Central environmental protection inspection and carbon emission reduction: A tripartite evolutionary game model from the perspective of carbon neutrality

作     者：Zhen-Hua Zhang Dan Ling Qin-Xin Yang Yan-Chao Feng Jing Xiu 

作者机构：School of EconomicsLanzhou UniversityLanzhou 730000GansuChina Institute of Green FinanceLanzhou UniversityLanzhou 730000GansuChina School of ManagementLanzhou UniversityLanzhou 730000GansuChina School of BusinessZhengzhou UniversityZhengzhou 450001HenanChina Institute of EconomicsJilin Academy of Social SciencesChangchun130033JilinChina 

出 版 物：《Petroleum Science》 (石油科学（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2024年第21卷第3期

页      面：2139-2153页

核心收录：

学科分类：0820[工学-石油与天然气工程] 12[管理学] 1204[管理学-公共管理] 083305[工学-城乡生态环境与基础设施规划] 08[工学] 0833[工学-城乡规划学] 

基　　金：the financial support from the Postdoctoral Science Foundation of China(2022M720131) Spring Sunshine Collaborative Research Project of the Ministry of Education(202201660) Youth Project of Gansu Natural Science Foundation(22JR5RA542) General Project of Gansu Philosophy and Social Science Foundation(2022YB014) National Natural Science Foundation of China(72034003,72243006,and 71874074) Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(2023lzdxjbkyzx008,lzujbky-2021-sp72) 

主　　题：Central environmental protection inspection Local government Manufacturing enterprise Tripartite evolutionary game Carbon emission reduction 

摘      要：Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction *** study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection(CEPI)on driving carbon emission reduction,and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each *** research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI *** the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%,50%—80%,the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%,60%—30%.The evolutionary result of“thorough inspection,regulation implementation,low-carbon managementis the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary ***,the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit,the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy *** study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy.