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统计与决策 2009年第3期25卷 180-182页

作者：王虹周晶南京大学工程管理学院南京210093

针对风险中性供应商与loss-averse零售商组成的供应链,文章研究回购契约下loss-averse零售商的最优决策,分析结果表明零售商由于害怕损失会做出偏离系统最优的决策。引入奖励-惩罚契约,通过供应商的激励可以实现供应链在回购契约下的协... 详细信息

针对风险中性供应商与loss-averse零售商组成的供应链,文章研究回购契约下loss-averse零售商的最优决策,分析结果表明零售商由于害怕损失会做出偏离系统最优的决策。引入奖励-惩罚契约,通过供应商的激励可以实现供应链在回购契约下的协调。最后通过算例分析,验证了奖励-惩罚契约在供应链协调中的有效性,并说明零售商风险规避度越大,供应商为实现供应链协调付出的成本就越大。

关键词：供应链协调风险规避 loss-averse 回购契约奖励-惩罚契约

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Supply Chain Coordination Based on Revenue-Sharing Contract with Retailer Having loss-averse Preferences

Supply Chain Coordination Based on Revenue-Sharing Contract ...

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2009中国控制与决策会议

作者： Qinghua Pang~1 1.Business School,HoHai University,Changzhou 213022,China

＜正＞Revenue-Sharing（RS） contract is a kind of mechanism to improve the performance or to achieve the perfect coordination of supply chain（SC）.In the paper,considering retailer has loss-averse preferences,a model of an SC contract aimed at coordinating a two-stage SC is proposed,which is based on revenue sharing mechanism,and the customer demand is *** by analyzing the model,the paper explains that how the loss-averse preferences of the retailer influences the optimal order quantity,the quota of revenue sharing and supply chain *** result shows:when the retailer has loss-averse preferences,there exists one order quantity that maximizes his expected utility;in[0,（1-（?））c]and[1-w/v,1-w/p],there respectively exists only one wholesale price that supplier charges retailer and only one quota of the retailer’s revenue that retailer gives to supplier;the wholesale price and the quota are both the decreasing functions of the retailer’s loss-averse preferences.

关键词： Supply Chain Management Revenue-Sharing Contract loss-averse Supply Chain Coordination Stochastic Demand Expected Utility

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Ordering and Pricing Strategies in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain Considering loss-averse and Fairness-Concerns

Ordering and Pricing Strategies in a Two-Echelon Supply Chai...

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2011 International Conference on Management Science and Intelligent Control(ICMSIC 2011)

作者： LIU Jian School of information technology JiangXi University of Finance and Economics Nan Chang China QIU Guo-bin School of information technology JiangXi University of Finance and Economics Nan Chang China

Expected utility of loss-averse and fairness-concerns proposed to retailer, objective function of maximizing expected profit is suggested to neutral manufacturer. This paper investigates retailer’s optimal ordering strategy and manufacturer’s optimal pricing strategy based upon games models, following conclusions are drawn by theoretical and numerical analysis, order quantity decreases in loss-averse coefficient and fairness-concerns coefficient. Wholesale price decreases in loss-averse coefficient, increases in fairness-concerns coefficient, which show that loss-averse plays the same effect on ordering and pricing strategy for retailer and manufacturer respectively. but fairness-concerns gives different result for them.

关键词： loss-averse fairness-concerns ordering pricing

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Study on New Coordination Mechanisms of Generalized Supply Chains with loss-averse Agents

Study on New Coordination Mechanisms of Generalized Supply C...

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2009中国控制与决策会议

作者： Yu Tian College of Logistics Engineering Shanghai Maritime University Shanghai 200135,China Yan-xue Gong and Shao-chao Sun Research Institute of Automation East China University of Science and Technology Shanghai 200237,China

＜正＞Behavioral factors become one of the main concerns of research on supply *** modeling and coordination issues are addressed among supply chains with loss-averse ***,a generalized supply chain model is firstly established under the framework of Behavioral Decision Theory and Pareto Optimality,and then the optimal sharing rules and joint action pairs are successively ***,the coordination problem is examined in a two-stage specific *** indicates that the limitation exists in traditional buyback and revenue sharing contracts,and two incentive restraint mechanisms based on gain-loss sharing contract are proposed to help accomplish the optimum performance.

关键词： Supply Chain loss-averse Pareto Optimality Coordination Mechanism Gain/loss Sharing

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