Optimized Antidumping Duty Rate under Cournot Mode and Its’ Signaling Game Analysis
作者单位：Business School of Central South University
会议名称：《第三届（2008）中国管理学年会——会计分会场》
会议日期：2008年
学科分类：02[经济学] 0202[经济学-应用经济学] 020206[经济学-国际贸易学] 07[理学] 070104[理学-应用数学] 0701[理学-数学]
基 金：national natural science foundation project of china(No:70772039) 2006 layout project of Social sciences and humanities of educational ministry(No:06JA790114) 2008 social sciences and humanities emphases supported project of central south of china
关 键 词：Signaling game Cournot mode optimal antidumping duty rate
摘 要：We analyzed the optimal antidumping duty rate in the condition of oligarch Competition with Cournot mode. We conclude the elements influence the optimal antidumping duty rate are demand elasticity of consumer and marginal cost of foreign company when the domestic and foreign company make decision in the same time. As this game is essentially a signaling game, so we constructed a signaling game matrix to analyze the optimal strategy selection between foreign company and importing government. We conclude the Nash equilibrium will form with the importing government taking the single antidumping duty rate and the low cost company disguising to be the high cost company when the signaling disguise cost is comparatively low. When the signaling disguise cost is enough high, the company will give up disguise and the discriminate antidumping duty rate can ensure the optimal national welfare.