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A Blockchain-Based Protocol for Malicious price discrimination

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Journal of Computer Science & Technology 2022年第1期37卷 266-276页

作者： Li-De Xue Ya-Jun Liu Wei Yang Wei-Lin Chen Liu-Sheng Huang School of Computer Science and Technology University of Science and Technology of ChinaHefei 230000China Information Department the First Affiliated Hospital of Soochow UniversitySuzhou 215000China

Serious price discrimination emerges with the development of big data and mobile networks,which harms the interests of *** solve this problem,we propose a blockchain-based price consensus protocol to solve the malicious price discrimination faced by *** give a mathematical definition of price discrimination,which requires the system to satisfy consistency and *** distributed blockchain can make the different pricing of merchants transparent to consumers,thus satisfying the *** aging window mechanism of our protocol ensures that there is no disagreement between any node on the consensus on price or price discrimination within a fixed period,which meets the ***,we evaluate its performance through a prototype implementation and experiments with up to 100 user *** results show that our protocol achieves all the expected goals like price transparency,consistency,and timeliness,and it additionally guarantees the consensus of the optimal price with a high probability.

关键词： blockchain digital economy distributed application price discrimination price transparency

Applied Study of price discrimination Implemented on a Two-Path Route Expressway

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Tsinghua Science and Technology 2006年第6期11卷 632-639页

作者：石京 Institute of Transportation Engineering Tsinghua University

This study aims at implementing price discrimination to get maximum revenue on a two-path route expressway, focusing on the problems which occur in traffic forecasting when applying a ＂profit-maximizing＂ toll designed to maximize revenue for a certain toll road in Japan. A break-even discussion is inevitable in the process of planning a certain toll road. According to the theory of transportation economics, market segmentation price discrimination is supposed to be efficient in the transportation market to increase the revenue of fixed facilities. In the model, a bypass and an adjacent expressway form a two-path route section. Two different toll levels are implemented for the bypass： one is for through traffic, and the other is for insideinside and inside-outside traffics. This two-path route plus two-toll-level system thus causes difficulty in traffic assignment that is based on the minimum route searching method. In the study, a rational approach of adjusting the through traffic is implemented to predict the traffic flow as well as revenue on two parallel routes with different toll levels. The approximate calculation method that fixes the split rate of the passing through traffic flow is applied to solve the two-path route plus two-toll-level problem since passing through traffic is price elastic. Market segmentation pricing, which gives two toll levels in a toll road, is proved to be practical for increasing revenue. The results are also verified to be rational by using the survey data of Meishin Expressway.

关键词： road planning traffic forecast two-toll-level problem price discrimination

The Role of Consumer Privacy Concerns in Shaping Platform Strategy for Online Markets

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Journal of the Operations Research Society of China 2024年第2期12卷 363-386页

作者： Jin-Kun Yang Yong-Rui Duan Jia-Zhen Huo School Economics and Management Tongji UniversityShanghai 200092China

We investigate the effects of consumer privacy concerns on the pricing and personal data collection strategy of an online *** online platform derives revenues from disclosing consumer information to *** compete for the information in order to enable them to price discriminate and thus derive revenues from consumer purchases.A novel aspect of our research is that we allow the online platform to sell only a subset of consumer *** develop analytical models where consumers can/cannot protect their *** analysis yields three main ***,in the monopoly case,we find that when the consumer privacy disclosure aversion cost is relatively low,it is optimal for the platform to sell all consumer information to the ***,in the duopoly case,we illustrate that when the consumer privacy disclosure aversion cost is relatively low,the platform will sell all consumer information to only one firm;when the cost is moderate,the platform will choose to sell the information of only some consumers and to only one firm;when the cost is relatively high,the platform will select only some of the consumers and sell their information to both ***,it will be better for the platform to provide the information protection service for free when the privacy cost is low.

关键词： price discrimination User privacy Consumer information Two-sided market Privacy disclosure aversion cost

Computational pricing in Internet era

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Frontiers of Computer Science 2018年第1期12卷 40-54页

作者： Fei TIAN Tao QIN Tie-Yan LIU Microsoft Research Asia Beijing 100080 China

Pricing plays a central rule to a company＇s prof- itability, and therefore has been extensively studied in the literature of economics. When designing a pricing mech- anism/model, an important principle to consider is ＂price discrimination＂, which refers to selling the same resources with different prices according to different values of buy- ers. To meet the ＂price discrimination＂ principle, especially when the number of buyers is large, computational methods, which act in a more accurate and principled way, are usu- ally needed to determine the optimal allocation of sellers＇ re- sources （whom to sell to） and the optimal payment of buyers （what to charge）. Nowadays, in the Internet era in which quite a lot of buy and sell processes are conducted through Internet, the design of computational pricing models faces both new challenges and opportunities, considering that （i） nearly real- time interactions between people enable the buyers to reveal their needs and enable the sellers to expose their information in a more expressive manner, （ii） the large-scale interaction data require powerful methods for more efficient processing and enable the sellers to model different buyers in a more precise manner. In this paper, we review recent advances on the analysis and design of computational pricing models for representative Internet industries, e.g., online advertising and cloud computing. In particular, we introduce how computa- tional approaches can be used to analyze buyer＇s behaviors （i.e., equilibrium analysis）, improve resource utilization （i.e., social welfare analysis）, and boost seller＇s profit （i.e., revenue analysis）. We also discuss how machine learning techniques can be used to better understand buyer＇s behaviors and design more effective pricing mechanisms, given the availability oflarge scale data. Moreover, we make discussions on future re- search directions on computational pricing, which hopefully can inspire more researchers to contribute to this important

关键词： computational pricing price discrimination on-line advertising cloud computing mechanism design

Imperfect targeted advertising with two-period competition

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Journal of Southeast University(English Edition) 2014年第3期30卷 374-379页

作者：邹翔仲伟俊梅姝娥东南大学经济管理学院南京211189

A two-period model is developed to investigate the competitive effects of targeted advertising with imperfect targeting in a duopolistic market. In the first period, two firms compete in price in order to recognize customers. In the second period, targeted advertising plays an informative role and acts as a price discrimination device. The firms＇ optimal advertising and pricing strategies under imperfect targeting are compared with those under perfect targeting. Equilibrium decisions show that, under imperfect targeting, when the advertising cost is low enough, both firms will choose to target ads at the rivals＇ old segments. This equilibrium, which could not exist under perfect targeting, results in two opposite results. When cost is high, the effect of mis-targeting will soften price competition and increase profits; on the contrary, when cost is low enough, it will lead to aggressive price competition and profit loss with the increase of imperfect targeting, so firms may have incentives to reduce the mis- targeting degree.

关键词： targeted advertising imperfect targeting price discrimination two-period game

A model of targeted advertising with customer recognition

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Journal of Southeast University(English Edition) 2012年第4期28卷 490-495页

作者：张建强仲伟俊梅姝娥东南大学经济管理学院南京211189

A two-period duopoly model is developed to examine the competitive effects of targeted advertising with customer recognition （TACR）. In the model, two competing firms sell goods to end consumers in the first period, during which customer recognition is obtained. In the second period, advertising can be targeted toward different consumer types. Advertising is assumed to be persuasive in the way that consumer valuation is increased. Equilibrium decisions and profits in each period are derived, showing that the firm who loses the current competition will win in the future. As a result, forward-looking firms price less aggressively so that their long-term profits can be enhanced with the help of TACR. Particularly, TACR improves profits through three important effects： valuation increasing, customer poaching, and anti-competition. Finally, this paper investigates the welfare issues, showing that firms enhance profits at the expense of consumer surplus. It is, therefore, suggested that public sectors take a step to protect consumers with the rapid development of targeting technology.

关键词： targeted advertising customer recognition price discrimination purchase history

Business Analysis of Didi Chuxing in the Chinese Ride-hailing Market

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Contemporary Social Sciences 2020年第5期5卷 70-80页

作者： Chen Zuanxu the University of Queensland Australia

This essay presents my analysis of Didi Chuxing’s ride-hailing business in the Chinese market considering economic concepts and tools such as market structure,economies of scale and price anchoring to understand aspects of Didi Chuxing such as its cost structure,pricing strategies and marketing *** the largest ride-hailing platform in China,the success of Didi Chuxing can offer important guidelines for the healthy development and expansion of this industry to other countries.

关键词： Didi Chuxing Chinese Ride-hailing market company analysis price discrimination

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网络效应、转移成本和竞争性价格歧视

产业经济 2011年第2期

作者：蒋传海

本文在存在网络效应和转移成本的市场条件下，构建两期动态博弈模型研究厂商根据消费者的购买历史进行竞争性歧视定价的商业行为。研究结果表明转移成本是厂商可以实施价格歧视的内在原因；在歧视定价均衡中，厂商在第二期会通过给予价... 详细信息

本文在存在网络效应和转移成本的市场条件下，构建两期动态博弈模型研究厂商根据消费者的购买历史进行竞争性歧视定价的商业行为。研究结果表明转移成本是厂商可以实施价格歧视的内在原因；在歧视定价均衡中，厂商在第二期会通过给予价格优惠吸引竞争对手的消费者转移，并在第一期为争取市场份额而进行激烈的竞争，网络效应加剧了企业两期的价格竞争。就市场绩效而言，网络效应会导致消费者剩余和社会福利的提高、厂商利润的下降；而转移成本对于社会福利的影响则是负面的。此外和统一定价相比，歧视定价降低社会总福利。因此以社会总福利为目标的公共政策，应着重于降低转移成本，并限制厂商使用歧视定价的营销策略。

关键词：网络效应转移成本消费者购买历史价格歧视统一定价 network effect switching cost consumers' purchased-history price discrimination uniform pricing

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非法价格歧视行为的判断标准研究