Factors for wireless operators'collusion and competition

作     者：WEN Dan-hui CHEN Rong-bang LU Ting-jie 

作者机构：School of Economics and Management Tsinghua UniversityBeijing 100084 China School of Higher Vocational Education Henan Polytechnic UniversityJiaozuo 454000 China School of Economics and Management Science Beijing University of Posts andTelecommunications Beijing 100876 China 

出 版 物：《The Journal of China Universities of Posts and Telecommunications》 (中国邮电高校学报（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2007年第14卷第1期

页      面：61-64页

核心收录：

学科分类：080904[工学-电磁场与微波技术] 0810[工学-信息与通信工程] 0202[经济学-应用经济学] 02[经济学] 020205[经济学-产业经济学] 0809[工学-电子科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 08[工学] 080402[工学-测试计量技术及仪器] 0804[工学-仪器科学与技术] 081001[工学-通信与信息系统] 

主　　题：chum rate wireless communication collusion,market asymmetries cost asymmetries product differentiation 

摘      要：This article analyses on why China Mobile and China Unicom have chosen price war rather than tacit collusion these years. On the basis of the analysis on factors that influence tacit collusion, and combined with the facts of wireless communication market, the author suggests that the market asymmetries, cost asymmetries, and product differentiation are the basic factors, which trigger price competition between the Chinese wireless operators. By constructing a game model based on Chum rate, this article discusses how these factors cause a fight between the operators and how vigorous the price competition will be. At last, the author suggests that to keep vigor in this industry, continuous structural adjustment is essential. Besides, the number portability policies may cause tacit collusion.