An economic analysis of Iranian petroleum contract

作     者：Fazel M.Farimani Xiaoyi Mu Hamed Sahebhonar Ali Taherifard Fazel M.Farimani;Xiaoyi Mu;Hamed Sahebhonar;Ali Taherifard

作者机构：Sharif Policy Research InstituteSharif University of TechnologyTehranIran Center for EnergyPetroleum Mineral Law and PolicyUniversity of DundeeDundeeUK Sobhan Institute for Energy StudiesTehranIran Sobhan Institute for Energy StudiesImam Sadiq UniversityTehranIran 

出 版 物：《Petroleum Science》 (石油科学（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2020年第17卷第5期

页      面：1451-1461页

核心收录：

学科分类：0202[经济学-应用经济学] 02[经济学] 020205[经济学-产业经济学] 

主　　题：Iranian petroleum contract(IPC) Fiscal regime Government take Progressive Petroleum rent 

摘      要：Following three generations of buyback contracts,the new model of Iranian petroleum contracts(IPC) was introduced by the Iranian cabinet to incentivize investments in the *** paper analyzes the fiscal terms of the contract with technical information from one of the candidate fields for *** financial simulation shows that,in general,the IPC resembles more a service contract than a production sharing contract as the contractor s take is relatively low—below 5% across different scenarios of crude oil ***,the IPC is progressive in that as the overall profitability of the project improves the government takes an increasing share of the economic *** results are confirmed in a sensitivity analysis of each party s profitability and takes on oil price,CAPEX,OPEX and the fee.