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Simple Contracts to Coordinate the Capacity Procurement Model with asymmetric Demand information

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Journal of Systems Science & Complexity 2022年第1期35卷 245-263页

作者： LI Linqiu LIU Ke Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijing 100190China University of Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100190China

This paper studies the important problem of how to coordinate the capacity procurement model with asymmetric demand information.Under the model,the supplier has to secure necessary capacity before receiving a firm order from the manufacturer who possesses private demand information for her product.Optimal supply chain performance requires the manufacturer to share her forecast truthfully and the supplier to build enough capacity.In the literature,some elaborate contracts are designed to solve the problem.However,the authors prove that two simple conventional contracts(linear capacity reservation contract and payback agreement)can coordinate the supply chain and guarantee credible information sharing.Besides,the authors propose a new mechanism in which punishment is imposed in the payment function to bind the parties.To avoid punishment,the firms will choose the best decision for the entire supply chain.The contracts in this paper are all simple and easy to implement.The authors believe this work provides some insights to design coordination contracts in theory or in practice.

关键词： asymmetric information capacity investment mechanism design supply chain management

asymmetric information, Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Market Regulation

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Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica 2021年第3期37卷 459-476页

作者： Hong LIU Ying JIANG Huai-nian ZHANG KLAS and School of Mathematics and Statistics Northeast Normal UniversityChangchun 130024China Department of Mathematics and Physics Beijing Institute of Petrochemical TechnologyBeijing 102617China

This paper studies the trading behavior of an irrational insider and its influence on the market equilibrium in the presence of market regulation.We find that the market with only one insider with private information is almost close to a strong efficient market,under the condition of market regulation.In the equilibrium,the probability of the insider being caught trading with private information is zero,which shows that the reasonable behavior of the regulator is to essentially give up regulation.But the market efficiency and the irrational trader’s trading intensity all greatly improve because of the existence of the market regulation.

关键词： insider trading market regulation heterogeneous prior beliefs asymmetric information

asymmetric information in Combating Terrorism: Is the Threat Just a Bluff?

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Tsinghua Science and Technology 2010年第5期15卷 604-612页

作者：张婧申世飞杨锐 Center for Public Safety Research Department of Engineering Physics Tsinghua University

This paper explores the mitigation of terrorism risks based on dynamic interactions between terrorist organizations and governments with asymmetric information.Uncertainties in the objectives and capabilities of terrorists complicate defensive resource allocations for the public safety.Simultaneous and sequential game models are developed to investigate the asymmetric information effects on defensive strategies and terrorism risk analysis.The government can detect explicit or implicit signals to support decisions and update its beliefs according to a Bayesian law after it receives a terrorist threat.Analyses of the equilibrium for the signaling game indicate that the optimal government defensive strategy will significantly impact the actions of the terrorists.asymmetric information is shown to play a crucial role in security decision making and terrorism risk mitigation,with the optimal defensive strategy changing according to terrorists and government capabilities.

关键词： asymmetric information counter-terrorism risk assessment sequential game resource allocation

Linear-quadratic stochastic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric information

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Science China(information Sciences) 2017年第9期60卷 211-225页

作者： Jingtao SHI Guangchen WANG Jie XIONG School of Mathematics Shandong University School of Control Science and Engineering Shandong University Department of Mathematics University of Macau

This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic stochastic Stackelberg differential game, where players have asymmetric roles, with one leader and one follower in the context of two-person game. It is required that the information available to the follower is a sub-σ-algebra of the one of the leader. By maximum principle and optimal filtering, a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of the game is given. A special example is used to elaborate the result.

关键词： stochastic Stackelberg differential game linear-quadratic control asymmetric information condi tional mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equation optimal filtering

QUALITY EVALUATION LEVEL DECISION IN OUTSOURCING UNDER asymmetric information

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同方期刊数据库

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Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering 2006年第3期15卷 375-381页

作者： Cuihua ZHANG Haibin YU Guangshu CHANG School of Business and Management Northeastern University Shenyang 110004 China Shenyang Institute of Automation Chinese Academy of Sciences Shenyang 110003 China Zhengzhou Institute of Aeronautics Zhengzhou 450015 China

In this paper, the issue of quality evaluation level decision problem in outsourcing is studied under different information backgrounds. Based on the quality contracting optimization models of Stanley and others, a principal agent model concerned with quality prevention level and evaluation level is set up with regards to buyer as principal and supplier as agent. In the models, quality prevention level is a variable decided by the supplier, quality evaluation level and transfer payment are variables decided by the buyer. We focus on the study of quality evaluation level and transfer payment decision in outsourcing under asymmetric information. Maximal principle is used to get the solution to quality evaluation level when supplier quality prevention level information is hidden. At last simulation calculation is performed concerned with tractor production outsourcing business of an agricultural machine company. Simulation results under different information backgrounds are analyzed and compared.

关键词： Outsourcing asymmetric information principal agent maximal principle quality evaluation

Design Capability Identify under asymmetric information

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Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(New Series) 2013年第6期20卷 9-14页

作者： Yi-Yong Lin You-Song Wang School of Civil Engineering and Transportation South China University of Technology

Under the condition of asymmetric information,the Spence 's Job Market Signaling Model is generally applied to inspect the design capability of a designer and his labor and efforts to be invested; however,since the"prior probability"and "posterior probability"have great uncertainties,the practical effect of this model is poor. On the basis of analyzing reverse selection questions,this paper provides a design capability screening model,which can make a designer automatically expose his hidden information so that necessary actions can be taken as required by the owner to realize risk sharing. A calculation example is finally given to demonstrate that the new model is helpful for an owner to select a designer with high professional level and to lead the designer to work hard,so it is of significant application value.

关键词： Spence ’s Job Market Signaling Model reverse selection design capability risk analysis asymmetric information

Quantity discount contracts for supply chain coordination under asymmetric information and disruptions

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Journal of Southeast University(English Edition) 2008年第S1期24卷 11-16页

作者： Zhuang, Pin Zhao, Lindu School of Economics and Management Southeast University Nanjing 210096 China College of Economics and Management Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Nanjing 210016 China

The quantity discount contracts are investigated for a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain with asymmetric information when the retailer's cost is disrupted. While the retailer's cost structure is asymmetric information, two all-unit quantity discount contract models, fixed expected-profit percentage discount(FEPD) and fixed wholesale-pricing percentage discount(FWPD) under asymmetric information are proposed in a regular scenario. When the retailer's cost distribution fluctuates due to disruptions, the optimal emergency strategies of supply chains are obtained under asymmetric information. Using numerical methods, the impact of cost disruptions on decisions about the regular wholesale price, discount wholesale price, order quantity and expected profits of the retailer, the supplier as well as the total system are analyzed. It is found that the FEPD policy is more robust and adaptable than the FWPD policy in disruption circumstances.

关键词： supply chain quantity discount disruption management asymmetric information

SCM Implementation Decisions Under asymmetric information: An Agency Approach

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Journal of Systems Science and information 2020年第5期11卷 447-457页

作者： Lina WANG Stephen POELMANS Koen MILIS School of Economics and Management Hainan Normal UniversityHaikou 571158China Faculty of Economics and Management Hogeschool-Universiteit BrusselKU Leuven AssociationWarmoesberg 261000 BrusselsBelgium Campus Vesta Education Management IndustryBrusselsBelgium

The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-supply chain management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions.For both conditions,SCM implementation optional decision optimizing models have been developed.In these models,both clients and vendors try to pursue their own benefits.Based upon the principal-agent theory,the models show to what extent a principal(a client)needs to pay more to an agent(a vendor)in a context of asymmetric information.For the client it is important to understand the extra costs to be able to adopt effective strategies to stimulate a vendor to perform an optimal implementation of a SCM system.The results of a simulation experiment regarding SCM implementation options illustrate and verify the theoretical findings and confirm the general notion that the less informed party is obliged to pay information rent to the better-informed party.

关键词： SCM implementation problems asymmetric information implementation control cost evaluation level principal-agent theory

Study on Pollution Cost Control Model under asymmetric information Based on Principal Agent

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Journal of Systems Science and information 2021年第5期9卷 549-557页

作者： Lina WANG Koen MILIS Stephen POELMANS School of Economics and Management Hainan Normal UniversityHaikou 571158China Campus Vesta Education Management IndustryBrusselsBelgium Faculty of Economics and Management Hogeschool-Universiteit BrusselKULeuven AssociationWarmoesberg 26Brussel 1000Belgium

Pollution cost control is key to solve pollution problem.The paper takes pollution control cost of pollution control contract between management authority and pollutant discharge enterprise as research object,considers pollution control quality level,pollution control quality inspection and pollution control cost model,and establishes pollution control cost model of management authority and pollutant discharge enterprise,including rational constraints of pollutant discharge enterprise.And it analyzes principal-agent relationship between the two under condition of asymmetric information,and un-observability of pollution control level is shown as hiding information of sewage enterprises.In essence,it is problem of adverse selection in principal-agent.Pollution control cost of management is objective function.The first order condition of pollution control cost of sewage enterprise is transformed into state space equation,and optimal control of problem is solved by using maximum principle.In particular,management authority,as principal,uses pollution control provisions to reward,punish and encourage pollutant discharge enterprises as agents.

关键词： principal agent asymmetric information pollution cost control