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A bayesian theory of Games： An Analysis of Strategic Interactions with Statistical decision Theoretic Foundation

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Journal of Mathematics and System Science 2012年第3期2卷 145-155页

作者： Jimmy Teng School of Economics University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus Selangor 43500 Malaysia

This paper introduces a new game theoretic equilibrium which is based upon the bayesian subjective view of probability, BEIC （bayesian equilibrium iterative conjectures）. It requires players to make predictions, starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions （or conjectures） and keep updating with statistical decision theoretic and game theoretic reasoning until a convergence of conjectures is achieved. Information known by the players such as the reaction functions are thereby incorporated into their higher order conjectures and help to determine the convergent conjectures and the equilibrium. In a BEIC, conjectures are consistent with the equilibrium or equilibriums they supported and so rationality is achieved for actions, strategies and conjectures. The BEIC approach is capable of analyzing a larger set of games than current Nash Equilibrium based games theory, including games with inaccurate observations, games with unstable equilibrium and games with double or multiple sided incomplete information games. On the other hand, for the set of games analyzed by the current games theory, it generates far lesser equilibriums and normally generates only a unique equilibrium. It treats games with complete and perfect information as special cases of games with incomplete information and noisy observation whereby the variance of the prior distribution function on type and the variance of the observation noise term tend to zero. Consequently, there is the issue of indeterminacy in statistical inference and decision making in these games as the equilibrium solution depends on which variances tends to zero first. It therefore identifies equilibriums in these games that have so far eluded the classical theory of games. Finally, it also resolves inconsistencies in equilibrium results by different solution concepts in current games theory such as that between Nash Equilibrium and iterative elimination of dominated strategies and that between Perfect B

关键词： New equilibrium concept iterative conjectures convergence bayesian decision theory Schelling point.

A Receiver-Forwarding decision Scheme Based on bayesian for NDN-VANET

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China Communications 2020年第8期17卷 106-120页

作者： Xian Guo Yuxi Chen Laicheng Cao Di Zhang Yongbo Jiang School of Computer and Communication Lanzhou University of TechnologyLanzhou 730050China

Named Data Network(NDN) has caused wide concerns in VANET community because NDN uses a content-centric mechanism that naming content rather than the host. However, integrating NDN into VANET(NDN-VANET) also faces several challenges including consumer/provider mobile, broadcast storm problem and so on. In this paper, we propose a bayesian-based Receiver Forwarding decision(BRFD) scheme to mitigate the broadcast storm problem incurred by interest packets in NDN-VANET. In the BRFD, vehicles received an interest packet are required to make forwarding decisions based on bayesian decision theory according to current network conditions obtained by neighbor interaction. However, the receiver-forwarding decision in BRFD can also cause a conflict issue because multiple vehicles forward copies of the same packet at the same time. So a back-off mechanism is introduced in BRFD. Experimental results show that the BRFD algorithm has better performance in several aspects in contrast to probability-based forwarding scheme and "bread crumb" routing.

关键词： named-data networking content routing bayesian decision theory broadcast storm VANET

Optimal procurement strategy of fresh produce retailer under stochastic product qualification and market demand

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Journal of Control and decision 2021年第2期8卷 192-200页

作者： Zhouyang Liang Hongwei Liu Meihua Zuo Hui Zhu Yonghua Zuo School of Management Guangdong University of TechnologyGuangzhouPeople’s Republic of China School of Architecture and Civil Engineering Huizhou UniversityHuizhouPeople’s Republic of China School of Management Guangzhou UniversityGuangzhouPeople’s Republic of China School of Mathematics and Information Science Jiangxi Normal UniversityNanchangPeople’s Republic of China Jiangxi Institute of Economic Development NanchangPeople’s Republic of China

Consider an optimal procurement strategy for fresh produce,which is a type of perishable *** to the different quality provided by each manufacturer,the fresh produce qualification rates are ***,consumers demand is influenced by the freshness and price of products,as a result,the demand in the market is not *** this scenario,how a particular retailer should develop an optimal procurement strategy will be a core issue in supply chain *** order to address the above questions,the bayesian approach is adopted to explore retailer optimal procurement strategies with uncertainty about product supply and market ***,simulation data are used to analyse the results of the proposed model and expected non-random model to illustrate the validity and feasibility of the proposed model.

关键词： Fresh produce optimal procurement strategy stochastic product qualification uncertainty of supply and demand bayesian decision theory

An Analysis of the Value of Additional Information Provided by Water Quality Measurement Network

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Journal of Water Resource and Protection 2016年第8期8卷 767-776页

作者： François Destandau Amadou Pascal Diop GESTE UMR MA 8101 Engees-Irstea Strasbourg France

European Community policy concerning water is placing increasing demands on the acquisition of information about the quality of aquatic environments. The cost of this information has led to a reflection on the rationalization of monitoring networks and, therefore, on the economic value of information produced by these networks. The aim of this article is to contribute to this reflection. To do so, we used the bayesian framework to define the value of additional information in relation to the following three parameters: initial assumptions (prior probabilities) on the states of nature, costs linked to a poor decision (error costs) and accuracy of additional information. We then analyzed the impact of these parameters on this value, particularly the combined role of prior probabilities and error costs that increased or decreased the value of information depending on the initial uncertainty level. We then illustrated the results using a case study of a stream in the Bas-Rhin department in France.

关键词： bayesian decision theory Eutrophication Value of Information Water Quality Monitoring Network Water Resource Management

bayesian Equilibrium by Iterative Conjectures as a Refinement of Nash Equilibrium

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Journal of Mathematics and System Science 2012年第9期2卷 545-551页

作者： Jimmy Teng School of Economics University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus Selangor 43500 Malaysia

BEIC （bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures） analyzes games with players forming their conjectures about what other players will do through iterative reasoning starting with first order uninformative conjectures and keep updating their conjectures iteratively with game theoretic reasoning until a convergence of conjectures is achieved. In a BEIC, beliefs about the other players＇ strategies are specified and they are consistent with the equilibrium strategies they supported. A BEIC is therefore a perfect bayesian equilibrium and hence a refinement of Nash equilibrium. Through six examples, the BE1C solutions are compared with those obtained by the other refining criteria of payoff-dominance, risk-dominance, iterated admissibility, subgame perfect equilibrium, bayesian Nash equilibrium, perfect bayesian equilibrium and the intuitive criterion. The outstanding results from the comparisons are that the BEIC approach is able to pick the natural focal point of a game when the iterated admissibility criterion fails to, the BEIC approach rules out equilibrium depending upon non credible threat, and that in simultaneous and sequential games of incomplete information, the BEIC approach not only normally narrows down the equilibriums to one but it also picks the most compelling equilibrium compare with bayesian Nash equilibrium or perfect bayesian equilibrium or intuitive criterion.

关键词： New equilibrium concept refinement iterative reasoning bayesian decision theory conjectures.

基于敌意风险分析方法的多阶段反恐设备选址模型

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