假设，整合契约参照点与委托代理分析范式，构建了有调价冲突存在的竞争中介模型，以期揭示柔性契约与代理人行为之间存在的两条效应相反的作用路径。来自213份建设项目样本的实证结果表明：控制调价冲突后，柔性契约能够改善代理人行为；调价冲突负向中介了柔性契约与代理人行为改善的关系；柔性契约是代理人尽善履约的必要非充分条件。本研究为实践中科学使用柔性契约提供了理论指导与管理启示。

关键词：柔性契约代理人行为调价冲突委托代理契约参照点　　flexible contracts agents' behavior price adjustments conflict principal-agent contract reference point

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Design of principal-agent Incentive Mechanism between Government and NPO

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Proceedings of Business and Economic Studies 2021年第1期4卷 41-45页

作者： Honglian Guo Zhenzhen Wu Han Li Beijing Wuzi University Beijing 101149China

Based on principal-agent theory,this paper establishes an incentive contract mechanism between government and NPO under asymmetric information,and analyzes the impact of absolute risk aversion and output level on the expected utility of government,NPO and society.Research shows that risk aversion is negatively correlated with the expected utility of government,NPO and society.The output coefficient is positively correlated with the expected utility of government,NPO and society.Reducing absolute risk aversion,increasing output coefficient and increasing government incentives can effectively motivate NPO to actively participate in social rescue activities.

关键词： principal-agent Incentive intensity Level of output Expected utility

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公立高校与政府、个人委托代理关系及其问题分析

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高等教育 2004年第3期 43-46页

作者：楚红丽

随着高教体制改革的深入，厘清公立高校所涉及的委托代理关系，分析和解决其存在的委托代理问题迫在眉睫。公有产权下解决委托代理问题的关键，是设计激励、约束和竞争制度来排斥信息效率低下和激励不相容问题。

关键词：公立高校政府个人委托代理 public higher education institution government individual principal-agent

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SCM Implementation Decisions of principal-agent under Asymmetric Information

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Open Journal of Applied Sciences 2019年第4期9卷 159-171页

作者： Lina Wang Stephan Poelmans Koen Milis Economy & Management School Hainan Normal University Haikou China Management School Liaoning University of Technology Jinzhou China Faculty of Economics and Management Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel KULeuven Association Brussel Belgium Education Management Industry Campus Vesta Brussels Belgium

The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-Supply Chain Management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. For both conditions, SCM implementation options’ decision optimizing models have been developed. In these models, both clients and vendors try to pursue their own benefits. Based upon the principal-agent theory, the models show to what extent a principal (a client) needs to pay more to an agent (a vendor) in a context of asymmetric information. For the client, it is important to understand the extra costs to be able to adopt effective strategies to stimulate a vendor to perform an optimal implementation of a SCM system. The results of a simulation experiment regarding SCM implementation options illustrate and verify the theoretical findings and confirm the general notion that the less informed party is obliged to pay information rent to the better-informed party.

关键词： SCM Implementation Problems Asymmetric Information Implementation Control Cost Evaluation Level principal-agent Theory

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