检索结果-南通市图书馆

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

Chinese Physics B 2018年第6期27卷 119-126页

作者： Ji Quan Yu-Qing Chu Wei Liu Xian-Jia Wang Xiu-Kang Yang School of Management Wuhan University of Technology Wuhan 430070 China School of Science Wuhan University of Technology Wuhan 430070 China School of Resources and Environmental Engineering Wuhan University of Technology Wuhan 430070 China School of Economics and Management Wuhan University Wuhan 430072 China

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.

关键词： public goods games stochastic stable equilibrium punishment finite population

来源：

维普期刊数据库

同方期刊数据库评论

在线全文

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

Some Analytical Properties of the Model for Stochastic Evolutionary Games in finite populations with Non-uniform Interaction Rate

引用

Communications in Theoretical Physics 2013年第7期60卷 37-47页

作者： QUAN Ji WANG Xian-Jia GuangDong Electric Power Design Institute China Energy Engineering Group Co. Ltd Guangzhou 510663 China Department of Management and Economics Tianjin University Tianjin 300072 China Institute of Systems Engineering Wuhan University Wuhan 430072 China School of Economics and Management Wuhan University Wuhan 430072 China

Traditional evolutionary games assume uniform interaction rate, which means that the rate at which individuals meet and interact is independent of their strategies. But in some systems, especially biological systems, the players interact with each other discriminately. Taylor and Nowak (2006) were the first to establish the corresponding non-uniform interaction rate model by allowing the interaction rates to depend on strategies. Their model is based on replicator dynamics which assumes an infinite size population. But in reality, the number of individuals in the population is always finite, and there will be some random interference in the individuals' strategy selection process. Therefore, it is more practical to establish the corresponding stochastic evolutionary model in finite populations. In fact, the analysis of evolutionary games in a finite size population is more difficult. Just as Taylor and Nowak said in the outlook section of their paper, 'The analysis of non-uniform interaction rates should be extended to stochastic game dynamics of finite populations.' In this paper, we are exactly doing this work. We extend Taylor and Nowak's model from infinite to finite case, especially focusing on the influence of non-uniform connection characteristics on the evolutionary stable state of the system. We model the strategy evolutionary process of the population by a continuous ergodic Markov process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we can give the evolutionary stable state of the system. We make a complete classification of the symmetric 2×2 games. For each case game, the corresponding limit distribution of the Markov-based process is given when noise intensity is small enough. In contrast with most literatures in evolutionary games using the simulation method, all our results obtained are analytical. Especially, in the dominant-case game, coexistence of the two strategies may become evolutionary stable states in our model. This result can be used to

关键词： stochastic evolutionary games non-uniform interaction rate finite population evolutionary stablestate

来源：

维普期刊数据库

同方期刊数据库评论

在线全文

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

Cross-Entropy Minimization Estimation for Two-Phase Sampling and Non-Response

引用

Journal of Systems Science & Complexity 2015年第2期28卷 489-503页

作者： WU Changchun TANG Linjun ZHANG Shangli School of Mathematics Physics and Information EngineeringJiaxing University School of Science Beijing Jiaotong University

This paper considers the problem of estimating the finite population total in two-phase sampling when some information on auxiliary variable is available. The authors employ an informationtheoretic approach which makes use of effective distance between the estimated probabilities and the empirical frequencies. It is shown that the proposed cross-entropy minimization estimator is more efficient than the usual estimator and has some desirable large sample properties. With some necessary modifications, the method can be applied to two-phase sampling for stratification and non-response. A simulation study is presented to assess the finite sample performance of the proposed estimator.

关键词： Auxiliary information cross-entropy minimization estimation finite population nonresponse two-phase sampling.

来源：

维普期刊数据库

同方期刊数据库评论

在线全文

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

An Information-Theoretic Approach to Effective Inference for Z-functionals

引用

Acta Mathematica Sinica,English Series 2009年第11期25卷 1893-1906页

作者： Chang Chun WU Run Chu ZHANG College of Mathematics and Information Engineering Jiaxing University Jiaxing 314001 P. R. China KLAS and School of Mathematics and Statistics Northeast Normal University Changchun 130024 P. R. China LMPC and School of Mathematical Sciences Nankai University Tianjin 300071 P. R. China

In this paper, through an information-theoretic approach, we construct estimations and confidence intervals of Z-functionals involving finite population and with the presence of auxiliary information. In particular, we give a method of estimating the variance of finite population with known mean. The modified estimates and confidence intervals for Z-functionals can adequately use the auxiliary information, at least not worse than what the standard ones do. A simulation study is presented to assess the performance of the modified estimates for the finite sample case.

关键词： confidence interval finite population modified Z-estimates information-theoretic approach Z-functional

来源：

维普期刊数据库

同方期刊数据库评论

在线全文

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

Minimal Sufficiency in Rare populations

引用

Journal of Mathematics and System Science 2012年第5期2卷 281-285页

作者： Mohammad Moradi Jennifer A. Brown Miriam Hodge Department of Science Razi University Kermanshah 67146 Iran Department of Mathematics and Statistics University of Canterbury Christchurch 8011 New Zealand

It is well understood that for conventional survey designs the set of unordered distinct units in a sample is a minimally sufficient statistic. This means that for inferential statistic of the sample, the value of the sampled units rather than the sample design is important. Sampling rare populations presents distinct challenges. Examples of rare populations are in biology with rare and endangered animals where there are only a few remaining individuals, or in social science, with the low incidence of people from an unusually high （or low） income group. Sampling rare populations tends to result in the case that many of the sample units do not contain information on the characteristic of interest （e.g., the rare animal, or people from the unusual income group）. For finite rare populations the set of unordered distinct rare-units in a sample is a minimally sufficient statistic. In an example case study of a rare buttercup, the properties of the minimal sufficient estimator are explored. We compare the efficiency of the estimator for the population total based on the minimally sufficient statistic, with the standard estimator for a range of sample sizes. The variance of the minimally sufficient estimator was always smaller than the variance of the sufficient estimator. For rare populations where non-rare units can be distinguished from rare units because they have the same fixed value, the minimal sufficient statistic is the rare units, if any, in the sample.

关键词： Rare population finite population sufficiency minimal sufficiency.

来源：

维普期刊数据库评论

在线全文

维普期刊数据库

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

欢迎您,

建议与咨询留下您的常用邮箱和电话号码，以便我们向您反馈解决方案和替代方法

时间限定

文献类型

馆藏选择

核心期刊

语言

文献类型

帮助

文字说明：

检索规则说明：

检索范例：

分类表

所选分类

限定检索结果

文献类型

馆藏范围

日期分布

学科分类号

主题

机构

作者

语言

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

请选择保存的检索档案：

请选择收藏分类：

通借通还

欢迎您,

建议与咨询 留下您的常用邮箱和电话号码，以便我们向您反馈解决方案和替代方法

时间限定

文献类型

馆藏选择

核心期刊

语言

文献类型

帮助

文字说明：

检索规则说明：

检索范例：

分类表

所选分类

限定检索结果

文献类型

馆藏范围

日期分布

学科分类号

主题

机构

作者

语言

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

请选择保存的检索档案： 新增检索档案 确定 取消

请选择收藏分类： 新增自定义分类 确定 取消

通借通还

建议与咨询留下您的常用邮箱和电话号码，以便我们向您反馈解决方案和替代方法

请选择保存的检索档案：

请选择收藏分类：