Cryptanalysis of One Fair E-cash System
Cryptanalysis of One Fair E-cash System作者机构:Dept.of MathematicsShanghai Jiaotong Univ.Shanghai 200240 ChinaDept. of Information and Computation Science Shanghai Maritime UniversityShanghai 200135 Dept.of MathematicsShanghai Jiaotong Univ. Shanghai 200240 China
出 版 物:《Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong university(Science)》 (上海交通大学学报(英文版))
年 卷 期:2006年第11卷第3期
页 面:389-393页
核心收录:
学科分类:07[理学] 070104[理学-应用数学] 0701[理学-数学]
主 题:cryptanalysis group signature fair e-cash system forgeability
摘 要:The security of Canard-Traore fair e-cash system scheme was believed to depend on the strong-RSA assumption and the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption in groups of unknown order. But it is not the case. The cryptanalysis on Canard-Traore fair e-cash system was presented. An algorithm was designed to show that Canard-Traore fair e-cash system is insecure: It is forgeability. Further, two drawbacks on Canard-Traore fair e-cash system scheme were pointed out. One is that those integer intervals for si(i=1,…,9) are unappropriate. The other is that the datum s3 in signature data is redundant. Moreover, a minute description of the technique to shun the challenge in the scheme was presented. The technique is helpful for designing new group signature schemes in the future.