检索结果-南通市图书馆

Wholesale Pricing and Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in Duopoly Supply chains with Social Responsibility

Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering 2019年第1期28卷 110-125页

作者： caichun chai Tiaojun Xiao Institute of Game Behavior and Operations Management School of Management Science and Engineering Nanjing University of Finance and Economics Nanjing 210023 China School of Management and Engineering Nanjing University Nanjing 210093 China

This paper analyzes manufacturers’ wholesale price decisions and the evolutionarily stable strategies of the retailers’ marketing behavior in duopoly supply chains, where each chain consists of one manufacturer and many retailers. Each retailer chooses one of two marketing strategies: social responsibility or non-social responsibility (i.e., a firm only cares about the benefits of its shareholders). We identify the conditions under which a strategy profile is evolutionarily stable. Furthermore, we investigate the manufacturers’ wholesale prices and find the following:(i) the retailer’s social responsibility decreases the unit wholesale price;(ii) when the degree of the retailer’s social responsibility is medium, the social responsibility of the retailer in a supply chain increases the profit of the retailer’s own manufacturer and decreases the profit of the rival’s manufacturer;otherwise, it decreases the profits of the two manufacturers;and (iii) when each retailer exhibits its social responsibility moderately, a triple-win situation can be achieved.

关键词： Evolutionarily stable strategy replicator dynamics social responsibility supply chain management

来源：

维普期刊数据库评论

在线全文

维普期刊数据库

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

Evolutionary Stable Strategies for Supply chains: Selfishness,Fairness, and Altruism

引用

Journal of Systems Science and Information 2018年第6期9卷 532-551页

作者： caichun chai Hailong ZHU Zhangwei FENG Institute of Game Behavior and Operations Management Nanjing University of Finance and Economics Institute of Applied Mathematics Anhui University of Finance and Economics School of Engineering and Management Nanjing University

The management strategies of a firm are inevitable affected by individual behavior preferences. The effect of individual preference on the evolutionary dynamics for supply chains is studied by employing replicator dynamics. Each firm has three behavior preferences: selfishness, fairness, and altruism. Firstly, the case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers including two pure strategies is considered and the effect of preference parameter on the equilibrium outcome in the shortterm interaction is discussed. Secondly, the equilibrium state in the short-term is always disturbed because the change of the environment, firm’s structure, and so forth. Using the replicator dynamics,the evolutionary stable strategies of manufacturers and retailers in the long-term interaction are analyzed. Finally, the extend case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers include three pure strategies is investigated. These results are found that the strategy profile in which both manufacturer and retailer choose fairness or altruism, or one player chooses fair or altruistic strategy and the other player chooses selfish strategy may be evolutionary stable, the stability of these equilibria depends on the the preference parameters.

关键词： stability evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium preference

来源：

维普期刊数据库

同方期刊数据库评论

在线全文

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

一类多菌株STD模型的共存性(英文)

引用

应用数学 2011年第3期24卷 519-526页

作者：柴彩春蒋继发安徽财经大学统计与应用数学学院应用数学研究所安徽蚌埠233030 上海师范大学数理学院上海200092

我们已经研究过一类拥有两种菌株的异性传播的性传染病模型.得到了边界平衡点稳定的充要条件,并确认在边界平衡点的稳定性和正平衡点的存在性之间存在着很强的联系.但是只给出了特殊条件下正平衡点稳定的充要条件,这篇文章将就以前没解... 详细信息

我们已经研究过一类拥有两种菌株的异性传播的性传染病模型.得到了边界平衡点稳定的充要条件,并确认在边界平衡点的稳定性和正平衡点的存在性之间存在着很强的联系.但是只给出了特殊条件下正平衡点稳定的充要条件,这篇文章将就以前没解决的问题,对这类模型给出完整的分析.

关键词：性传播疾病病原体菌株共存

来源：

维普期刊数据库

同方期刊数据库评论

在线全文

学校读者我要写书评

暂无评论

欢迎您,

建议与咨询留下您的常用邮箱和电话号码，以便我们向您反馈解决方案和替代方法

时间限定

文献类型

馆藏选择

核心期刊

语言

文献类型

帮助

文字说明：

检索规则说明：

检索范例：

分类表

所选分类

限定检索结果

文献类型

馆藏范围

日期分布

学科分类号

主题

机构

作者

语言

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

请选择保存的检索档案：

请选择收藏分类：

通借通还

欢迎您,

建议与咨询 留下您的常用邮箱和电话号码，以便我们向您反馈解决方案和替代方法

时间限定

文献类型

馆藏选择

核心期刊

语言

文献类型

帮助

文字说明：

检索规则说明：

检索范例：

分类表

所选分类

限定检索结果

文献类型

馆藏范围

日期分布

学科分类号

主题

机构

作者

语言

在线全文

在线全文

在线全文

请选择保存的检索档案： 新增检索档案 确定 取消

请选择收藏分类： 新增自定义分类 确定 取消

通借通还

建议与咨询留下您的常用邮箱和电话号码，以便我们向您反馈解决方案和替代方法

请选择保存的检索档案：

请选择收藏分类：