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Evolutionary dynamics of tax-based strong altruistic reward and punishment in a public goods game

CHINESE PHYSICS B 2024年第9期33卷 247-257页

作者： Yang, Zhi-Hao Yang, Yan-Long Guizhou Univ Math & Stat Sch Guiyang 550025 Peoples R China

In public goods games, punishments and rewards have been shown to be effective mechanisms for maintaining individual cooperation. However, punishments and rewards are costly to incentivize cooperation. Therefore, the generation of costly penalties and rewards has been a complex problem in promoting the development of cooperation. In real society, specialized institutions exist to punish evil people or reward good people by collecting taxes. We propose a strong altruistic punishment or reward strategy in the public goods game through this phenomenon. Through theoretical analysis and numerical calculation, we can get that tax-based strong altruistic punishment (reward) has more evolutionary advantages than traditional strong altruistic punishment (reward) in maintaining cooperation and tax-based strong altruistic reward leads to a higher level of cooperation than tax-based strong altruistic punishment.

关键词： evolutionary game theory strong altruism punishment reward 02.50.Le 05.45.Pq 02.60.cb COOPERATION CARROT STICK

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Effect of distribution of fines on evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game

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CHINESE PHYSICS B 2024年第9期33卷 239-245页

作者： Sun, Xing-Ping Bi, Yan-Zheng Kang, Hong-Wei Shen, Yong Chen, Qing-Yi Yunnan Univ Sch Software Kunming 650000 Peoples R China

In the realm of public goods game, punishment, as a potent tool, stands out for fostering cooperation. While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem, the associated costs can be substantial. Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions, while defectors face fines. Unfortunately, these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air, representing a loss to the system itself. However, by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers, not only can we mitigate this loss, but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced. Based upon this premise, this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model. Under identical parameter settings, by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model, the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game. The experimental results clearly demonstrate that, in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high, the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse. However, the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies, thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation, even in the face of substantial punishment cost.

关键词： public goods game fine distribution cooperation 02.50.Le 02.50.Ng 02.60.cb 02.70.Uu REPLICATOR DYNAMICS PUNISHMENT REWARDS INVESTMENT ALLOCATION PROVISION SANCTIONS EMERGENCE MECHANISM

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Strip method to construct a two-dimensional quasilattice with eight-fold symmetry

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CHINESE PHYSICS B 2024年第9期33卷 462-465页

作者： Huang, Weishen Fu, Xiujun South China Univ Technol Sch Phys & Optoelect Guangzhou 510640 Peoples R China

Based on the substitution rule and symmetry, we propose a method to generate an octagonal quasilattice consisting of square and rhombus tiles. Local configurations and Ammann lines are used to guide the growth of the tiles in a quasiperiodic order. The structure obtained is a perfect eight-fold symmetric quasilattice, which is confirmed by the radial distribution function and the diffraction pattern.

关键词： quasicrystals eight-fold symmetry Ammann-Beenker tiling 61.44.Br 61.50.Ah 02.60.cb CRYSTALS TILINGS

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