Impact of Entry of Online Switching-Referral Platforms:An Economic Analysis

会议名称：《第十六届（2021）中国管理学年会》

会议日期：2021年

学科分类：12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 

关 键 词：online platforms entry switching referral consumer switching firm enrollment competition pricing game theory 

摘      要：Many consumers do not carry the product that gives them higher value due to their unawareness of this choice for some product categories（e.g.,mobile phone plans,credit cards and insurance）.Recently,a new type of online platforms has entered the market,and consumers can switch to high-value products with their free switching-referral ***,the switching choices are restricted to only the rms enrolled with the *** study entry of such an online switching-referral platform on consumer surplus and rm prot,using an analytical model that captures both enrollment interaction between the platform and rms and product switch of consumersthe two intertwining characteristics that dierentiate this platform from *** nd that when many uninformed consumers are not matched with high-value products ex ante,consumer surplus is lower（higher） if the platform can help more（fewer） of them switch to these ***,we show that the platform prefers a non-exclusive contract that enrolls all rms and thus is able to facilitate more consumer *** the other hand,enrolling with the platform is a dominant strategy for the rms;however,they may consequently realize less prot although their products being better matched to more consumers makes them set higher ***,we also demonstrate that either a low cost of reaching uninformed consumers by the platform or a low switching cost of consumers may hurt both consumers and rms after entry of the *** also discuss the eect of oering multiple products by rms and an alternative contract form between the platform and rms.