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A survey of decision making in adversarial games

Science China(Information Sciences) 2024年第4期67卷 85-112页

作者： Xiuxian LI Min MENG Yiguang HONG Jie CHEN College of Electronics and Information Engineering Tongji University Shanghai Research Institute for Intelligent Autonomous Systems

In many practical applications, such as poker, chess, drug interdiction, cybersecurity, and national defense, players often have adversarial stances, i.e., the selfish actions of each player inevitably or intentionally inflict loss or wreak havoc on other players. Therefore, adversarial games are important in realworld applications. However, only special adversarial games, such as Bayesian games, are reviewed in the literature. In this respect, this study aims to provide a systematic survey of three main game models widely employed in adversarial games, i.e., zero-sum normal-form and extensive-form games, Stackelberg(security) games, and zero-sum differential games, from an array of perspectives, including basic knowledge of game models,(approximate) equilibrium concepts, problem classifications, research frontiers,(approximate) optimal strategy-seeking techniques, prevailing algorithms, and practical applications. Finally, promising future research directions are also discussed for relevant adversarial games.

关键词： adversarial games zero-sum games Stackelberg games differential games Nash equilibrium correlated equilibrium regret

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Transaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain

High-Confidence Computing

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High-Confidence Computing 2022年第1期2卷 28-37页

作者： Zhilin Wang Qin Hu Yawei Wang Yinhao Xiao Department of Computer and Information Science Indiana University-Purdue University IndianapolisINUSA Department of Computer Science The George Washington UniversityWashingtonDCUSA School of Information Science Guangdong University of Finance and EconomicsGuangzhouChina

The importance of transaction fees in maintaining blockchain security and sustainability has been confirmed by extensive research,although they are not mandatory in most current blockchain systems.To enhance blockchain in the long term,it is crucial to design effective transaction pricing mechanisms.Different from the existing schemes based on auctions with more consideration about the profit of miners,we resort to game theory and propose a correlated equilibrium based transaction pricing mechanism through solving a pricing game among users with transactions,which can achieve both the individual and global optimum.To avoid the computational complexity exponentially increasing with the number of transactions,we further improve the game-theoretic solution with an approximate algorithm,which can derive almost the same results as the original one but costs significantly reduced time.We also propose a truthful assessment model for pricing mechanism to collect the feedback of users regarding the price suggestion.Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanism.

关键词： Blockchain Transaction pricing Game theory correlated equilibrium Peer prediction

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