检索结果-南通市图书馆

adverse selection,loan access and default behavior in the Chilean consumer debt market

Financial Innovation 2023年第1期9卷 1566-1594页

作者： Carlos Madeira Central Bank of Chile SantiagoChile

Why do households use different types of loans?Which factors cause borrowers to default?Using a comprehensive survey dataset from Chile,I estimate a partial information model of consumer debt access,lender choice,loan amount and default.The model consists of a first-stage multinomial logit that explains the choice across the five loan types,plus the options of no access to debt due to credit constraints and a no wish for consumer debt.In the second and third stages,the model assumes a log-linear regression of the debt amount and a logit regression of the default behavior,accounting for the loan type selection probability.Identification is obtained using factors measured at different time periods for the default and the loan type choices.I find that households choose different lenders based on income,education and labor risks.Higher income and education decrease the probability of credit constraints,while increasing bank lending and debt amounts.Unemployment risk and household size increase the chances of all the loan types;however,unemployment decreases the debt amount.Age and wage volatility reduce the probability of all loans.Default decreases with income,education and age,whereas it increases with indebtedness,unemployment,household size,health shocks,and paying previous loans.Counterfactual exercises demonstrate that pension reform,higher requirements for borrowers’capacities,and financial literacy programs could substantially reduce default risk.Financial literacy could greatly reduce arrears,households with credit constraints,the number of debtors and the aggregate debt amounts,especially for non-bank lending.Highlights Chilean borrowers present heterogeneous adverse selection across lender types.No Debt Access decreases with income,age,education,but it increases with risk.Default is associated with income,unemployment,indebtedness and demographics.Paying past loans and health needs are associated with indebtedness and default.Financial literacy programs may be a powerful policy to improve the debt market.

关键词： Consumer credit Default risk Unemployment Financial literacy adverse selection Credit constraints

来源：

维普期刊数据库评论

在线全文

维普期刊数据库

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

A test on adverse selection of farmers in crop insurance:Results from Inner Mongolia,China

引用

Journal of Integrative Agriculture 2017年第2期16卷 478-485页

作者： ZHAO Yuan-feng CHAI Zhi-hui Michael S.Delgado Paul V.Preckel College of Economics and Management Inner Mongolia Agricultural University Department of Agricultural Economics Purdue University

adverse selection is an operating risk of crop insurance. Based on survey data on crop insurance collected by questionnaires in Inner Mongolia, China, the paper uses non-parametric analysis and econometric models to estimate the relationship between conditions for crop production and farmers＇ insurance decision in order to test the existence of farmers＇ adverse selection. The results show farmers＇ adverse selection does exist, but settling a claim by negotiation and premium subsidy from governments at all levels can defuse farmers＇ adverse selection under the current system of crop insurance. Risk regionalization, heterogeneous insurance contract and product innovation may decrease adverse selection to some extent.

关键词： crop insurance farmers adverse selection

来源：

维普期刊数据库

同方期刊数据库评论

在线全文

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

Complimentary return-freight insurance serves the dark side: An innovative online return policy in China

引用

Journal of Management Science and Engineering 2023年第2期8卷 244-257页

作者： Shidao Geng Qingcheng Zeng Feng Liu Wenli Li School of Economics and Management Ningbo University of TechnologyNingbo315211China School of Maritime Economics and Management Dalian Maritime UniversityDalian116026China School of Management Science and Engineering Dongbei University of Finance and EconomicsDalian116025China Department of Management Science and Engineering Dalian University of TechnologyDalian116024China

E-commerce is a typical form of retail digitalization that introduces online uncertainty and product returns.To decrease the negative influence of online uncertainty,the largest Chinese e-commerce company,the Alibaba Group,invited an insurance company to develop return-freight insurance(RFI),a new kind of insurance,to compensate for consumers'losses in the event of online product returns.Complimentary RFl can increase consumer confidence in the retailer and attract more demand.Retailers who offer complimentary RFI demonstrate to consumers that their products and services are too good to incur excessive product returns.However,some low-quality online retailers can mimic competitors'behavior by offering complimentary RFI to consumers.This study aims to introduce an innovative online return policy based on RFI and to explore whether lowquality online retailers would use complimentary RFI as their return strategy to mislead consumers.Using signaling theory,we built a conceptual economic model that includes three exogenous pricing variables:RF,insurance premium,and compensation.These variables play different roles in the model because consumers cannot observe the insurance premium,but the compensation can be.The main finding of this study is that innovative complimentary RFI could be abused by low-type retailers when the premium and compensation are appropriate.Interestingly,compensation plays different roles for retailers with different product values:low-type retailers use complimentary RFI as a noise tool.When the product works for the consumer and the insurance profit is not too high,the compensation for the low-quality product should be larger than that for the highquality product,which is different from conventional wisdom.Although high-type online retailers may use complimentary RFl as a product quality signal,there is still a significant risk that nefarious elements will use it to create product quality noise.

关键词： Return-freight insurance Return policy Noise/signal effect adverse selection

来源：

维普期刊数据库评论

在线全文

维普期刊数据库

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

On the adverse selection of P2P Online Lending Market and Its Governance

On the Adverse Selection of P2P Online Lending Market and It...

引用

作者： ZHOU Geng FAN Conglai WANG Yuwei Nanjing University

Information asymmetry has a negative effect on financing efficiency;financing interest rate can ease the impact of information asymmetry on financing efficiency, while financing term can enhance the impact of information asymmetry on financing efficiency. The credit-keeping borrowers should disclose all information as much as possible. When the information disclosure is frustrated, it can be made up by raising interest rates and shortening the time limits. The investors should resist the temptation of high interest rates and choose the financing projects with well-disclosed information. The P2P intermediary platforms should establish smooth channels for information disclosure and improve the degree of intelligence for automated bidding. The regulators should establish a mandatory information disclosure system and strive to reduce the level of equilibrium interest rates in the markets.

关键词： P2P online lending information asymmetry financing efficiency adverse selection

来源： cnki会议评论

在线全文

cnki会议

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

A Study on‘the Market for Lemons’and the Strategy of‘Unification’in Booking Systems:A Case Study on the FAHSYSU Simulation T System of the Training Center for Clinical Skills of the First Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-sen University

引用

Modern Electronic Technology 2022年第2期6卷 9-16页

作者： Yiyan Dai The First Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-sen University GuangzhouGuangdongChina

Based on the blueprint of the training center for clinical skills of our hospital,this paper discusses the effect of‘the market for lemons’in its booking system from the perspective of economics of information,uses the law of large numbers and the central limit theorem to model to carry out the case study of FAHSYSU Simulation T,and takes measures of offsetting adverse selections to increase booking efficiency.The paper also analyzes how to apply the ancient Chinese theory that man is an integral part of nature to wipe out‘the market for lemons’.

关键词： Information asymmetry The market for lemons Akalov mode adverse selection Tao

来源：

维普期刊数据库评论

在线全文

维普期刊数据库

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

A contract theory analysis to fiscal relations between the central and local governments in China

引用

Economic and Political Studies 2019年第3期7卷 281-313页

作者： Yutaka Suzuki Faculty of Economics Hosei UniversityTokyoJapan

We use a contract theory/mechanism design framework to analyse the fiscal relations and reforms between the central and local governments in China,which are said to have made great contributions to economic growth since the‘economic reform’.First,we present the mechanism(a fiscal incentive contract model),which has created incentives for the development agent(local government),and clarify theoretically how the concept of bao(contract)works.We then comprehend the concept of bisai(contest)within the framework of the yardstick competition between local governments,and review the mechanism which encourages proper information revelation through intergovernmental comparison and competition.Lastly,we make a theoretical comparative analysis on the fiscal system reform(from the fiscal contracting system to the tax sharing system),from the perspective of how much room was left for the‘ratchet effect’in the dynamic relation between the central and local governments,and how it was solved(or mitigated)in the two fiscal systems.

关键词： Fiscal contracting tax sharing adverse selection mechanism design yardstick competition ratchet effect

来源：

维普期刊数据库评论

在线全文

维普期刊数据库

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

The Role of Social Media in Providing Crisis Information in China:A Critical Evaluation of the Tianjin Fire Incident

引用

Journal of Systems Science and Information 2017年第6期8卷 556-570页

作者： Xiangfei LI Kees BOERSMA Institute of Crisis Management Tianjin Polytechnic University Department of Organization Sciences VU University

This paper focusses on the information asymmetry in crisis news after a serious incident in Tianjin, China, in 2015. The incident caused enormous damage and resulted in societal unrest because of the lack of reliable information from the formal media channels. Social media — micro blogs —played a major role in reporting on crisis situations. We divided netizens(i.e., the citizens of the net)into high and low types according to their information-critical level to the crisis news. The data shows information deterioration on the crisis news, related to the netizens’ information-critical level. For the traditional media there is the opportunity to use information quality distortion to make more marginal profits. This is possible only if the citizens’ information stays under a certain quality level. The result is overprovision of low quality news and high quality news driven out of the market, whereupon adverse selection(i.e., a lack of symmetric information) appears. However, by adopting a process view, we found self-correcting mechanism(i.e., dying out of rumors) of the social media communities in China.We provided a agent-base model and simulation to show that the more media exist in the market, the faster speed of the information deterioration, but also the capacity to ‘discuss’ rumors.

关键词： social media in China crisis communication adverse selection deteriorating news self-correcting mechanisms

来源：

维普期刊数据库

同方期刊数据库评论

在线全文

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

灵活就业流动人口参保是逆选择还是被选择?

引用

社会保障制度 2023年第4期

作者：冉晓醒仇雨临

全民覆盖是医保制度迈向高质量发展的基础。灵活就业流动人口的参保行为对制度的全民覆盖产生重要影响。基于2017年流动人口动态监测调查数据，以经济人假设分析灵活就业流动人口的健康风险与医保参保行为之间的关系，探寻该群体参保逆... 详细信息

全民覆盖是医保制度迈向高质量发展的基础。灵活就业流动人口的参保行为对制度的全民覆盖产生重要影响。基于2017年流动人口动态监测调查数据，以经济人假设分析灵活就业流动人口的健康风险与医保参保行为之间的关系，探寻该群体参保逆选择的存在。研究发现：健康风险对灵活就业流动人口参保决策和险种确定均不产生显著影响，逆选择现象不存在。以政治人的视角进一步分析可知：已参保灵活就业流动人口对居民医保的参保险种和户籍地参保明显的偏向性是医疗保险制度人群分割与地域分割关键矛盾的体现，也是受参保缴费和户籍条件限制而被制度选择的结果。因此，当前医保制度的根本任务在于以现实需求为导向完善医保制度供给，消除灵活就业流动人口的参保障碍。

关键词：灵活就业流动人口基本医保逆选择 flexible employment floating population basic medical insurance adverse selection

来源：人大复印报刊资料评论

在线全文

人大复印报刊资料

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

考虑公平偏好的双重信息不对称下PPP项目激励机制研究

引用

管理科学 2022年第3期

作者：王先甲袁睢秋林镇周赵金华秦颖

PPP项目中社会资本的能力禀赋和努力水平为其私有信息，如何激励社会资本显示真实的能力禀赋和努力水平一直是PPP项目治理研究的重要议题。在传统的PPP项目激励治理研究中，往往假设社会资本只具有单一私有信息，由此形成单一的逆向选... 详细信息

PPP项目中社会资本的能力禀赋和努力水平为其私有信息，如何激励社会资本显示真实的能力禀赋和努力水平一直是PPP项目治理研究的重要议题。在传统的PPP项目激励治理研究中，往往假设社会资本只具有单一私有信息，由此形成单一的逆向选择或道德风险问题。但在PPP激励治理现实中，社会资本经常同时拥有关于能力禀赋和努力水平双重私有信息，从而导致关于类型不对称信息的逆向选择和关于行为不对称信息的道德风险问题共存。本文研究了PPP项目中逆向选择和道德风险共存的激励机制设计问题。构建了针对社会资本同时拥有能力禀赋和努力水平两种私有信息的激励机制设计模型。该模型以项目产出绩效为激励途径，通过设计最优契约使得社会资本谎报信息类型的收益水平不高于其真实汇报类型的收益，从而激励社会资本显示真实能力禀赋的同时付出最优努力水平，保证项目效率。同时考虑了社会资本的公平偏好，探讨了公平偏好对这种双重不对称信息激励机制设计的影响。研究表明：通过设计合理的PPP项目激励机制能够实现对社会资本的信息甄别和激励其付出最优努力的双重目的，政府对社会资本的激励强度同社会资本市场分布有关，且随着社会资本嫉妒偏好强度的提高和被指责偏好强度的减弱而增大。本文的研究可以为解决现实中PPP项目的激励机制设计问题提供理论依据和决策参考。

关键词： PPP项目逆向选择道德风险公平偏好　　PPP project adverse selection moral hazard fair preference

来源：人大复印报刊资料评论

在线全文

人大复印报刊资料

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

AN ANALYSIS ON POOR QUALITY OF REAL ESTATE COMMODITY BY INFORMATION ECONOMICS

AN ANALYSIS ON POOR QUALITY OF REAL ESTATE COMMODITY BY INFO...

引用

The 4th International Conference on Management

作者： Chen Jing, Liu Weihua Tianjin Institute of Urban Construction, Tianjin, ChinaWu Yuhua Management Institute of Tianjin University, Tianjin, China

First, this article points out that the inner reason, which caused the poor quality ofreal-estate commodity, is the information asymmetry in trade. Second, the inner mechanism of thepoor quality is analyzed by the use of adverse selection mode. At last, signaling and informationscreening countermeasures are proposed to improve the quality of real estate.

关键词： Quality Asymmetric information adverse selection Signaling Screening

来源： cnki会议评论

在线全文

cnki会议

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

欢迎您,

建议与咨询留下您的常用邮箱和电话号码，以便我们向您反馈解决方案和替代方法

时间限定

文献类型

馆藏选择

核心期刊

语言

文献类型

帮助

文字说明：

检索规则说明：

检索范例：

分类表

所选分类

限定检索结果

文献类型

馆藏范围

日期分布

学科分类号

主题

机构

作者

语言

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

请选择保存的检索档案：

请选择收藏分类：

通借通还

欢迎您,

建议与咨询 留下您的常用邮箱和电话号码，以便我们向您反馈解决方案和替代方法

时间限定

文献类型

馆藏选择

核心期刊

语言

文献类型

帮助

文字说明：

检索规则说明：

检索范例：

分类表

所选分类

限定检索结果

文献类型

馆藏范围

日期分布

学科分类号

主题

机构

作者

语言

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

请选择保存的检索档案： 新增检索档案 确定 取消

请选择收藏分类： 新增自定义分类 确定 取消

通借通还

建议与咨询留下您的常用邮箱和电话号码，以便我们向您反馈解决方案和替代方法

请选择保存的检索档案：

请选择收藏分类：