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FIMI： A Constant Frugal incentive mechanism for Time WindowCoverage in Mobile Crowdsensing

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Journal of Computer Science & Technology 2017年第5期32卷 919-935页

作者： Jia Xu Jian-Ren Fu De-Jun Yang Li-Jie Xu Lei Wang Tao Li School of Computer Science Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications Nanjing 210023 China Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Big Data Security and Intelligent Processing Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications Nanjing 210023 China Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Big Data Security and Intelligent Processing Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications Nanjing 210023 China Department of Computer Science Colorado School of Mines Golden 80401 U.S.A.

Mobile crowdsensing has become an efficient paradigm for performing large-scale sensing tasks. An incentive mechanism is important for a mobile crowdsensing system to stimulate participants and to achieve good service quality. In this paper, we explore truthful incentive mechanisms that focus on minimizing the total payment for a novel scenario, where the platform needs the complete sensing data in a requested time window (RTW). We model this scenario as a reverse auction and design FIMI, a constant frugal incentive mechanism for time window coverage. FIMI consists of two phases, the candidate selection phase and the winner selection phase. In the candidate selection phase, it selects two most competitive disjoint feasible user sets. Afterwards, in the winner selection phase, it finds all the interchangeable user sets through a graph-theoretic approach. For every pair of such user sets, FIMI chooses one of them by the weighted cost. Further, we extend FIMI to the scenario where the RTW needs to be covered more than once. Through both rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed mechanisms achieve the properties of RTW feasibility (or RTW multi-coverage), computation efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, and constant frugality.

关键词： crowdsensing incentive mechanism constant frugality

Impact of Crowdsourcee’s Vertical Fairness Concern on the Crowdsourcing Knowledge Sharing Behavior and Its incentive mechanism

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Journal of Systems Science & Complexity 2021年第3期34卷 1102-1120页

作者： ZHU Binxin LEON Williams PAUL Lighterness GAO Peng School of Management Jiangsu UniversityZhenjiang 212013China Centre for Competitive Creative Design CranfieldUniversityBedfordshire MAT430ALUK School of Business Jiangsu University of TechnologyChangzhou 213001China

This paper examines in detail the impact of the crowdsourcee’s vertical fairness concern on the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism in crowdsourcing *** conditions for the establishment of the incentive mechanism are analyzed and the impact of fairness concern sensitivity on expected economic revenues of both sides as well as the crowdsourcing project performance is studied by game theory and computer *** results show that the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism can only be established if the ratio between the performance improvement rate and the private cost reduction rate caused by shared knowledge is within a certain *** degree of the optimal linear incentives,the private solution efforts,and the improvement of knowledge sharing level are positively correlated with the sensitivity of vertical fairness *** the non-incentive mode,the ratio between the performance conversion rate of private solution effort and the performance conversion rate of knowledge sharing effort plays an important role in moderating a crowdsourcing project’s *** authors find that the number of participants is either conducive or nonconducive to the improvement of *** implementation of knowledge sharing incentive can achieve a win-win situation for both the crowdsourcer and the crowdsourcee.

关键词： Creative crowdsourcing community incentive mechanism knowledge sharing vertical fairness concern

Budget-Aware Dynamic incentive mechanism in SpatialCrowdsourcing

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Journal of Computer Science & Technology 2017年第5期32卷 890-904页

作者： Jia-Xu Liu Yu-Dian Ji Wei-Feng Lv Ke Xu State Key Laboratory of Software Development Environment Beihang University Beijing 100191 China School of Software Liaoning Technical University Huludao 125105 China Department of Computer Science and Engineering Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Hong Kong China State Key Laboratory of Software Development Environment Beihang University Beijing 100191 China

The ubiquitous deployment of GPS-equipped devices and mobile networks has spurred the popularity of spatial crowdsourcing. Many spatial crowdsourcing tasks require crowd workers to collect data from different locations. Since workers tend to select locations nearby or align to their routines, data collected by workers are usually unevenly distributed across the region. To encourage workers to choose remote locations so as to avoid imbalanced data collection, we investigate the incentive mechanisms in spatial crowdsourcing. We propose a price adjustment function and two algorithms, namely DFBA (Dynamic Fixed Budget Allocation) and DABA (Dynamic Adjusted Budget Allocation), which utilize price leverage to mitigate the imbalanced data collection problem. Extensive evaluations on both synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate that the proposed incentive mechanisms are able to effectively balance the popularity of different locations.

关键词： incentive mechanism crowdsensing spatial crowdsourcing

An incentive mechanism for Federated Learning:A Continuous Zero-Determinant Strategy Approach

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IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica 2024年第1期11卷 88-102页

作者： Changbing Tang Baosen Yang Xiaodong Xie Guanrong Chen Mohammed A.A.Al-qaness Yang Liu IEEE the College of Physics and Electronic Information Engineering Zhejiang Normal UniversityUniversityJinhua 321004China the School of Mathematical Sciences Zhejiang Normal UniversityJinhua 321004China the Department of Electrical Engineering City University of Hong KongHong KongChina Key Laboratory of Intelligent Education Technology and Application of Zhejiang Province Jinhua 321004China

As a representative emerging machine learning technique, federated learning(FL) has gained considerable popularity for its special feature of “making data available but not visible”. However, potential problems remain, including privacy breaches, imbalances in payment, and inequitable *** shortcomings let devices reluctantly contribute relevant data to, or even refuse to participate in FL. Therefore, in the application of FL, an important but also challenging issue is to motivate as many participants as possible to provide high-quality data to FL. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism for FL based on the continuous zero-determinant(CZD) strategies from the perspective of game theory. We first model the interaction between the server and the devices during the FL process as a continuous iterative game. We then apply the CZD strategies for two players and then multiple players to optimize the social welfare of FL, for which we prove that the server can keep social welfare at a high and stable level. Subsequently, we design an incentive mechanism based on the CZD strategies to attract devices to contribute all of their high-accuracy data to ***, we perform simulations to demonstrate that our proposed CZD-based incentive mechanism can indeed generate high and stable social welfare in FL.

关键词： Federated learning(FL) game theory incentive mechanism machine learning zero-determinant strategy

An incentive mechanism Model for Crowdsensing with Distributed Storage in Smart Cities

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Computers, Materials & Continua 2023年第8期76卷 2355-2384页

作者： Jiaxing Wang Lanlan Rui Yang Yang Zhipeng Gao Xuesong Qiu State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology Beijing University of Posts and TelecommunicationsBeijingChina

Crowdsensing,as a data collection method that uses the mobile sensing ability of many users to help the public collect and extract useful information,has received extensive attention in data *** crowdsensing relies on user equipment to consume resources to obtain information,and the quality and distribution of user equipment are uneven,crowdsensing has problems such as low participation enthusiasm of participants and low quality of collected data,which affects the widespread use of *** paper proposes to apply the blockchain to crowdsensing and solve the above challenges by utilizing the characteristics of the blockchain,such as immutability and *** architecture for constructing a crowdsensing incentive mechanism under distributed incentives is proposed.A multi-attribute auction algorithm and a k-nearest neighbor-based sensing data quality determination algorithm are proposed to support the *** users upload data,determine data quality according to the algorithm,update user reputation,and realize the selection of perceived *** process of screening data and updating reputation value is realized by smart contracts,which ensures that the information cannot be tampered with,thereby encouraging more users to *** of the simulation show that using two algorithms can well reflect data quality and screen out malicious *** the help of blockchain performance,the architecture and algorithm can achieve decentralized storage and tamper-proof information,which helps to motivate more users to participate in perception tasks and improve data quality.

关键词： Crowdsensing incentive mechanism blockchain smart contract

Economy supervision mode of electricity market and its incentive mechanism

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Global Energy Interconnection 2020年第5期3卷 504-510页

作者： Xuejian Guo Qi Qu Xin Guo Wei Yang Pengfei Zhang State Grid International Development Co. Ltd.Xicheng DistrictBeijing100031P.R.China North China Electric Power University Changping DistrictBeijing 102206P.R.China Centro de Investigação em Energia.REN-State Grid S.ARua Cidade De Goa4 Ed.BLisbon2685-038Portugal Independent Power Transmission Operator S.A. 89 Dyrrachiou str.&Kifisou 10443AthensGreece

The analysis of a supervision environment is the first step for a company to enter the new electricity market. Transmission and distribution assets are the main investment targets of a company. The overseas power market belongs to the regulated industry;whether it is a stock M&A project or a green land bidding project, the regulatory environment determines the assets. The level of return and investment risk that guides the operation strategy of existing overseas assets, has a significant impact on the investment and operations of international companies. A comprehensive and rapid assessment of the regulatory environment can help the project teams of international companies understand the macroenvironment of the target electricity market within a short period, quickly identify investment risks, qualitatively analyze the return level of the underlying assets, shorten the decision time, capture investment opportunities, and enhance the team. Efficiency and quality of work are factors of great importance.

关键词： Economy supervision mode Electricity market incentive mechanism

Improvement of incentive mechanism on BitTorrent-like Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Systems

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Journal of Donghua University(English Edition) 2007年第4期24卷 523-528页

作者：俞嘉地李明禄洪峰薛广涛 Department of Computer Science and Engineering Shanghai Jiaotong University

BitTorrent is a very popular Peer-to-Peer file sharing system, which adopts a set of incentive mechanisms to encourage contribution and prevent free-riding. However, we find that BitTorrent’s incentive mechanism can prevent free-riding effectively in a system with a relatively low number of seeds, but may fail in producing a disincentive for free-riding in a system with a high number of seeds. The reason is that BitTorrent does not provide effective mechanisms for seeds to guard against free-riding. Therefore, we propose a seed bandwidth allocation strategy for the BitTorrent system to reduce the effect of seeds on free-riding. Our target is that a downloader which provides more service to the system will be granted a higher benefit than downloaders which provide lower service when some downloaders ask for downloading file from a seed. Finally, simulation results are given, which validate the effectiveness of the proposed strategy.

关键词： BitTorrent FreeRiding incentive mechanism Bandwidth Allocation Strategy

An optimal coupling incentive mechanism concerning insider’s compliance behavior towards marine information security policy

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Journal of Ocean Engineering and Science 2023年第5期8卷 573-575页

作者： Xiaolong Wang Changlin Wang Zaiguan Sun Chunhui Wang School of Economics and Management Binzhou UniversityBinzhou 256600China

It is widely agreed that the insider’s noncompliance to the marine information security policies has brought about a major security problem in the organizational *** research has stressed the potential of remunerative control,i.e.,reward,to better understand this *** studies have been devoted to the exploration of the coupling incentive mechanism of tangible and intangible rewards that would induce insider’s compliance behavior towards the marine information security *** the present study,we address this research gap by proposing a theoretical model that explains the optimal coupling incentive mechanism of these two different types of remunerative *** findings have delivered insightful implications for practice and research on how to improve the marine information security policy compliance in a more subtle way.

关键词： Marine information Information security policy Compliance behavior incentive mechanism

incentive mechanism analysis of information security outsourcing based on principal-agent model

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Journal of Southeast University(English Edition) 2014年第1期30卷 113-117页

作者：熊强仲伟俊梅姝娥东南大学经济管理学院南京211189 江苏大学管理学院镇江212013

In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote client enterprises to complete outsourcing service actively. The incentive mechanism model of information security outsourcing is designed based on the principal-agent theory. Through analyzing the factors such as enterprise information assets value, invasion probability, information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree how to impact on the incentive mechanism, conclusions show that an enterprise information assets value and invasion probability have a positive influence on the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient; while information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree have a negative influence on the compensation coefficient. Therefore, the principal enterprises should reasonably design the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient to encourage information security outsourcing agency enterprises to the full extent.

关键词： principal agent information security outsourcing incentive mechanism