Corporate fraud and bank loans:Evidence from china
Corporate fraud and bank loans:Evidence from china作者机构：School of AccountancyCentral University of Finance and EconomicsNo.39Haidian South District School of Economics and Business AdministrationBeijing Normal University
出 版 物：《China Journal of Accounting Research》 (中国会计学刊（英文版）)
年 卷 期：2011年第4卷第3期
页 面：155-165页
学科分类：02[经济学] 0202[经济学-应用经济学] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 020204[经济学-金融学（含∶保险学）]
基 金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Project No.70772017) Scholarship Award for Excellent Doctoral Student granted by Ministry of Education grants from the Beijing Municipal Commission of Education"Joint Construction Project" the"Project 211"(Phase-3)Fund of the Central University of Finance and Economics,China
主 题：Corporate fraud Bank loans Credit risk Information
摘 要：Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank,as both the firm s credit risk and information risk increase after punishment By focusing on Chinese firms borrowing behavior after events of corporate fraud,we find that firms bank loans after punishment are not only significantly lower,but are also less than those for non-fraudulent firms.In addition,loan interest rates after punishment are not only higher than before,but also higher than those for their non-fraudulent counterparts.In addition,we find that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes theperformance-bank loanrelationship.Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively affects a firm s ability to source debt financing,which provides new evidence about the economic consequences of fraud.
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