Shapley Value for Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalition

作     者：于晓辉 张强 

作者机构：School of Management and Economics Beijing Institute of Technology 

出 版 物：《Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology》 (北京理工大学学报（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2008年第17卷第2期

页      面：249-252页

核心收录：

学科分类：12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 07[理学] 070104[理学-应用数学] 070105[理学-运筹学与控制论] 0701[理学-数学] 

基　　金：the National Natural Science Foundation of China(70771010) the Second Phase of"985 Project"of China (107008200400024) the Graduate Student s Science and Technology Innovation Project of Beijing Institute of Technology (GB200818) 

主　　题：cooperative game fuzzy cooperative game Shapley value λ-fuzzy measure Choquet integral 

摘      要：Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on conventional Shapley value. This kind of fuzzy cooperative games admit the representation of rates of players＇ participation to each coalition. And they can be applicable to both supperadditive and subadditvie cooperative games while other kinds of fuzzy cooperative games can only be superadditive. An explicit form of the Shapley function on fuzzy games with λ-fuzzy measure was also proposed.