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A SURVEY OF STACKELBERG DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODELS IN SUPPLY AND MARKETING channelS

Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering 2007年第4期16卷 385-413页

作者： Xiuli HE Ashutosh PRASAD Suresh P. SETHI Genaro J. GUTIERREZ School of Management The University of Texas at Dallas Richardson TX 75080 McCombs School of Business The University of Texas at Austin Austin TX 78731

Stackelberg differential game models have been used to study sequential decision making in noncooperative games in diverse fields. In this paper, we survey recent applications of Stackelberg differential game models to the supply chain management and marketing channels literatures. A common feature of these applications is the specification of the game structure： a decentralized channel composed of a manufacturer and independent retailers, and a sequential decision procedure with demand and supply dynamics and coordination issues. In supply chain management, Stackelberg differential games have been used to investigate inventory issues, wholesale and retail pricing strategies, and outsourcing in dynamic environments. The underlying demand typically has growth dynamics or seasonal variation. In marketing, Stackelberg differential games have been used to model cooperative advertising programs, store brand and national brand advertising strategies, shelf space allocation, and pricing and advertising decisions. The demand dynamics are usually extensions of the classical advertising capital models or sales-advertising response models. We begin by explaining the Stackelberg differential game solution methodology and then provide a description of the models and results reported in the literature.

关键词： Stackelberg differential games supply chain management marketing channels open-loop equilibria feedback policies channel coordination optimal control

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Supply Chain coordination of Loss-Averse Newsvendor with Contract

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Tsinghua Science and Technology 2005年第2期10卷 133-140页

作者：张龙宋士吉吴澄 CIMS Engineering Research Center Tsinghua University Beijing 100084 China

This paper studies a supply chain model in which a single supplier sells a single product to a single retailer who faces the newsvendor problem. The retailer is loss averse. The results show that the op- timal production quantity with decentralized decision making with a wholesale price contract is less than that with centralized decision making. The supply chain can achieve channel coordination with buy back and tar- get rebate contracts. With buy back contracts, the supply chain system profits can be allocated arbitrarily between the supplier and retailer. A new kind of contract, the incremental buy back contract, gives similar results as with the buy back contract. The advantages and drawbacks of these three types of contracts are analyzed with numerical examples.

关键词： supply chain management supply contract channel coordination risk analysis

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Price squeeze under fairness: the road to supply chain coordination with a powerful retailer

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Journal of Management Analytics 2022年第4期9卷 448-479页

作者： Mengmeng Wang Xiaojing Feng Antai College of Economics&Management Shanghai Jiao Tong UniversityShanghaiPeople’s Republic of China West Institute for Economic Research Southwestern University of Finance and EconomicsChengduPeople’s Republic of China

This research investigates the impacts of the manufacturer’s fairness concerns on the supply chain performance when the power retailer implements a price squeeze and market service investment *** game-theoretic modeling,we find that 1)in the absence of fairness,although the manufacturer may be worse off due to possessing imperfect information on the price squeeze rate,the channel may be coordinated through an ex-ante negotiation between the two parties.2)When the manufacturer has fairness concerns for price squeeze,both channel performance and brand goodwill are made worse by disadvantageous inequality and improved by advantageous inequality versus the case of no fairness ***,channel members’ex-ante negotiations regarding a profit reallocation scheme under certain conditions may achieve the following three objectives:generating a channel profit of the coordination level,promoting brand goodwill to the level of the integrated channel,and creating an equitable channel relationship.

关键词： behavioral operations management power retailer fairness channel coordination price squeeze bargaining

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Adjusted-Stackelberg Revenue Sharing for Coordinating Dual Sales channel

Adjusted-Stackelberg Revenue Sharing for Coordinating Dual S...

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The Tenth International Conference on Information and Management Sciences

作者： Erwin Widodo Katsuhiko Takahashi Katsumi Morikawa I Nyoman Pujawan Budi Santosa Graduate School of Engineering Hiroshima University Higashi-Hiroshima739-8527Japan

＜正＞Dual sales channel（DSC）,a structure of simultaneous sales through conventional store and online facility has been gaining its ***,besides of its potential,DSC also comes with its inner-competition between *** situation leads to the necessity of an effective coordination *** propose an approach of revenue sharing based on adjusted Stackelberg equilibrium result on DSC *** approach is simply practical unlike complicated full-coordination of Bertrand scheme but is able to offer higher total DSC profit than the original Stackelberg scheme.

关键词： dual sales channel sales return channel coordination pricing scheme

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coordination of Supply Chains by Flexible Option Contracts

Coordination of Supply Chains by Flexible Option Contracts

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第24届中国控制与决策会议

作者： Lili Wang,the School of Science, Qingdao Technological University,260033, Qingdao, China Jihui Zhang, Yushuang Liu the Institute of Complexity Science, Qingdao University, 266071 Qingdao, China Rongzhong Wang the Haier Technology Co., Ltd, DPG U-home Div,266101, Qingdao, China

This paper studies coordination in a supply chain with one manufacture and one retailer using the flexible supply contracts via call options. First we derive the manufacture’s optimal production decisions and the retailer’s optimal order decisions. Then we obtain an contract set, in which any option contract can coordinate the supply chain. We also prove that using the option contracts in this set, the manufacture’s profit, the retailer’s profit and the supply chain’s total profit can also increase, compared with the wholesale price contract.

关键词： Supply chain management Supply contract channel coordination Option contract

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实体零售与网络零售的协同形态及演进

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贸易经济 2014年第5期 27-33页

作者：王国顺何芳菲

顾客需求、企业发展需求及成本要素共同作用于实体零售与网络零售。受各要素影响，实体零售与网络零售协同的形态从市场探索发展至双渠道共生，再至双渠道协同，并向更高层次的协同形态演进。在实体零售与网络零售的协同演进过程中，各... 详细信息

顾客需求、企业发展需求及成本要素共同作用于实体零售与网络零售。受各要素影响，实体零售与网络零售协同的形态从市场探索发展至双渠道共生，再至双渠道协同，并向更高层次的协同形态演进。在实体零售与网络零售的协同演进过程中，各要素可能是推动力也可能是阻力，导致二者在协同演进过程中出现冲突。通过解决冲突可加强实体零售与网络零售的协同程度，提高优势资源的共享率，并形成新的协同形态。

关键词：实体零售网络零售渠道协同零售企业 brick-and-motor retail online retail channel coordination retailers

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双边收益共享与两部收费契约下的全渠道协调策略

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管理科学 2022年第3期

作者：李建斌郭培强陶智颖

在线上购买、线下取货（buy-online and pick-up-in-store，BOPS）的全渠道模式下，考虑消费者存在交叉购买行为，即线上消费者线下取货时在实体店产生的额外消费行为，电商平台和零售商的协调问题。传统收益共享契约（revenue sharing... 详细信息

在线上购买、线下取货（buy-online and pick-up-in-store，BOPS）的全渠道模式下，考虑消费者存在交叉购买行为，即线上消费者线下取货时在实体店产生的额外消费行为，电商平台和零售商的协调问题。传统收益共享契约（revenue sharing，RS）只是单方面的上下游企业之间的收益共享，针对BOPS零售系统中消费者的交叉购买行为给零售商带来了额外收益，基于传统RS契约，设计了一种新的协调机制——双边收益共享契约（bilateral revenue sharing，BRS），即电商平台将BOPS产生的收益分享给零售商，同时零售商将线下交叉销售收益分享给电商平台，形成线上和线下渠道、电商平台和零售商的双向共享机制。研究发现：当BRS契约的两个契约参数其中一个取0时即退化为传统RS契约，而此时传统RS契约无法协调全渠道BOPS系统，BRS契约则可以在线下实体店的边际交叉销售收益不高时使系统达到协调。进一步，又考虑了两部收费契约（two-part tariff，TPT）和RS契约组成的混合契约（mixed contract，MC）。研究结果表明：当系统的边际交叉销售收益较小时，采用BRS契约可以使全渠道BOPS系统达到协调；当边际交叉销售收益相对较大时，采用MC契约可以使系统达到协调；而当边际交叉销售收益处于中等水平时，采用BRS契约或者MC契约则取决于电商平台与零售商的谈判能力。

关键词：全渠道BOPS 交叉销售渠道协调双边收益共享契约两部收费契约 omni-channel BOPS cross-selling channel coordination bilateral revenue sharing contract two-part tariff contract

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企业社会责任下碳减排优化策略与协调机制研究

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管理科学 2021年第5期

作者：林欢马骋孙琦李丹

基于企业社会责任（CSR）的视角，本文研究由生产低碳产品的制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链的最优策略及供应链协调问题。通过构造供应链成员具有社会责任感的效用函数，分析了CSR对各成员的利润和环境的影响。研究发现：制造商和零售... 详细信息

基于企业社会责任（CSR）的视角，本文研究由生产低碳产品的制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链的最优策略及供应链协调问题。通过构造供应链成员具有社会责任感的效用函数，分析了CSR对各成员的利润和环境的影响。研究发现：制造商和零售商都是通过降低碳排放水平来体现社会责任感；无论制造商有社会责任感还是零售商有社会责任感，供应链的利润都增大；在收益共享—成本分摊合同（RC合同）下协调，可以使制造商和零售商实现双赢（帕累托最优）；零售商应该承担更多的社会责任，降低碳排放水平。

关键词：供应链企业社会责任感(CSR) 碳减排渠道协调帕累托最优 supply chain corporate social responsibility(CSR) carbon emissions channel coordination pareto optimality

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