R & D STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN AN ASYMMETRICAL CASE

作     者：Minggao XUE Pu GONG Minggao XUE Pu GONG Department of Finance,College of Management,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China.Email:xmgwt@hust.edu.cn.

作者机构：Department of Finance College of Management Huazhong University of Science and Technology Wuhan 430074 China. 

出 版 物：《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》 (系统科学与复杂性学报（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2006年第19卷第4期

页      面：547-557页

核心收录：

学科分类：0711[理学-系统科学] 12[管理学] 1201[管理学-管理科学与工程(可授管理学、工学学位)] 07[理学] 08[工学] 0811[工学-控制科学与工程] 081103[工学-系统工程] 

基　　金：This work is supported by Post Doctor Science Foundation of China(2003034479) Natural Science Foundation of China(70671047) 

主　　题：Asymmetric information optimal investment threshold value option game preemption the mixed investment strategy. 

摘      要：This article analyzes R ＆ D investment decisions in an asymmetrical case. The investment decisions share three important characteristics. First, the investment is completely irreversible. Second, there are two kinds of uncertainties over the future returns from the investment and over technology in R ＆ D process, respectively. Third, there is strategic competition in the asymmetrical case. This article presents the optimal investment threshold values and the optimal investment rule of high-efficient firm （leader）, and shows that the investment threshold values are reduced by competition of two firms. Finally, the mixed investment strategies for two firms, the probability that each firm separately exercises the option to invest, and the probability that two firms simultaneously exercise the option are given in the paper.