Towards Risk Evaluation of Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities in Security Protocols

作     者：曹振 关志 陈钟 Member, IEEE 胡建斌 唐礼勇 

作者机构：China Mobile Research Institute Beijing 100053 China School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science Peking University Beijing 100871 China Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies Ministry of Education Beijing 100871 China 

出 版 物：《Journal of Computer Science & Technology》 (计算机科学技术学报（英文版）)

年 卷 期：2010年第25卷第2期

页      面：375-386,F0003页

核心收录：

学科分类：0808[工学-电气工程] 0839[工学-网络空间安全] 08[工学] 0835[工学-软件工程] 0701[理学-数学] 0811[工学-控制科学与工程] 0812[工学-计算机科学与技术（可授工学、理学学位）] 

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.60873239 

主　　题：risk evaluation Denial-of-Service (DOS) Value-at-Risk (VaR) 

摘      要：Denial-of-Service （DOS） attacks are virulent to both computer and networked systems. Modeling and evaluating DoS attacks are very important issues to networked systems; they provide both mathematical foundations and theoretic guidelines to security system design. As defense against DoS has been built more and more into security protocols, this paper studies how to evaluate the risk of DoS in security protocols. First, we build a formal framework to model protocol operations and attacker capabilities. Then we propose an economic model for the risk evaluation. By characterizing the intruder capability with a probability model, our risk evaluation model specifies the ＂Value-at-Risk＂ （VaR） for the security protocols. Tile ＂Value-at-Risk＂ represents how much computing resources are expected to lose with a given level of confidence. The proposed model can help users to have a better understanding of the protocols they are using, and in the meantime help designers to examine their designs and get clues of improvement. Finally we apply the proposed model to analyze a key agreement protocol used in sensor networks and identify a DoS flaw there, and we also validate the applicability and effectiveness of our risk evaluation model by applying it to analyze and compare two public key authentication protocols.