ELAID:detecting integer-Overflow-to-Buffer-Overflow vulnerabilities by light-weight and accurate static analysis
作者机构:Institute of Information EngineeringChinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina School of Cyber SecurityUniversity of Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
出 版 物:《Cybersecurity》 (网络空间安全科学与技术(英文))
年 卷 期:2018年第1卷第1期
页 面:860-878页
核心收录:
学科分类:07[理学] 0701[理学-数学] 070101[理学-基础数学]
基 金:supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.61802394,U1836209) Foundation of Science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory(No.KJ-17-110) National Key Research and Development Program of China(2016QY071405) Strategic Priority Research Program of the CAS(XDC02040100,XDC02030200,XDC02020200)
主 题:Integer-Overflow-to-Buffer-Overflow(IO2BO)vulnerability Inter-procedural dataflow analysis Taint analysis Path satisfiability
摘 要:The Integer-Overflow-to-Buffer-Overflow(IO2BO)vulnerability has been widely exploited by attackers to cause severe damages to computer *** identifying this kind of vulnerability is critical for software *** many works have been done to mitigate integer overflow,existing tools either report large number of false positives or introduce unacceptable time *** address this problem,in this article we present a static analysis *** first constructs an inter-procedural call graph and utilizes taint analysis to accurately identify potential IO2BO *** it uses a light-weight method to further filter out false ***,it generates constraints representing the conditions under which a potential IO2BO vulnerability can be triggered,and feeds the constraints to SMT solver to decide their *** have implemented a prototype system ELAID based on LLVM,and evaluated it on 228 programs of the NIST’s SAMATE Juliet test suite and 14 known IO2BO vulnerabilities in real *** experiment results show that our system can effectively and efficiently detect all known IO2BO vulnerabilities.