Strategic Interaction in Spending on Environmental Protection:Spatial Evidence from Chinese Cities

作     者：Huihui Deng Xinye Zheng Nan Huang Fanghua Li 

作者机构：Institute of International EconomyUniversity of International Business and Economics School of EconomicsRenmin University of China Department of EconomicsUniversity of California 

出 版 物：《China & World Economy》 (中国与世界经济（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2012年第20卷第5期

页      面：103-120页

核心收录：

学科分类：12[管理学] 1204[管理学-公共管理] 

基　　金：supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities the Research Funds of Renmin University of China (11XNL009) 

主　　题：environmental protection spatial econometrics strategic interaction 

摘      要：In China, the responsibilitY of protecting the environment lies largely with local governments. Within the framework of spatial econometrics, we investigate empirically the consequence of such an institutional setting. Using city-level data for China, the present study finds that city governments behave strategically in making spending decisions regarding environmental protection. This paper finds that a city government appears to cut its own spending as a response to the rise in environmental protection spending by its neighbors. Hence, environmental protection tends to be underprovided. As a result, we suggest that centralizing the environmental protection responsibility to a higher level of government would be beneficial in terms of controlling pollution in China.