Local corruption and corporate cash holdings:Sheltering assets or agency conflict?

作     者：Xixiong Xu Yaoqin Li 

作者机构：School of Economics and Business Administration Chongqing University The Innovation Institute of Corporate Finance & Accounting Governance Chongqing University (IICFAG) 

出 版 物：《China Journal of Accounting Research》 (中国会计学刊（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2018年第11卷第4期

页      面：307-324页

学科分类：12[管理学] 120202[管理学-企业管理（含：财务管理、市场营销、人力资源管理）] 0202[经济学-应用经济学] 0302[法学-政治学] 03[法学] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 030204[法学-中共党史(含：党的学说与党的建设)] 0201[经济学-理论经济学] 030503[法学-马克思主义中国化研究] 0305[法学-马克思主义理论] 

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant No.71572019] Graduate Scientific Research and Innovation Foundation of Chongqing,China [Grant No.CYB16001] National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant Nos.71602013,71772019] The Humanities and Social Sciences Foundation of the Ministry of Education [Grant No.17YJA630017] Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universities [Grant No.2017CDJSK02 PT01] 

主　　题：Corruption Corporate cash holding Political extraction Asset sheltering Agency cost 

摘      要：This study investigates the impact of corruption on corporate cash holdings in China. The political extraction argument predicts that firms might shelter liquid assets to avoid extraction by corrupt officials. Using data on A-shared listed firms between 2007 and 2012, we find that firms located in more corrupt regions hold less cash, supporting this hypothesis. Political resources help to diminish the risk of exploitation, reducing the extent to which liquid assets are sheltered. We find that the negative association between corruption and cash holding is more significant for non-state-owned enterprises(Non-SOEs)than for state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Moreover, the cash holdings of Non-SOEs without political connections are more sensitive to corruption than those of Non-SOEs with political connections. These findings demonstrate that expropriation by corrupt officials is an important factor driving firms to manage liquidity.