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private benefits of control,Growth Opportunities and Investor Protection

China Journal of Accounting Research 2009年第1期2卷 123-145页

作者： Min Xiao Jiaxing You School of Management Xiamen University Chinab School of Economics Xiamen University

We develop a model to illustrate that controlling shareholders choose the level of investor protection that maximizes their own interests. controlling shareholders in companies with complicated control structures can easily extract private benefits and are thus reluctant to enhance investor protection which would necessitate increased transparency. In contrast, controlling shareholders in companies with valuable growth opportunities are willing to improve investor protection so that they can benefit from the increased value resulting from the lower cost of capital. We test this prediction using firm-level data in China. The results show that the level of investor protection increases with decreases in control structure opacity and increases in growth opportunities. The correlation is more significant for enforcement than for the mechanisms of investor protection.

关键词： private benefits of control Growth opportunities Investor protection

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The private benefits of Corporate control:Evidence from China

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Economic and Political Studies 2014年第1期2卷 44-64页

作者： XIAOJIN LIU TERENCE T.L.CHONG the Department of Economics The Chinese University of Hong Kong

By analyzing block share transfers in China during 1999-2006,this study provides estimates of the private benefits of corporate control in *** find that those controlling blocks are usually priced at a significant positive premium compared to those comparable non-controlling *** benefits of corporate control vary with shareholders structure,firm characteristics and institutional *** particular,targets with a high intangible asset ratio have less benefits of control,cross-listing in B or H shares curbs the extract of private benefits and companies acquired by private firms are associated with higher private ***,it is found that benefits of control are negatively associated with market economy and factor market development *** argue that firms with higher private benefits experience more tunneling activities by their controlling shareholders.

关键词： private benefits of control block share transfers Chinese stock market

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Have the private benefits in Italian Firms Decreased？

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Chinese Business Review 2012年第10期11卷 911-922页

作者： Carmelo Intrisano University ofCassino Cassino Italy

The topic of the paper is the estimate of the benefit of control, according to the Barclay and Holderness method. The reference system of this research is Italy, given that the empirical evidence of the past which had underlined private benefits particularly high among Italian companies and the reference period is 1999-2007. The idea of this research is to demonstrate that, since the Legislative Decree No. 58 of February 24, 1998 （Consolidated Law on Finance, henceforth Consolidated Law）, which has significantly changed the protection of minority shareholders, in Italian, the intensity of private benefits has on average declined sharply. To this end, considering the results of the empirical researches on periods pre-1998 and at the turn of the Consolidated Law, the paper provides evidence that the improvement of minority shareholder protection already shown by these researches is further accentuated over the years, because of the effects that the new regulatory framework has produced. In fact, the basic assumption is that the important laws, as Consolidate Law, require several years to produce the desired results in full. This idea is supported by the findings of research that show an average percentage of private benefits dropped to five percent of the capital. Hence, the investigation is extended to the demonstration of comparability of this estimation with other estimations quoted in literature, verifying the statistical significance of the correlations between the measures estimated and the variables considered as determinants in much of the literature.

关键词： private benefits of control amenities block premium voting rights insider shareholders outside shareholders

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民办高校举办者变更与控制权私利

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高等教育 2013年第5期 95-108页

作者：周红卫王彦玮

现行法律制度规定民办高校的举办者可以变更，随着举办权的变更，民办高校控制权也将随之改变。在这个变更过程中，常常会导致学校法人虚置财产直接流失，及由于学校资产归属不清带来的控制权溢价被举办者和创办者独占等问题。现实中对... 详细信息

现行法律制度规定民办高校的举办者可以变更，随着举办权的变更，民办高校控制权也将随之改变。在这个变更过程中，常常会导致学校法人虚置财产直接流失，及由于学校资产归属不清带来的控制权溢价被举办者和创办者独占等问题。现实中对民办高校举办权变更行为监管十分困难，本文通过分析三个民办高校的案例，研究举办者、创办者在民办高校举办者变更过程中控制权转移的原因、真实交易内容和制约因素等，由此探讨民办高校举办者和创办者通过民办高校控制权转让交易获取控制权私利问题。研究结论认为：举办者和创办者可以通过民办高校举办者变更来获取控制权私利。民办高校举办者变更过程中，政府主管单位对民办高校控制权转让过程中产生的控制权私利行为没有有效的约束。部分举办者和创办者将投资教育作为一种短期的商业活动来运作，存在着比较强烈的营利动机及营利行为。

关键词：民办高校控制权私利控制权溢价 private college private benefits of control control premium

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