Village Elections,Accountability and Income Distribution in Rural China

作     者：Yang Yao 

作者机构：China Center for Economic Research Beijing University Beijing China 

出 版 物：《China & World Economy》 (中国与世界经济(英文版))

年 卷 期：2006年第14卷第6期

页      面：20-38页

核心收录：

学科分类：120301[管理学-农业经济管理] 12[管理学] 0202[经济学-应用经济学] 1203[管理学-农林经济管理] 0302[法学-政治学] 03[法学] 1202[管理学-工商管理] 0201[经济学-理论经济学] 0701[理学-数学] 

基　　金：the financial support from the Chinese Medical Board and the National 211 Projects Fund and thank the excellent data collection efforts provided by the Research Center of Rural Economy the Ministry of Agriculture China 

主　　题：rural China income distribution village governance 

摘      要：China has experimented with village elections for nearly 20 years. Using village and household survey data collected from 48 villages of 8 Chinese provinces for the period 1986-2002, this paper studies how the introduction of elections affects village governance and income distribution in Chinese villages. The econometric analysis finds the following outcomes. First, village elections have increased the share of public expenditure and reduced the share of administrative expenditure in the village budget, so the accountability of the elected village committee has been enhanced. Second, elections have not led to more income redistribution; instead, they have reduced the progressiveness of income redistribution. Third, elections have reduced income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient in villages. The reduction is equivalent to 5.7 percent of the sample average, or 32 percent of the growth of the Gini coefficient in the period of 1987-2002. Because village elections have not led to more income redistribution, this positive effect must have come from more public investment, which benefits the poor more than wealthier people. The general conclusion that we draw from our results is that, despite institutional constraints, village elections have improved village governance and the life of villagers.