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quantum cryptanalysis on some generalized Feistel schemes

Science China(Information Sciences) 2019年第2期62卷 180-191页

作者： Xiaoyang DONG Zheng LI Xiaoyun WANG Institute for Advanced Study Tsinghua University Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security Ministry of EducationShandong University

Post-quantum cryptography has attracted much attention from worldwide cryptologists. In ISIT 2010, Kuwakado and Morii gave a quantum distinguisher with polynomial time against 3-round Feistel networks. However, generalized Feistel schemes(GFS) have not been systematically investigated against quantum attacks. In this paper, we study the quantum distinguishers about some generalized Feistel *** d-branch Type-1 GFS(CAST256-like Feistel structure), we introduce(2 d-1)-round quantum distinguishers with polynomial time. For 2 d-branch Type-2 GFS(RC6/CLEFIA-like Feistel structure), we give(2 d + 1)-round quantum distinguishers with polynomial time. Classically, Moriai and Vaudenay proved that a 7-round 4-branch Type-1 GFS and 5-round 4-branch Type-2 GFS are secure pseudo-random permutations. Obviously, they are no longer secure in quantum setting. Using the above quantum distinguishers, we introduce generic quantum key-recovery attacks by applying the combination of Simon’s and Grover’s algorithms recently proposed by Leander and May. We denote n as the bit length of a branch. For(d2-d + 2)-round Type-1 GFS with d branches, the time complexity is 2((1/2d2-3/2d+2)·n/2), which is better than the quantum brute force search(Grover search) by a factor 2((1/4d2+1/4d)n). For 4 d-round Type-2 GFS with d2 branches, the time complexity is 2((d2n)/2(, which is better than the quantum brute force search by a factor 2((3d2n)/2).

关键词： generalized Feistel schemes Simon Grover quantum key-recovery quantum cryptanalysis

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quantum key-recovery attack on Feistel structures

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Science China(Information Sciences) 2018年第10期61卷 240-246页

作者： Xiaoyang DONG Xiaoyun WANG Institute for Advanced Study Tsinghua University Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security Ministry of EducationShandong University

Post-quantum cryptography has drawn considerable attention from cryptologists on a global scale. At Asiacrypt 2017, Leander and May combined Grover’s and Simon’s quantum algorithms to break the FX-based block ciphers, which were introduced by Kilian and Rogaway to strengthen DES. In this study,we investigate the Feistel constructions using Grover’s and Simon’s algorithms to generate new quantum key-recovery attacks on different rounds of Feistel constructions. Our attacks require 2quantum queries to break an r-round Feistel construction. The time complexity of our attacks is less than that observed for quantum brute-force search by a factor of 2. When compared with the best classical attacks, i.e.,Dinur et al.’s attacks at CRYPTO 2015, the time complexity is reduced by a factor of 2without incurring any memory cost.

关键词： quantum cryptanalysis quantum key-recovery Feistel structure Simon Grover

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quantum key recovery attack on SIMON32/64

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Cybersecurity 2021年第1期4卷 349-363页

作者： Hui Liu Li Yang State Key Laboratory of Information Security Institute of Information EngineeringChinese Academy of Sciences100093 BeijingChina School of Cyber Security University of Chinese Academy of Sciences100049 BeijingChina

The quantum security of lightweight block ciphers is receiving more and more ***,the existing quantum attacks on lightweight block ciphers only focused on the quantum exhaustive search,while the quantum attacks combined with classical cryptanalysis methods haven’t been well *** this paper,we study quantum key recovery attack on SIMON32/64 using quantum Amplitude Amplification algorithm in Q1 *** first,we reanalyze the quantum circuit complexity of quantum exhaustive search on SIMON32/*** estimate the Clifford gates count more accurately and reduce the T gate ***,the T-depth and full depth is reduced due to our minor ***,using four differentials given by Biryukov in FSE 2014 as our distinguisher,we give our quantum key recovery attack on 19-round SIMON32/*** treat the two phases of key recovery attack as two QAA instances separately,and the first QAA instance consists of four sub-QAA ***,we design the quantum circuit of these two QAA instances and estimate their corresponding quantum circuit *** conclude that the quantum circuit of our quantum key recovery attack is lower than quantum exhaustive *** work firstly studies the quantum dedicated attack on SIMON32/*** this is the first work to study the complexity of quantum dedicated attacks from the perspective of quantum circuit complexity,which is a more fine-grained analysis of quantum dedicated attacks’complexity.

关键词： quantum cryptanalysis Lightweight block ciphers quantum amplitude amplification Differential cryptanalysis Key recovery attack SIMON32/64

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