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Manufacturers’strategy for introducing remanufactured products under a government subsidy:Introduce or not?

Journal of Management Science and Engineering 2023年第1期8卷 128-148页

作者： Zhen Wang Jiazhen Huo Yongrui Duan School of Economics and Management Tongji UniversityShanghai200092China Bosch-Tongji University Chair of Global Supply Chain Management Shanghai200092China

With strong government advocacy and encouragement,many manufacturers hope to enter the remanufacturing market.Manufacturers who have entered the remanufacturing market hope to increase their profits through effective decision-making.Using game-theoretic models,this study investigates manufacturers’conditions for introducing remanufactured products and the production decisions after the introduction by constructing a consumer utility model.Our study demonstrates that manufacturers’decision-making method directly affects their decision to introduce remanufactured products.If a manufacturer plans to introduce remanufactured products,they should adopt a centralized decision-making method for the two products.Under this decision-making method,when the ratio of the government subsidy to the cost of new products is not too large or too small,the manufacturer can introduce remanufactured products.Additionally,the range of the ratio of the government subsidy to the cost of new products is related to the difference between the ratio of the cost of remanufactured products to that of new products and the substitutability of the remanufactured products.Therefore,when formulating a subsidy,the government should control it within a reasonable range and formulate differentiated subsidy strategies based on different enterprises’specific conditions to give full play to the benefits of the government subsidy.Moreover,after the manufacturer has introduced remanufactured products,the consumer surplus and manufacturer’s profit increase with the government subsidy.However,social welfare increases only when the government subsidy is within a reasonable range.Furthermore,compared with subsidizing consumers,it is found that subsidizing the manufacturer does not affect their profit,the consumer surplus,and social welfare;however,the range within which the manufacturer can introduce remanufactured products narrows.

关键词： Remanufacturing government subsidy Consumer utility Decision-making method Game model

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COMPETITIVE STRATEGY IN REMANUFACTURING AND THE EFFECTS OF government subsidy

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Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering 2017年第4期26卷 417-432页

作者： Lu Xiao Xianjia Wang Kwai-Sang Chin Yong Qin School of Economics and Management Wuhan University Wuhan 430072 China Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management City University of Hong Kong Xiangyang Sergeant School of Military Economy Academy Xiangyang 441118 China

In this paper, we consider a single-period model comprised of an original manufacturer （OM） who produces only new products and a remanufacturer who collects used products from consumers and produces remanufactured products. The OM and the remanufacturer compete in the product market. We examine the effects of government subsidy as a means to promote remanufacturing activity. In particularly, we consider three subsidy options： subsidy to remanufacturer, subsidy to consumers, and subsidy shared by remanufacturer and consumers. We find that the introduction of government subsidy on remanufacturer or consumers always increases remanufacturing activity. We also find that subsidy to remanufacturer is the best subsidy option, because subsidy to remanufacturer results in lower price of remanufactttred products, thus leading to higher consumer surplus.

关键词： Remanufacturing competitive strategy government subsidy game theory

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government subsidy,Investment and Financing Constraints,and the Formation of Zombie Companies

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China Finance and Economic Review 2019年第3期8卷 40-58页

作者： Jianbo Song Zihao Su Dehong Wang School of Business Renmin University of China(RBS) 不详 International Business School Beijing Foreign Studies UniversityChina

Zombie companies have serious adverse effects on economic development.The relationship between government subsidies and zombie companies is a focus in China’s supply-side structural reform.In this paper,we classify companies into two categories:investment-constrained companies lacking investment opportunities,and fi nancing-constrained companies with limited sources of capital.Based on data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2016,this paper examines the relationship between government subsidies and the zombification of companies subject to different types of constraints.We find that more government subsidies have been allotted to investment-constrained companies than financing-constrained ones;government subsidy is one of the various factors that have contributed to company zombification,but the correlation is only significant for investment-constrained companies;financing subsidy dedicated to expanding corporate financing is more effective in helping investment-constrained companies than government subsidies in general,but neither government subsidies nor financing subsidies are effective in preventing investment-constrained companies from turning into zombies.In the robustness test that controls the endogeneity problem of reverse causality,replaces proxy variables,lags subsidy variables and discusses the zombification of loss-making enterprises,the results are still valid.This paper provides a heterogeneous perspective to study the connection between government subsidies and the formation of zombie companies,and in view of subsidy mismatch,puts forward recommendations regarding the use of government subsidies.

关键词： zombie company government subsidy financing subsidy investment constraints fi nancing constraints

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Production Decisions of Automakers in the Chinese Automobile Industry:A Tripartite Model of government,Automakers,and Consumers

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Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering 2023年第6期32卷 708-728页

作者： Jinhuan Tang Qiong Wu Yiming Chen Yuran Jin Kun Wang School of Economics and Management Shenyang Aerospace UniversityShenyang110136China School of Business Administration University of Science and Technology LiaoningAnshan114051China

Based on the evolutionary game approach,this paper analyzes how the automaker makes rational production decisions under the influence of the government and consumers.A tripartite evolutionary game model of“government-automaker-consumer”is established to explore the interactions under the condition of bounded rationality.The study shows that:1)The increase of credit price and credit ratio will promote the diffusion of new energy vehicles(NEVs).2)The cost premium of NEVs and the shrinking market will slow the spread of NEVs to some extent but will not prevent NEVs from becoming a trend in the automobile industry.However,the cost premium of fuel vehicles(FVs)will accelerate the development of the NEV industry.3)government subsidies can promote the development of NEV industry to some extent,but they are not always effective.The government can simultaneously implement subsidies for automakers and consumers in the early stages,and choose to implement the subsidy only for consumers in the medium term.Additionally,there is no need to implement the subsidy policy at a later stage.

关键词： Dual-credit policy new energy vehicles tripartite evolutionary game government subsidy

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农产品冷库PPP项目运营模式及补贴设计

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管理科学 2024年第5期

作者：冯卓宋金波胡祥培

本研究分析并比较了企业参与农产品冷库PPP项目的两种常见运营模式，即购买模式和租赁模式。研究发现只有当冷库的建设成本较低时，企业才愿意参与到冷库建设中，并且两种模式都导致较低的农民利润和社会福利。为了提高两种模式下的社... 详细信息

本研究分析并比较了企业参与农产品冷库PPP项目的两种常见运营模式，即购买模式和租赁模式。研究发现只有当冷库的建设成本较低时，企业才愿意参与到冷库建设中，并且两种模式都导致较低的农民利润和社会福利。为了提高两种模式下的社会福利，进一步研究了政府的补贴设计问题，研究发现政府补贴可以在一定条件下提高两种模式下的社会福利，在此基础上给出了政府应选择对农民还是对企业进行补贴的边界条件。关于两种模式之间的比较，研究发现租赁模式下的农民利润和社会福利更低，而且租赁模式使得政府更难通过补贴设计来提高社会福利。研究结果旨在为政府科学确定农产品冷库PPP项目的运营模式以及补贴设计提供决策支持。

关键词：冷库 PPP 运营模式政府补贴　　cold storage PPP operating model government subsidy

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Cost-benefit comparison of carbon capture,utilization,and storage retrofitted to different thermal power plants in China based on real options approach

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Advances in Climate Change Research 2020年第4期11卷 415-428页

作者： FAN Jing-Li SHEN Shuo XU Mao YANG Yang YANG Lin ZHANG Xian Center for Sustainable Development and Energy Policy Research(SDEP) School of Energy&Mining EngineeringChina University of Mining&TechnologyBeijing(CUMTB)Beijing100083China State Key Laboratory of Coal Resources and Safe Mining China University of Mining and TechnologyBeijing100083China School of Management and Economics Beijing Institute of TechnologyBeijing100081China Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research Beijing Institute of TechnologyBeijing100081China School of Economics and Management China University of GeosciencesBeijing100083China The Administrative Centre for China's Agenda 21(ACCA21) Ministry of Science and Technology(MOST)Beijing100038China

A trinomial tree model based on a real options approach was developed to evaluate the investment decisions on carbon capture,utilization,and storage(CCUS)retrofitted to the three main types of thermal power plants in China under the same power generation and CO2 emissions levels.The plant types included pulverized coal(PC),integrated gasification combined cycle(IGCC),and natural gas combined cycle(NGCC)plants.We take into account a subsidy policy consistent with the 45Q tax credit of the U.S.,as well as uncertainty factors,such as carbon price,technological progress,CO_(2) geological storage paths,oil price,and electricity price.The results showed that the investment benefit of ordinary NGCC power plants is 93.04 million USD.This provides greater economic advantages than the other two plant types as their investment benefit is negative if the captured CO_(2) was used for enhanced water recovery(EWR),even if 45Q subsidies are provided.Compared with NGCC+CCUS power plants,PC+CCUS and IGCC+CCUS power plants have more advantages in terms of economic benefits and emission reduction.The 45Q subsidy policy reduced the critical carbon price,which determines the decision to invest or not,by 30.14 USDt^(-1) for the PC and IGCC power plants and by 15.24 USDt^(-1) for the NGCC power plants.Nevertheless,only when the subsidy reaches at least 71.84 USDt^(-1) and the period limit is canceled can all three types of power plants be motivated to invest in CCUS and used the capture CO_(2) for EWR.Overall,the government should focus on the application of CCUS in coal-fired power plants(in addition to developing gas power generation),especially when CO_(2) is used for enhanced oil recovery(EOR).The government could introduce fiscal policies,such as 45Q or stronger,to stimulate CCUS technology development in China.

关键词： Carbon dioxide remove CCUS Real option government subsidy Thermal power plants

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Advertisement vs.Monetary subsidy:Which is Better for Remanufacturing?

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Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering 2020年第3期29卷 344-359页

作者： Yanting Huang Benrong Zheng Zongjun Wang College of Management Shenzhen UniversityShenzhen 518060China College of Economics&Management Huazhong Agricultural UniversityWuhan 430070China School of Management Huazhong University of Science and TechnologyWuhan 430074China

The government subsidy plays an important role in the recycling and remanufacturing process of a closed-loop supply chain.This paper focuses on the impacts of different patterns of government subsidy on the chain members'profits and the environment.Furthermore,we develop three models in a supply chain including a manufacturer,a retailer and a collector,namely(1)the government invests public service advertisement to stimulate the remanufacturing process(Model AS);(2)the government offers only monetary subsidy to the collector(Model MS);(3)the government allocates the subsidy into two parts,namely both advertisement and monetary subsidy(Model HS).We find that,no matter which subsidy pattern the government adopts,both the manufacturer and the collector are beneficiaries of the government subsidy,and that such subsidizing activity is definitely conducive to the environmental sustainability.Taking into account the chain members,profits and the environmental impact,the optimal hybrid subsidy scheme(Model HS)is more beneficial than that in both Model MS and Model AS,which can be attributed to the combination of the incentives provided by the public service advertisement and the price attraction by the monetary subsidy.We also find that,for single advertisement and monetary subsidy,the amount of government subsidy will decide their merits and demerits.The direct monetary subsidy in Model MS will have a greater influence regarding to the supply quantity of used products than the mere advertisement subsidy in Model AS when the subsidy is relatively large.

关键词： Supply chain management remanufacturing government subsidy environmental impact

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The mystery of zombie enterprises——‘‘stiff but deathless”

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China Journal of Accounting Research 2017年第4期10卷 341-357页

作者： Xinfeng Jiang Sihai Li Xianzhong Song College of Economics and Management Huazhong Agricultural University School of Accounting Zhongnan University of Economics and Law School of Management Jinan University

Drawing on social exchange theory,this study uses data on China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2016 to examine why zombie enterprises are‘‘stiff but deathless."We?nd that these enterprises are able to‘‘linger breathlessly"due to government support in the form of increased subsidies and bank loans.The government is more inclined to grant subsidies to zombie companies that assume greater policy burdens,speci?cally those offering more jobs.Furthermore,an enterprise’s property rights do not in?uence the level of‘‘blood transfusions"received,and government assistance fails to bolster operating effciency or value.This phenomenon is further explored in the context of the incentives local government offcials have to maintain employment stability.Our conclusions highlight the necessity and urgency of cleaning up zombie enterprises.

关键词： Zombie enterprise government subsidy Enterprise contribution Private interests of officials Enterprise value

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Export,subsidy and innovation:China’s state-owned enterprises versus privately-owned enterprises

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Economic and Political Studies 2016年第2期4卷 137-155页

作者： Laijun Luo Yang Yang Yuze Luo Chang Liu School of Economics Renmin University of ChinaChina School of Finance Renmin University of ChinaChina Development Research Center of the State Council China Global Economic Policies and Division of Economics University of NottinghamNingboChina

In this study,we advance the literature on export and government subsidy by examining their effects in the context of China,a fastgrowing emerging economy,and comparing the effects across ownership of enterprises.We examine the relationship among export,government support and firms’innovation capability,and how these relationships differ between state-owned and private owned enterprises,by using a large data sample of Chinese firms(2003–2007).First,we find that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between export and innovation in state-owned enterprises,but not in private owned enterprises.Second,there is a positive effect of government subsidy on firms’innovation capability.Finally,from the sub-sample analyses,we identify differences in the impact of government support between SOEs and POEs.This study will inspire future research into these issues in the disciplines of marketing,management and international business.

关键词： Export government subsidy innovation capability inverted U-shaped relationship

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Role of government subsidies in the new energy vehicle charging infrastructure industry:a three-party game perspective

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Chinese Journal of Population,Resources and Environment 2021年第2期19卷 143-150页

作者： Weizhong Yue Yingqi Liu Yu Tong Zeyuan Song School of Economics and Management Beijing University of TechnologyBeijing100124China Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-rural Development Beijing101160China School of Economics and Management Beijing Jiaotong UniversityBeijing100044China

With the new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation,China has posited the direction of“new infrastructure”in 2020.As one of the seven major industries of the“new infrastructure”,the charging infrastructure(CI)industry not only supports the upgrade of the new energy vehicle industry but also provides developing platforms for emerging industries,such as wireless charging,energy storage,smart microgrid,and new energy consumption.Therefore,the government’s supporting role is crucial for the CI industry.To effectively explore the effectiveness of government’s subsidy policy in the CI industry and promote its healthy development,we employed a game model and discussed the government's evolution process of different game strategies between CI and battery-swapping station(BSS)operators in this study.First,China's government subsidies for the electric vehicle(EV)industry were classified into CIs and BSSs.The subsidies obtained by the CI operators were operating subsidies,whereas those obtained by BSSs were investment subsidies.Second,a game model was constructed,involving the government,operators,and users.The model used backward induction to seek the refined Nash equilibrium solution for CIs and BSS operators.The Nash equilibrium solution indicated that the optimal investment amount and BSS quantity of the operator were positively correlated with the government subsidy intensity.When the profitability of the operators increased and the amount of the subsidies increased,consumers’willingness to use EVs increased and the policy effects were closely related to the benefits of government management.The decisions made by either the users or the operators were inversely related to the operators’management efficiency.Besides,the subsidy policy was affected by the government management.Therefore,in the implementation stage of the government’s future subsidy policies,the government needs to innovate and improve management effectiveness.The government could use subsidy policies as a driving f

关键词： Game theory New energy vehicle Charging infrastructure government subsidy

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