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auctions to reveal consumers’willingness to pay for low-carbon hydrogen projects:combining lessons from renewables and natural-gas industries

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Clean Energy 2024年第4期8卷 103-110页

作者： Miguel Vazquez Michelle Hallack SDA School of Management Bocconi UniversityVia Roberto Sarfatti1020136 MilanMIItaly Florence School of Regulation EUIVia Giovanni Boccaccio12150133 FirenzeFIItaly

Low-carbon hydrogen is expected to play a key role in realizing net-zero and sustainable development ***,there is a gap between the cost of producing low-carbon hydrogen and its potential users’willingness to pay for such *** implement support for the development of the industry,we propose using low-carbon hydrogen long-term agreements allocated through auction *** objectives are 2-fold:(i)matching supply and demand volumes considering the time horizon and geographical delivery point specification and(ii)allocating the *** perspective article innovates by proposing a reference price indexed to liquid to natural-gas prices,which is the main product that low-carbon hydrogen aims to *** premium and the production cost are defined through a double-sided *** aims to minimize the public policy funds required to incentivize the low-carbon hydrogen market while facilitating long-term agreements and mitigating price risks that may hinder investment.

关键词： hydrogen auctions Renewable Eenergy Systems support mechanisms natural gas

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Evolutionary Techniques for Reverse auctions

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Intelligent Control and Automation 2013年第4期4卷 371-378页

作者： Shubhashis Kumar Shil Samira Sadaoui Malek Mouhoub Department of Computer Science University of Regina Regina Canada

Winner determination is one of the main challenges in combinatorial auctions. However, not much work has been done to solve this problem in the case of reverse auctions using evolutionary techniques. This has motivated us to propose an improvement of a genetic algorithm based method, we have previously proposed, to address two important issues in the context of combinatorial reverse auctions: determining the winner(s) in a reasonable processing time, and reducing the procurement cost. In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed method in practice, we conduct several experiments on combinatorial reverse auctions instances. The results we report in this paper clearly demonstrate the efficiency of our new method in terms of processing time and procurement cost.

关键词： Winner Determination Combinatorial Reverse auctions Genetic Algorithms

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Procurement auctions with Ex-ante Auctioneer-Bidder Collusion and Endogenous Bribery

Procurement Auctions with Ex-ante Auctioneer-Bidder Collusio...

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中国信息经济学会2012学术年会暨第四届博士生论坛

作者： Huang He,Li Zhipeng

We study three-tier government procurement auctions,in which the auctioneer may collude with one ex-ante favored bidder and the government regulates the auctioneer with a Performance-Based Transfer（PBT）.The favored bidder is permitted by the auctioneer to submit two bids simultaneously in exchange for a bribe that is proportional to the difference between the two *** bribe share is the auctioneer’s decision *** the bribe share is given,the favored bidder adopts a piecewise strategy: he bids honestly if his cost is too high（higher than a threshold） to afford the bribe;he bribes and submits two bids if his cost is too low（lower than another threshold）,but in this case he is so efficient that his optimal strategy is too aggressive to appear natural,so he has to adopt a sub-optimal strategy to conceal the corruption;only when his cost is neither too high nor too low（between the two thresholds）,he can make the most of the privilege of submitting two *** two thresholds are decreasing in the bribe share and are well distinguished from similar thresholds in related *** the corruption,the allocation is inefficient with a positive probability,which implies a reduced expected social *** the corruption probability and the inefficiency probability are decreasing in the bribe *** the bribe share is one,our model simply turns into the standard *** the corruption results in a higher expected price,the government can regulate the auctioneer by imposing a ratio of the exceeding price on the auctioneer as a *** reward scheme is referred to as the PBT *** the PBT scheme,the optimal bribe share for the auctioneer is an increasing function of the PBT *** implies that if the PBT ratio exceeds some threshold,the optimal bribe share will be one,which implies no corruption and full efficiency.

关键词： auctions Ex ante Corruption favoritism Bribe Share Anti-Corruption

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Meeting peak electricity demand through combinatorial reverse auctioning of renewable energy

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Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy 2018年第1期6卷 73-84页

作者： Shubhashis Kumar SHIL Samira SADAOUI Department of Computer Science University of Regina

The option of organizing E-auctions to purchase electricity required for anticipated peak load period is a new one for utility *** meet the extra demand load,we develop electricity combinatorial reverse auction(CRA)for the purpose of procuring power from diverse energy *** this new,smart electricity market,suppliers of different scales can participate,and homeowners may even take an active *** our CRA,an item,which is subject to several trading constraints,denotes a time slot that has two conflicting attributes,electricity quantity and *** secure electricity,we design our auction with two bidding rounds:round one is exclusively for variable energy,and round two allows storage and nonintermittent renewable energy to bid on the remaining *** electricity auction leads to a complex winner determination(WD)task that we represent as a resource procurement optimization *** solve this problem using multi-objective genetic algorithms in order to find the trade-off solution that best lowers the price and increases the *** solution consists of multiple winning suppliers,their prices,quantities and *** validate our WD approach based on large-scale simulated *** first assess the time-efficiency of our WD method,and we then compare it to well-known heuristic and exact WD *** order to gain an exact idea about the accuracy of WD,we implement two famous exact algorithms for our constrained combinatorial procurement problem.

关键词： Renewable energy auctions Combinatorial reverse auctions Electricity auctions Retail markets Winner determination Genetic algorithms Multi-objective optimization

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Economics of eBay’s buyer protection plan

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Financial Innovation 2015年第1期1卷 88-107页

作者： J.Christopher Westland University of Illinois-Chicago 601 S.Morgan StreetUH2400 ChicagoILUSA

Background:This paper explores the financial viability of eBay’s Buyer Protection ***:We explore their warranty model assuming exponential auction listing and claims times,under competing assumptions of Normal(classical portfolio theory)versus Paretian claims(industry practice)distributions using a normative ***’s model viability was analyzed under three risk metrics–mean-variance risk of classic portfolio theory;value at risk used in regulation such as the Basel Accords;and tail value at risk which is preferred by ***:Five main findings of the research are:(1)long-term financial viability is set by boundary conditions that can be managed in eBay’s contract terms,(2)commonly used but simplistic assumptions of Gaussian distributions of contract failures can be misleading,and keeping the Buyer Protection Plan viable demands more realistic distributions,(3)value at risk measures provide more information about viability than expectations,(4)tail value at risk measures an lead to sudden and extreme variations in fund value over the parameter range and flawed contracting decisions,and(5)tail value at risk is the preferable risk measure for assessing Buyer Protection Plan viability,but it needs to be used with an assumption of Lomax contract failures to support profitable ***:Our analysis showed substantial improvements in claims management when tail value at risk measures were used instead of conventional VaR *** implies that current strategies,and prices for coverage may result in losses to eBay,in current practice.

关键词： auctions Insurance Risk E-markets Trust Reputation

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