NASH EQUILIBRIA WITHOUT CONTINUITY OF THE CHOICE RULES

作     者：José C. R. Alcantud 

作者机构：Facultad de Economía y Empresa Universidad de Salamanca Campus Miguel de Unamuno E 37007 Salamanca 

出 版 物：《Acta Mathematica Scientia》 (数学物理学报（B辑英文版）)

年 卷 期：2011年第31卷第4期

页      面：1535-1540页

核心收录：

学科分类：12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 07[理学] 070105[理学-运筹学与控制论] 0701[理学-数学] 

基　　金：supported by Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación under Research Project ECO2009-07682 Junta de Castilla y León under the Research Project SA024A08 GR-99 Funding 

主　　题：Nash equilibrium choice rules continuity Kakutani’s theorem 

摘      要：The proposal in Alcantud and Alo′s-Ferrer [1], where players that express their tastes according to choice rules facing a competitive situation, is further exploited here. We prove that, under lack of continuity of the choice rules it is also possible to ensure the existence of equilibrium. We shall appeal to general situations that are fulfilled by well-established models, where players have non-transitive preferences of various types.