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Sensitive Information Protection Model Based on bayesian Game

Computers, Materials & Continua 2022年第10期73卷 883-898页

作者： Yuzhen Liu Zhe Liu Xiaoliang Wang Qing Yang Guocai Zuo Frank Jiang School of Computer Science and Engineering Hunan University of Science and TechnologyXiangtan411201China Hunan Key Laboratory for Service computing and Novel Software Technology Xiangtan411201China College of computer and information engineering Hunan University of Technology and BusinessChangshaChina School of Computer Science and Information Engineering Guangzhou Maritime UniversityGuangzhouChina Hunan Software Vocational and Technical University XiangtanChina School of Engineering and IT University of New South WalesNSWAustralia

A game measurement model considering the attacker’s knowledge background is proposed based on the bayesian game theory aiming at striking a balance between the protection of sensitive information and the quality of *** quantified the sensitive level of information according to the user’s personalized sensitive information protection *** on the probability distribution of sensitive level and attacker’s knowledge background type,the strategy combination of service provider and attacker was analyzed,and a game-based sensitive information protection model was *** the combination of strategies under bayesian equilibrium,the information entropy was used to measure the leakage of sensitive ***,in the paper the influence of the sensitive level of information and the attacker’s knowledge background on the strategy of both sides of the game was considered *** on,the leakage of the user’s sensitive information was ***,the feasibility of the model was described by experiments.

关键词： Sensitive information game theory bayesian equilibrium sensitive level information entropy

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Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information

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Journal of Systems Engineering and Electronics 2002年第1期13卷 74-79页

作者： Hou Wenhua International Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, P.R. China Yao Li School of Mathematics and Statistics, Hebei Economics and Trade University, Shijiazhuang 050061, P.R. China Wang Shouyang Institute of Systems Science, Aca International Business School Nankai University Tianjin 300071 P. R. China School of Mathematics and Statistics Hebei Economics and Trade University Shijiazhuang 050061 P. R. China Institute of Systems Science Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100080 P. R. China

In the bayesian game models, the uncertainty is described with probability, but sometimes the uncertainty in practice is given by some fuzzy parameters, and the objectives of players may be not to maximize the expected payoffs. In this paper, a new subjective equilibrium is given for fuzzy games. We make a powerful comparison with bayesian and equilibria for Stackelberg duopoly game with fuzzy costs. It is showed that endogenous Stackelberg leadership is related with not only marginal costs but also beliefs of the firms.

关键词： Stackelberg model bayesian equilibrium Belief equilibrium.

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Study on Game Theory of Social Law Enforcement

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Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology 2003年第3期12卷 329-331页

作者：张国臣黎志成 Management College Huazhong University of Science and Technology

Based on the basis of the two stage dynamic game of complete information and purely tactful perfect equilibrium theory, the non cooperative gaming between the police department and the criminals is analyzed. Dynamic game can be proved to forecast and explain potential tactful choices of the police department and the criminals at various stages, so as to analyze the essence of the law enforcement by the theoretical models.

关键词： law enforcement dynamic game Nash equilibrium bayesian equilibrium

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Cournot Model of Multidimensional Game with Incomplete Information and Its equilibrium Analysis

Cournot Model of Multidimensional Game with Incomplete Infor...

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The Fourth International Conference on Systems Science and Systems Engineering(ICSSSE’03)

作者： TAN De-qing School of Economics & Management,Southwest JiaoTong University,Chengdu,610031.P.R.China LIU Guang-zhong School of Business & Management,Sichuan University,Chengdu,610064.P.R.China

The paper first discusses Cournot model of multidimensional game with Incomplete Information,then further analyzes that the bayesian equilibrium strategy chosen by firms independently participating in game for each kind of product are inferior to the bayesian equilibrium strategy chosen by firms participating in the multidimensional game when two firms take game for two kinds of product with substitution.

关键词： multidimensional game incomplete information bayesian equilibrium substitution

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