检索结果-南通市图书馆

Are transactional Political connections more valuable to firms than relational Political connections?

维普期刊数据库

同方期刊数据库评论

在线全文

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

Economic and political Studies 2022年第3期10卷 266-278页

作者： Taufiq Arifin Rezaul Kabir Katherin Marthon Sutaryo Sutaryo Faculty of Economics and Business Universitas Sebelas MaretSurakartaIndonesia Centre for Fintech and Banking Universitas Sebelas MaretSurakartaIndonesia Faculty of Behavioural Management and Social SciencesUniversity of TwenteEnschedethe Netherlands Gabelli School of Business Fordham UniversityNew YorkNYUSA

Political connections are an increasingly important part of firms’strategies to develop relationships with the government and poli-ticians.This study examines the impact of transactional and rela-tional Political connections on firm value.The results show that transactionally connected firms are more likely to exhibit greater firm value than their relationally connected and non-connected counterparts.This study further finds evidence of a long-term value-enhancing effect of the transactional approach to Political connections.A variety of robustness tests with alternative model specifications continue to show that transactional political con-nections lead to higher firm value.The findings indicate that firms with transactional Political connections are provided with better networks with the political regime in power compared with those with relational Political connections.These transactionally con-nected firms may enjoy preferential treatment from the govern-ment,in the form of lower taxes,and the access to government loans,subsidies,bailouts,and/or procurement contracts.

关键词： Political connections transactional connections relational connections firm value

Political connections,Government Regulations and Risk-Taking--Evidence From China

在线全文

维普期刊数据库

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

Frontiers of Economics in China-Selected Publications from Chinese Universities 2018年第4期13卷 655-684页

作者： Shangzhou Ji George Yungchih Wang School of Finance Shanghai University of International Business and EconomicsShanghai 201620China Faculty of International Liberal Arts Soka UniversityTokyo-toHachioji-shi Tangi-cho 1-236 Japan

Sufficient evidence suggests that enterprises under strong government regulations suffer the economic effects of Political connections, which not only leads to competitive disadvantages and loss of innovation, but also less willingness to take risks. This paper explores the relationship between Political connections and corporate risk-taking behavior in corporate governance. Specifically, in 2008, the Chinese government announced new policies to regulate government officials concurrently holding the positions of independent directors in firms. We sample publicly listed firms in the Chinese A-share market over the period of 2005–2010 and investigate changes in risk-taking behavior due to the new policies. Our findings indicate that a reduction in politically connected independent directors may encourage risk-taking behavior subject to the factors of state ownership, industry regulations, local government control, and corporate characteristics.

关键词： Political connections government regulations risk-taking independent directors

Anti-corruption, marketisation and firm behaviours: evidence from firm innovation in China

在线全文

维普期刊数据库

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

Economic and political Studies 2016年第1期4卷 39-61页

作者： Li Dang Ruilong Yang School of Economics at Renmin University of China BeijingChina

China has launched an anti-corruption campaign since theEighteenth CPC National Congress, which has exerted widespreadinfluences on Chinese politics and economy. This paper examinesthe effect of the anti-corruption initiative on firm behaviours fromthe perspective of research and development (R&D) investments. Itshows that pursuing Political connections and improving innovation are two mutually exclusive alternatives for firm growth inChina. The anti-corruption campaign raises the cost of seeking forpolitical bond and strengthens the incentive for firm innovation.After anti-corruption policies and regulations were issued, R&Dexpenditure in politically connected firms increases significantly;the anti-corruption initiative has positive effects on firm innovation.Further research shows that the effects vary with different types offirms. For state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the anti-corruptioninitiative only increases the R&D investments of firms with seniorexecutives who used to serve in the government;while for nonstate-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), this campaign has all-aroundpositive effects on their R&D investments. In the meantime, a heterogeneity at the provincial level is observed: R&D investments offirms with Political connections increase more significantly in provinces with more intense anti-corruption efforts. Finally, marketisation also has a role to play. For regions with a more developedmarket economy, anti-corruption increases the innovation of firmswith Political connections;whereas in regions with a less developed market economy, this effect is insignificant. This paper provides evidence for the opinion that anti-corruption is favourable toeconomic growth in China. To solve the endogeneity problem, ituses data obtained from the anti-corruption policy experimentsince the Eighteenth CPC National Congress and the difference-indifferences (DID) method to further test the hypotheses.

关键词： Anti-corruption DID firm innovation Political connections

Do independent directors play a political role? Evidence from independent directors' death events

在线全文

维普期刊数据库

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

China Journal of Accounting Research 2017年第4期10卷 295-316页

作者： Qing Ye Zengquan Li Center for Accounting Finance and Institutions Sun Yat-sen University Sun Yat-sen Business School Sun Yat-sen University School of Accountancy and The Institute of Accounting and Finance Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

We propose that independent directors are likely to play a political role in an institutional setting featuring weak investor protection and strong government intervention. Using Chinese data for 2001–2014, we investigate whether the stock price reaction to an independent director's death is related to his or her political connection. We find a stronger negative reaction to the death announcements of politically connected than politically unconnected independent directors. The magnitude of the reaction is positively related to directors' political rank, and cannot be offset by their firms' political capital. However,we document no evidence of politically connected independent directors exhibiting superior monitoring or consulting performance. Additional analyses show that firms are more inclined to appoint a politically connected independent director as a successor if his or her predecessor also had Political connections. Our study broadens scholarly understanding of independent directors' role in a non-Anglo-American setting.

关键词： Independent directors Political connections political role

在线全文

维普期刊数据库

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

政治关联、企业绩效与企业行为的研究综述

企业管理研究

企业管理研究 2010年第8期 3-10页

作者：马晓维苏忠秦曾琰谢珍珠

自Krueger开创性地指出企业家花费时间和金钱与政府官员建立关系能给企业带来利益以来，企业与政治之间的关系一直是经济学家关注的热点问题之一。本文梳理了近年来关于政治关联(Political connections)与企业价值之间的主要理论和实证... 详细信息

自Krueger开创性地指出企业家花费时间和金钱与政府官员建立关系能给企业带来利益以来，企业与政治之间的关系一直是经济学家关注的热点问题之一。本文梳理了近年来关于政治关联(Political connections)与企业价值之间的主要理论和实证文献。在实证文献综述中，从政治关联对企业价值与企业行为影响的这两个维度出发，按照文献的发展脉络和逻辑关系，阐述了这些文献的概念定义、度量方法、样本选择及主要结论。最后进行了总结并提出进一步研究的展望。

关键词：制度背景政治关联企业绩效融资行为　　institutional background Political connections corporate performance financing

来源：人大复印报刊资料评论

在线全文

人大复印报刊资料

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

反腐败、政商关系转型与企业绩效

社会主义经济理论与实践 2019年第3期 25-40页

作者：黄少卿潘思怡施浩

利用2013年以来中国政府的强力反腐行动作为一个准自然实验，本文基于上市公司数据，对政商关系转型如何影响企业绩效进行了经验分析，主要结论如下：上市公司维护旧政商关系的腐败性支出会降低业绩；反腐行动在打破旧政商关系、创造公... 详细信息

利用2013年以来中国政府的强力反腐行动作为一个准自然实验，本文基于上市公司数据，对政商关系转型如何影响企业绩效进行了经验分析，主要结论如下：上市公司维护旧政商关系的腐败性支出会降低业绩；反腐行动在打破旧政商关系、创造公平竞争环境上显现了成效，有政治关联和没有关联的两类公司的业绩差距在缩小，因为前一类公司出现了提高资源使用效率的“挖潜”现象，其中尤以民营控股上市公司为甚；反腐后上市公司的整体业绩出现了显著下滑，暗示着存在官员不作为现象，也说明依靠法治的新型政商关系的建立尚未完成。此外，反腐后上市公司整体研发投入显著增加，但尚未有证据表明研发投入已经改善了公司业绩。为使中国经济尽早转向高质量发展，应该在破除旧政商关系的同时加快建立新型政商关系，形成法治基础上对官员的激励与可问责机制。

关键词：政治关联反腐败企业绩效研发新型政商关系 Political connections anti-corruption firm performance R&D new pattern of government-business relationships

来源：人大复印报刊资料评论

在线全文

人大复印报刊资料

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

企业成长：政治关联还是能力建设？