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Opinion Dynamics in Two-Layer Networks with Hypocrisy

Journal of the Operations Research Society of China 2024年第1期12卷 109-132页

作者： Chi Zhao elena parilina Saint Petersburg State University Saint Petersburg199034Russia Qingdao University School of Mathematics and StatisticsQingdao 266071ShandongChina

We propose a general concealed voter model(GCVM),in which individuals interact in two layers and can exchange their opinions in the internal *** interaction is not allowed in a *** exchanging opinions in the internal layer,we mean that individuals share their real or internal opinions with their close *** process of opinion formation in GCVM is presented in the *** make the series of numerical simulations of GCVM with different network structures(both external and internal)and get some counterintuitive *** instance,we find out that sometimes with a relatively simple network structure of an external layer the consensus within the individuals’opinions cannot be reached,and if individuals in the network are not good at expressing their opinions publicly(in an external layer),exchanging opinions with their close friends(in an internal layer)is almost useless.

关键词： Opinion dynamics Voter model Concealed voter model General concealed voter model

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Strong Subgame Consistency of the Core in Stochastic Network Formation Games

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Journal of the Operations Research Society of China 2024年第1期12卷 189-213页

作者： Ping Sun elena parilina Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes Saint Petersburg State UniversitySaint Petersburg199034Russia

We consider a model of network formation as a stochastic game with random duration proposed initially in Sun and parilina(Autom Remote Control 82(6):1065–1082,2021).In the model,the leader first suggests a joint project to other players,i.e.,the network connecting ***,the players are allowed to form fresh links with each other updating the initially proposed *** stage payoff of any player is defined depending on the network *** are two types of randomness in the network formation process:(i)links may fail to be formed with different probabilities although players intend to establish them,(ii)the game process may terminate at any stage or transit to the next stage with a certain probability ***,a network is formed as a result of players’decisions and realization of random *** cooperative version of the stochastic game is *** particular,we examine the properties of subgame consistency as well as strong subgame consistency of the *** provide a payment mechanism or regularization of the core elements to sustain its subgame consistency and avoid the player’s deviations from the cooperative *** addition,the distribution procedure of the core elements is regularized in case there are negative payments to achieve only nonnegative payments to the players at any *** sufficient condition of a strongly subgame consistent core is also *** illustrate our theoretical results with a numerical example.

关键词： Stochastic game Network formation Core Strong subgame consistency

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A Game-theoretic Approach to Resource Sharing Management

A Game-theoretic Approach to Resource Sharing Management

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The Second International Conference on Game Theory and Applications (CMGTA’2007)

作者： elena parilina Department of Mathematical Game Theory and Statistical Decisions Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes Saint-Petersburg State UniversityUniversitetskii prospekt35PeterhofSaint-Petersburg198504Russia

＜正＞This work deals with the situation when some firms（players） working on a market of the same product or services and which have to incur the similar *** organize the network to save their money on these expenses using the resources of other *** problem is modelled as a cooperative game with transferable *** game is called the cooperative game of expenses *** game where the firms enter the market one after another is *** the first two stages the strategies of the firms are the choices of the number *** resource units that they share in this *** two stages the firms cooperate in the network in this area and allocate their expenses using an imputation received in the cooperative game of expenses allocation.

关键词： cooperative games Shapley Value subgame perfect equilibrium.

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