Cognitive Dissonance and ＂The Will to Believe＂

作     者：Nathan Hilberg 

作者机构：The University of Tennessee 301 McClung Tower Knoxville TN 37996-0430 USA 

出 版 物：《Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences》 (复旦人文社会科学论丛（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2017年第10卷第1期

页      面：87-102页

学科分类：07[理学] 070104[理学-应用数学] 0701[理学-数学] 

主　　题：Cognitive dissonance Evidentialism Belief- William James - William Clifford 

摘      要：That we shape our beliefs to align with our actions should be of interest within philosophy of religion and philosophy generally. Cognitive dissonance, a psychological state in which an individual＇s beliefs and actions do not conform with each other, presents just such a situation. The idea that cognitive dissonance, by strict evidentialist standards, compromises our epistemic integrity since cognitive dissonance causes us to hold beliefs for which we do not have evidence, recalls the exchange between William Clifford and William James in which they discuss evidentialism, the idea that we should hold no beliefs for which we do not have evidence. In this paper I draw upon extant published research concerning cognitive dissonance theory and religion. I also survey the Clifford-James debate, applying considerations from their exchange to cognitive dissonance and （religious） belief. I conclude by showing how cognitive dissonance can have ambiguous results as concerns the justification of beliefs and that philosophy could benefit from attending to factors impacting empirical aspects of belief formation such as cognitive dissonance.