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cooperative and Competitive Multi-Agent Systems:From Optimization to games

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IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica 2022年第5期9卷 763-783页

作者： Jianrui Wang Yitian Hong Jiali Wang Jiapeng Xu Yang Tang Qing-Long Han Jürgen Kurths Key Laboratory of Smart Manufacturing in Energy Chemical Process Ministry of EducationEast China University of Science and TechnologyShanghai 200237China Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of WindsorWindsorON N9B 3P4Canada IEEE School of Science Computing and Engineering TechnologiesSwinburne University of TechnologyMelbourneVIC 3122Australia Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research 14473 Potsdam Institute of Physics Humboldt University of Berlin12489 BerlinGermany

Multi-agent systems can solve scientific issues related to complex systems that are difficult or impossible for a single agent to solve through mutual collaboration and cooperation *** a multi-agent system,agents with a certain degree of autonomy generate complex interactions due to the correlation and coordination,which is manifested as cooperative/competitive *** survey focuses on multi-agent cooperative optimization and cooperative/non-cooperative *** from cooperative optimization,the studies on distributed optimization and federated optimization are *** survey mainly focuses on distributed online optimization and its application in privacy protection,and overviews federated optimization from the perspective of privacy protection ***,cooperative games and non-cooperative games are introduced to expand the cooperative optimization problems from two aspects of minimizing global costs and minimizing individual costs,***-agent cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors are modeled by games from both static and dynamic aspects,according to whether each player can make decisions based on the information of other ***,future directions for cooperative optimization,cooperative/non-cooperative games,and their applications are discussed.

关键词： cooperative games counterfactual regret minimization distributed optimization federated optimization fictitious

Inventory games with Quantity Discount

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Journal of Systems Science & Complexity 2021年第4期34卷 1538-1554页

作者： LI Wenzhong XU Genjiu SU Jun School of Mathematics and Statistics Northwestern Polytechnical UniversityXi'an 710072China School of Science Xi'an University of Science and TechnologyXi'an 710054China

Meca,et al.(2004)studied a class of inventory games which arise when a group of retailers who observe demand for a common good decide to cooperate and make joint *** this paper,the authors extend their model to the situation where the manufacturer provides the retailers with a price discount on purchases in excess of a certain order *** authors define the corresponding inventory game with quantity discount,and show that the inventory game has a nonempty ***,the authors propose a core allocation rule,the demand-proportionality rule,and characterize it by introducing efficiency,the retailer splitting property and continuity.

关键词： Allocation cooperative games inventory model quantity discount

CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND COORDINATION ISSUES FOR THE TIMELY PROCESSING OF OUTSOURCED OPERATIONS

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Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering 2014年第3期23卷 300-312页

作者： Tolga Aydinliyim Xiaoqiang Cai George L.Vairaktarakis Loomba Department of Management Zicklin School of Business Baruch CollegeCity University of New YorkNew YorkNY USA 10010-5585 Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management The Chinese University of Hong Kong Department of Operations Weatherhead School of Management Case Western Reserve UniversityClevelandOH USA 44106-72350

We consider dynamic capacity booking problems faced by multiple manufacturers each outsourcing certain operations to a common third-party firm. Each manufacturer, upon observing the current state of the third-party schedule, books capacity with the objective to jointly minimize holding costs that result from early deliveries, tardiness penalties due to late deliveries, and third-party capacity booking costs. When making a reservation, each manufacturer evaluates two alternative courses of action：（i） reserving capacity not yet utilized by other manufactures who booked earlier; or （ii） forming a coalition with a subset or all of other manufacturers to achieve a schedule minimizing coalition costs, i.e., a centralized schedule for that coalition. The latter practice surely benefits the coalition as a whole; however, some manufacturers may incur higher costs if their operations are either pushed back too much, or delivered too early. For this reason, a cost allocation scheme making each manufacturer no worse than they would be when acting differently （i.e., participating in a smaller coalition or acting on their own behalf,） must accompany centralized scheduling for the coalition. We model this relationship among the manufacturers as a cooperative game with transferable utility, and present optimal and/or heuristic algorithms to attain individually and eoalitionally optimal schedules as well as a linear program formulation to find a core allocation of the manufacturers＇ costs.

关键词： Outsourcing scheduling capacity allocation cooperative games

Cost Allocation for Inventory Problem with Transportation Discount under Carbon Tax Policy

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Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering 2024年第6期33卷 759-778页

作者： Guojing Chen Dongshuang Hou School of Mathematics and Statistics Northwestern Polytechnical UniversityXi’an710072China Research&Development Institute of Northwestern Polytechnical University in Shenzhen Sanhang Science&Technology BuildingShenzhen518063China

In this paper,we deal with the problem of cost allocation among multiple retailers in an inventory system with transportation quantity discount under the widely-used carbon tax *** first develop an inventory model with transportation discount under the carbon tax policy,and determine the optimal order quantity per order such that the total cost is minimized in the case of individual and joint *** show that the total cost for the group of retailers can be reduced by placing joint orders while the total carbon emissions may ***,we provide a sufficient condition which indicates that when the costs and carbon emissions associated with each order initiated are relatively high,enterprises can achieve dual objectives(both carbon emission reduction and cost reduction)through joint *** allocate the total cost among the retailers,we introduce an inventory game and show that this game is *** on this,we propose a cost allocation rule,which belongs to the core of the game.

关键词： Supply chain management inventory systems carbon tax transportation discount cooperative games

Invasive Species Control Based on a cooperative Game

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Applied Mathematics 2013年第10期4卷 54-59页

作者： Ismet Esra Buyuktahtakın Zhuo Feng George Frisvold Ferenc Szidarovszky Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering Wichita State UniversityWichitaUSA Computer Science and Engineering Arizona State UniversityTempeUSA Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics University of ArizonaTucsonUSA Department of Applied Mathematics University of PecsPecsHungary

We develop a long-term dynamic model for controlling invasive species using the theory of cooperative games. The model is applied to control of invasive buffelgrass in the Arizona desert, which directly competes with indigenous species and can increase wildfire risk. Interest groups care about damages to three threatened resources: saguaro, cactus, riparian vegetation, and buildings. The model optimally allocates labor and a budget to protect these resources by controlling the buffelgrass population over a multi-period planning horizon. The solution is based on computing the Shapley values for the interest groups. A homeowner strategy of creating defensible space around structures to protect against wildfire affords less protection to the other resources. A similar result holds for protection of saguaros, which are also spatially concentrated. Under the optimal solution, groups caring about spatially-dispersed, riparian vegetation would compensate homeowners and groups caring about saguaros for a reallocation of resources toward greater protection of dispersed vegetation. Results highlight the importance of the spatial configuration of players and the resources they wish to protect in invasive species control problems.

关键词： Non-Native Invasive Species Buffelgrass Optimal Control Integer Programming cooperative games Shapley Value

Imputation Schemes for the cooperative Game in the Hybrid Power System Planning

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Imputation Schemes for the Cooperative Game in the Hybrid Po...

A Game-theoretic Approach to Resource Sharing Management

第三十届中国控制会议

作者： MEI Shengwei,WANG Yingying,LIU Feng State Key Lab of Power Systems,Department of Electrical Engineering,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,P.R.China

＜正＞Game theory is a good way to model the hybrid power system planning,by taking the wind power,photovoltaic generation and storage batteries as *** is illustrated that the grand cooperation of all the three players can achieve the maximum total economic ***,that how to assign the gains from the cooperation is an essential problem in the cooperative game,and is thus the topic of this *** constraints for the core that any imputation of this cooperative game should satisfy are given in this paper to attempt to achieve a mutually acceptable basis for an agreement,such that all the players are interested to cooperate.A modified index of propensity to disrupt is used to test the cooperation strength of a given imputation ***,four specific imputation schemes including the equal assignment,the generation capacity based assignment,the Shapley value and the equal disruption propensity based imputations,are proposed and analyzed,and the last two schemes are illustrated to be the best.

关键词： cooperative games Hybrid Power System Planning Imputation Core Shapley Value Disruption Propensity

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A Game-theoretic Approach to Resource Sharing Management

协作车辆路径成本分摊问题的B-T Shapley方法

The Second International Conference on Game Theory and Applications (CMGTA’2007)

作者： Elena Parilina Department of Mathematical Game Theory and Statistical Decisions Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes Saint-Petersburg State UniversityUniversitetskii prospekt35PeterhofSaint-Petersburg198504Russia

＜正＞This work deals with the situation when some firms（players） working on a market of the same product or services and which have to incur the similar *** organize the network to save their money on these expenses using the resources of other *** problem is modelled as a cooperative game with transferable *** game is called the cooperative game of expenses *** game where the firms enter the market one after another is *** the first two stages the strategies of the firms are the choices of the number *** resource units that they share in this *** two stages the firms cooperate in the network in this area and allocate their expenses using an imputation received in the cooperative game of expenses allocation.

关键词： cooperative games Shapley Value subgame perfect equilibrium.

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